Did Washington underestimate Iraqi resolve? (FWD: Jane's Defence Weekly)

Jim Farmelant farmelantj at juno.com
Sun Mar 30 11:56:57 PST 2003


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28 March 2003 Did Washington underestimate Iraqi resolve?

Andrew Koch JDW Washington Bureau Chief

Coalition war plans in Iraq, developed at least initially in part around trying to persuade wider elements of the Iraqi armed forces not to fight, are being reconsidered as Iraqi morale has to date stood up relatively well.

US military commanders have begun to acknowledge that the Fedayeen Saddam and Special Security Organisation (SSO) paramilitary and other Iraqi forces are fighting more fiercely and capably than initial war plans envisaged.

However, say US defence and intelligence officials with experience in the region, the Iraqi resolve should come as no surprise. They say US intelligence reports have repeatedly warned that Iraqi paramilitary forces closely tied to Saddam Hussein's regime

were not likely to give up easily and could organise hit-and-run attacks to the rear of US forces.

The problem, the officials tell JDW, is that senior US civilian officials in the US Department of Defense did not heed the advice.

This underestimation is directly affecting the war planning, one element of which has been to try to detach senior Iraqi leaders and Ba'ath party officials from the country's regular army. If that was successfully accomplished Iraqi defences could be quickly overcome with a smaller US force. Without it, the length and intensity of the aerial bombing campaign will be far greater, as will the number of combat troops required.

Further, coalition commanders had hoped that the wider surrender of Iraqi regular units would enable them to keep the infrastructure of the country intact and save as much of the Iraqi Army as possible to help police a post-Saddam Iraq.

Part of the problem, officials say, is that coalition forces are less welcome than the senior civilian defence officials believed. Not only does that negatively impact on the coalition military plans, but also harms the operation's wider political objectives. The longer Iraqi resistance continues away from Baghdad - particularly in areas not fully under President Saddam Hussein's immediate control - the more the image the coalition portrayed of his government as being universally despised by its people is damaged.

US officials insist this lukewarm reception to date is not because of any support for Saddam among the Iraqis, but rather is due to lingering fears over possible retribution by Ba'ath loyalists. US defence officials note that Fedayeen Saddam, SSO and other regime loyalists have been dispersed among front-line army soldiers, threatening to shoot them if they surrender or do not fight.

However, that appears an incomplete explanation. One intelligence official said that nationalism is a greater factor than many expected. The negative image of the US among many Iraqis is also a factor, he said.

All of this indicates a more protracted and violent conflict than many had expected, and perhaps an even more difficult post-conflict period.

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Copyright 2003 Jane's Information Group. All rights reserved.

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