It also means that the war in Iraq is unlikely to wipe out Bush's ongoing political problems. Charlie Cook argues that:
"The real political consequences of policy miscalculations have been masked to a certain extent by the halo effect of the terrorist attacks and the focus on foreign policy. Very real symptoms regarding the president's political health, the condition of his agenda and his ability to advance his agenda have gone unrecognized or with little note. Once the war is over, the problems that remain will be just as serious but more evident. Even a boost in Bush's approval numbers after an exceedingly short and successful war could be short-lived given the nation's poor economy and the other serious problems that seem to have the president surrounded."
Public Opinion Watch concurs. It is even possible that Chuck Todd is right when he argues that there are two basic outcomes to this conflict, one of which will do Bush no good, while the other is likely to be harmful to his political prospects.
Outcome possibility is that the war ends quickly, Saddam is captured or exiled or killed, and the voting public then turns its attention to other things. That's what happened to Bush 41, who suffered greatly once the public shifted its focus of attention from a successful war to a domestic situation that was far from successful. Voters' attention spans are short, says Todd, and for this invasion to really help Bush it would have to occur very close to the election, not nineteen months away, as this one is.
Outcome possibility II is that we're involved in a dragged-out "permawar," marked by ongoing problems related to the conflict, an extended U.S. presence in the region, and a drag on the U.S. economy and defense resources. This doesn't mean, Todd stresses, a military quagmire fighting Iraqi forces, but various problems such as U.S. interests being targeted for terrorist attacks, not finding weapons of mass destruction after conquering Iraq, not capturing Saddam or Osama bin Laden by November 2004, or new conflicts with other countries (Iran, Syria, North Korea, etc.). The list could indeed go on, but Todd's basic point is that these kind of problems seem much more likely to hurt than help Bush's political standing at home.
Of course, the orthodox Republican reply is that September 11 changes everything-therefore neither outcome really applies. Somehow the war will become transmuted into political gold by the time November 2004 rolls around. Maybe so, but the data and arguments reviewed here suggest that this assertion should be viewed with considerable skepticism.