Political legitimacy in Chechnya ultimately will have more to do with patterns of economic development than with Sunday's constitutional referendum. Predictably, the vote is being questioned by Western commentaries and ridiculed by the militant website. Even some Russian observers have exclaimed that voter turnouts over 80 percent, including districts where there are clear signs of dissatisfaction with Moscow's policies, are almost too good to be true. Yet international monitors present in Chechnya during the vote did not spot significant irregularities. Is the result legitimate?
In October 2002, the Russian census found 1,088,000 residents of Chechnya. This appears to be an unrealistic enumeration of Chechen residents, though it may come closer to approximating the total number of Chechen nationals in all locations. Census procedures permitted one member of a family to record the names of all family members, including those at a distance. Realistically, the number of Chechen residents should be less than 650,000 and perhaps closer to 550,000. Hence, the size of the current electorate inside Chechnya probably falls between 250,000 and 350,000. However, at the beginning of this year electoral officials announced in the Russian media that they anticipated an electorate of approximately 540,000 people.
While this figure may have allowed for electoral participation by some Chechens residing in camps outside of Chechnya the number appears to be high.
These figures suggest that electoral officials may have had an opportunity to include as many as two or three hundred thousand falsified ballots without an appearance of irregularity. In practice, it is unlikely that there were this many, and so far there is no proof that there were any falsified ballots at all. Indeed, journalists found long lines of prospective voters at many polling places, and most of those whom they interviewed said they were voting for acceptance of the constitution. Careful research is required.
Yet together with ballots cast by Russian troops, ballots cast by genuine supporters of the constitution or the pro-Moscow administration of Akhmed Kadyrov, and ballots cast by people who are simply exhausted by the war, the latitude of these numbers may account for the remarkably high voter turnout. A similar combination of technique and tendencies is likely to favor Mr. Kadyrov, or some similar candidate, in the subsequent presidential election.
Economic Patterns
However, in the long-term political legitimacy often has as much to do with economic productivity as electoral procedure. The significance of the March referendum will have less to do with the short-term legitimacy of the new administration than with the long-term transition of economic patterns from those that perpetuate the war to those that will, one day in the distant future, underwrite stability.
Over the next five to ten years a new Chechen social order will slowly crystallize. New Chechen elites will gradually emerge around new patterns of economic flow that will develop with the establishment of the new administration, and the consequent expansion of federal subsidies for Chechen reconstruction and economic development. Subsequent budgetary transfers and humanitarian aid will follow patterns of top-down economic flow that will crystallize around the new administration and gradually consolidate its authority.
Progressively, the crystallization of this new order will marginalize Chechen radicals, and promote Chechen pragmatists and moderates. New groups of Chechen elites are already emerging in Chechnya and among the Chechen diaspora in Moscow. Many of these are more pragmatic, more focused upon preconditions for legitimate economic development, and more suspicious of radicalism than were their predecessors. Hence, the consolidation of this new order may be the best hope for long term stability in Chechnya. It would be beneficial for the new Chechen administration autonomously and genuinely to reflect the interests and needs of all of the people of Chechnya. Yet the patterns of economic flow that follow the establishment of a new administration thereafter will shape the development of new interests and needs in the republic.
Nevertheless, the precise formation of these patterns will be difficult for anyone to anticipate or control since they will be subject to corruption. Indeed, current regional economic patterns favor the perpetuation of the war. All of this will moderate the economic leverage that Moscow might apply toward the stabilization of Chechen society and mandate a shift in its political leverage.
Political Options
More than ever, it is now in Moscow's interest to settle with members of the Chechen opposition. Yet the prospect of negotiations with militant forces presents three fundamental problems. First, these forces are so fragmented that no leader genuinely represents all of them. Therefore, secondly, no single leader can guarantee any agreements that Moscow might achieve. Third, some militant leaders have been involved in terrorist activities that make them unattractive partners for negotiation.
The best opportunities for mediation of the conflict involve regional leaders, especially those in neighboring Muslim North Caucasian republics. Multiple local mediators might make multiple contacts on the Chechen side. This would be an advantage since many Chechen commanders will have to be approached individually due to the chronic fragmentation of militant forces. In some cases Moscow may have to consider separate concessions, but, for the most part, offers of amnesty may be the key since the tide appears to have turned irrevocably in Moscow's favor. The general strategy should be to settle individually with those Chechen militant leaders who are open to settlement in order to further isolate those who are not. Since amnestied opposition leaders must be given opportunities to compete for elective positions in the new Chechen administration there are now additional incentives for quick settlements.
After the referendum, as more people gradually return to Chechnya, terrorist acts will become easier to engineer, and more deadly in their execution. So long as terrorist acts continue it will be difficult to eliminate brutal federal searches and mass detentions, known as zachistki. Indeed, since zachistki tend to mobilize village populations to take up arms against Russian troops, militants may already be seeking to provoke zachistki as a means of recruitment. The cycle of injustice, abuse, and retribution may continue for some time to come. Therefore, in order to minimize contact with locals, Russian troops should be strictly garrisoned, and brought forward only at moments of crisis. With the establishment of the new Chechen administration Moscow appears likely to shift genuine law enforcement responsibilities to local officials. Whether or not the referendum results are genuine, political legitimacy in Chechnya will depend upon these long-term trends.