This was written before the referendum. Putin actually did wind up making an address of the type suggested by Bruce Ware.
The stalemate in Chechnya has reached a crucial turning point and will now begin changing in response to accumulating pressures on all sides.
Since 2001, international funding for Chechen militants has been reduced, while their Georgian sanctuaries have been eliminated. Russian public support for the conflict has declined.
As President Vladimir Putin's political agenda has broadened and deepened, the stalemate in Chechnya can only appear as a drain on precious resources. In view of these mounting pressures, it is not surprising that Putin is now placing greater pressure upon the Chechen population by proceeding with a constitutional referendum.
While the referendum is flawed, critics are missing the point. Over the next five to 10 years, a new Chechen social order will slowly crystallize, and new Chechen elites will gradually emerge around an economy that will develop with the establishment of new administration, and the consequent expansion of federal subsidies for Chechen reconstruction and economic development.
Subsequent budgetary transfers and humanitarian aid will follow patterns of top-down economic flow that will coalesce around the new administration and gradually consolidate its authority.
Sidelining radicals
This new order will marginalize Chechen radicals and promote Chechen pragmatists and moderates. New groups of Chechen elites are already emerging in Chechnya and among the Chechen diaspora in Moscow.
Some of these are more pragmatic, more focused upon preconditions for legitimate economic development and more suspicious of radicalism than were their predecessors. The consolidation of this new order may be the best hope for long-term stability in Chechnya.
It would be beneficial for the new Chechen administration to autonomously and genuinely reflect the interests and needs of all of the people of Chechnya. Yet the patterns of economic flow that follow the establishment of a new administration will shape the development of new interests and needs in the republic.
The precise formation of these patterns will be difficult for anyone to anticipate or control since they will be subject to corruption. Indeed, current regional economic patterns favor the perpetuation of the war.
All of this will moderate the economic leverage that Moscow might apply toward the stabilization of Chechen society, and to mandate a shift in Moscow's political leverage.
If one wishes to win the allegiance of people, then one should take care of their children. In order to achieve their objectives in the region, Russian officials must promote human rights, health care, education and economic development in Chechnya. Genuine power and authority must be transferred to Chechen officials.
To minimize attacks on federal troops, and to minimize abuse of noncombatants, federal troops must be strictly garrisoned at all times except during immediate crisis, when they could carefully manage the situation.
In the past, many Chechens and other Caucasian people lived and worked in Russian cities to the north. The earnings they sent home supported extended Caucasian families, contributed to local economies and helped stablize the region.
Harassment
However, in recent years, anti-Caucasian prejudices and harassment have driven many of these workers south, where their presence has added to unemployment and instability in the mountains.
The conflict in Chechnya and related terrorist incidents have amplified prejudice and increased harassment, contributing to a self-perpetuating cycle of violence and instability. Anti-Caucasian prejudice and harassment are severely contrary to Russian interests.
The best opportunities for mediation of the conflict may involve regional leaders, especially those in Muslim North Caucasian republics. Local mediators might make multiple contacts on the Chechen side. This would be an advantage since many Chechen commanders will have to be approached individually, due to the chronic fragmentation of militant forces.
The general strategy should be to settle individually with those Chechen militant leaders who are open to settlement, to further isolate those who are not.
Finally, Putin should make a direct and public appeal to the people of Chechnya. He should begin by calling upon them to consider their current situation and what their decade of struggle has brought them.
Expressing regret
He should express both personal and official regret for their suffering and, especially, for abuses and atrocities committed against them. He should solemnly and publicly vow to put an end to those abuses, and he should keep that vow.
He should ask the people of Chechnya to accept responsibility for abuses committed by Chechens against other Chechens and other people, including their Muslim neighbors in the region. He should call upon them to turn away from those who are committed to violence and to support Chechen officials who have taken a stand for order, peace and economic development.
Though such an appeal would take Putin beyond the current confines of Russia's political culture, he has the personal political skills and the broad public support that are the only real preconditions for such an appeal.
He need only consider how such an appeal would advance Russian objectives in the Caucasus and on the international stage.
(Robert Bruce Ware is an associate professor at Southern Illinois University who conducts field research in the Caucasus.) The Russia Journal