POW's

[Mark Bennett]

I believe Carrol's analysis is accurate.  The soldiers' revolt did much more
to end the Vietnam war than the "vocal opposition" of the anti-war movement,
which was effective primarily to the extent that it helped radicalize the
G.I.s.  This revolt was not merely negative, consisting of a large part of
the army in the field refusing to fight.  It was also had its, shall we say,
positive aspect, in that many of the grunts conveyed the unmistakable
message to the officer class that they would be shot if they tried to make
the grunts fight.  And they were.  By some estimates up to 25% of all
officer "combat" deaths were the result of fragging and assassination -  a
staggering percentage.  This is what scared the hell out of the
administration and the brass, and brought the war to a belated conclusion:
the specter of an insubordinate, armed, and hostile army.

A similar specter haunted the ruling class stateside.  Johnson, Nixon, et
al. never feared Woodstock Nation; they feared the people who burned down
Watts, Detroit, and Newark, and who fought Daly's goons in the streets of
Chicago.  The ruling class genuinely feared a violent civil insurrection,
which would have to be suppressed with an unreliable military - not an
inviting prospect.  In other words, it was both the reality and threat of
revolutionary violence, not the vocal opposition of the anti-war movement,
that brought the Vietnam war to an end, and which coerced temporary
accommodations from the bourgeoisie.  The same is true today.  Hundreds of
thousands of people can take to the streets to denounce the Bush junta as
war criminals, but as long as they limit their protests to shouting slogans,
carrying signs,  and engaging in harmless agitprop, the junta is safe and it
can disregard the protests.  As we have seen.

-----Original Message-----
From: Carrol Cox [mailto:cbcox at ilstu.edu] 
Sent: Monday, March 24, 2003 1:05 PM
To: lbo-talk at lists.panix.com
Subject: Re: POW's

Doug Henwood wrote:
> 
> > 
> And why did the ruling class worry about Vietnam syndrome for so long?
> 

The key point was that the army stopped fighting, and it was quite a few
years before the U.S. even _had_ an army again. Nothing scares a general
like not having an army.

So I guess the question to be answered, or the fact to be explained, is why
the army stopped fighting -- what complex of events led to that climactic
breakdown of the U.S. military.

Civilian protest undoubtedly was an important factor, though I would not
care to estimate its precise weight. Stan Goff's anecdote can be misleading
in this way: it focuses on a single moment. Things are a bit different after
several years of mounting casualties. There was, incidentally, a higher
desertion rate in WW 2 than in Vietnam -- so desertions are not a major
factor. But then in WW 2 no one helped a sailor desert, then boasted about
it, as I did in 1967. (I started him on the road to Sweden, and later helped
him turn himself in after the war. He was not political -- just didn't like
the service.) So desertions would not have spoken as loudly in WW 2 as in
the Vietnam war.

If 5-10% of the Iraqi population remains actively hostile, and 30% plus are
friendly to that smaller number, and even more are indifferent, life will
become very unpleasant for an occupying army in Iraq. And that army will
itself become increasingly mean.

And how will people in the u.s. respond to 3-10 casualties a month, month
after month, year after year?

Carrol


> Doug