Doug Henwood wrote:
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> And why did the ruling class worry about Vietnam syndrome for so long?
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The key point was that the army stopped fighting, and it was quite a few years before the U.S. even _had_ an army again. Nothing scares a general like not having an army.
So I guess the question to be answered, or the fact to be explained, is why the army stopped fighting -- what complex of events led to that climactic breakdown of the U.S. military.
Civilian protest undoubtedly was an important factor, though I would not care to estimate its precise weight. Stan Goff's anecdote can be misleading in this way: it focuses on a single moment. Things are a bit different after several years of mounting casualties. There was, incidentally, a higher desertion rate in WW 2 than in Vietnam -- so desertions are not a major factor. But then in WW 2 no one helped a sailor desert, then boasted about it, as I did in 1967. (I started him on the road to Sweden, and later helped him turn himself in after the war. He was not political -- just didn't like the service.) So desertions would not have spoken as loudly in WW 2 as in the Vietnam war.
If 5-10% of the Iraqi population remains actively hostile, and 30% plus are friendly to that smaller number, and even more are indifferent, life will become very unpleasant for an occupying army in Iraq. And that army will itself become increasingly mean.
And how will people in the u.s. respond to 3-10 casualties a month, month after month, year after year?
Carrol
> Doug