[lbo-talk] [Fwd: More re 'dreams and nightmares']

Carrol Cox cbcox at ilstu.edu
Wed May 21 15:51:52 PDT 2003


-------- Original Message -------- Subject: More re 'dreams and nightmares' Date: Wed, 21 May 2003 13:43:03 -0700 From: shniad at SFU.CA Reply-To: Discussions on the Socialist Register and its articles<SOCIALIST-REGISTER at YORKU.CA> To: SOCIALIST-REGISTER at YORKU.CA

From: michael a. lebowitz Subject: More re 'dreams and nightmares'

Dear friends and comrades,

I confess to impatience with people who talk about gross human rights abuses and repression with respect to the recent trials of so-called dissidents in Cuba--- without any sign that they have done any investigation beyond reading an Amnesty International press release (if that). The most significant repression in Cuba (where I have been-- except for trips to Venezuela--- since early February) has been the repression of law-breaking--- first and most significantly against an emerging drug network and extending to prosecution of people renting apartments without licenses, serving food obtained through the black market in the paladares and even to people selling peanuts on the street without a license. (Policing and fines for traffic violations are also up substantially.) Since so many people rely heavily on getting a little (and in some cases, a lot) on the side, this crack-down has had great impact, and my personal view (not the Cuban official position) is that it is an important part of the explanation as to why there was an upsurge in hijackings (not only the ones which made the headlines but also the 27 foiled plots)--- and why people with criminal records were prominent in these.

That's not the repression, though, that people mean when they go on about the plight of independent journalists, librarians, trade unionists, human rights activists, etc--- as if these people were tried for this rather than for receiving money and instructions from the US. Please, folks, take a little time to read the text of the Helms-Burton Act--- eg. sections 205 and 206 on the regime change demanded (character of the 'transition government' and who cannot be part of it) or sections 109 and 115 on the money to be provided for the overthrow of the existing government openly through the USAID and secretly. Look, too, at the official US declarations of the over $22 million devoted to this purpose by the USAID. And, finally, read some of the evidence on-line (eg., copies of hand-written notes giving instructions and sending money for the establishment of the Varela Project, 'conceived, financed and directed' from the outside) or, for a shorter version, look at the text of Felipe Perez Roque's press conference (available on-line at many sites, including www.ratb.ork.uk). When you've read some of the statements by the Cuban undercover agents who were receiving as much as $450 US a month--- over 20 times the average Cuban salary) and their evidence about writing articles for foreign circulation on specific subjects suggested by US officials, you'll understand why the so-called dissidents are viewed in Cuba as mercenaries working on behalf of the US government to overthrow the Cuban government. Of course, it's so much easier to recoil with horror at the concept of independent journalists, etc being persecuted! In contrast to my feelings about the defenders of those mercenaries, I respect people whose criticism of Cuba proceeds from their view of the absolute sanctity of human life--- including those who signed statements of condemnation or demonstrated against Cuba for this reason-- if they have done so in opposition to capital punishment in their own countries and in the United States (including that country's heinous torture of people--- teenagers among them--- in occupied Cuba, i.e. Guantanamo). There have been very strong statements about capital punishment made on this list--- suggesting that capital punishment must be viewed as a moral (and/or political) absolute and that no circumstances could ever justify it. Accordingly, having resorted to capital punishment recently, from this perspective Cuba must be condemned. (This position is to be distinguished from one which argues that the use of capital punishment was a tactical or strategical error--- one which has reduced support for Cuba at this critical time.)

I think that it is unquestionable that state murders cannot be part of the society that we want to build. From my perspective as a Marxist, though, central to a dialectical world-view is that parts do not exist separate from a whole; their properties are those that they acquire from being in a particular whole--- ie., from a particular combination with other parts. (Eg., money has different qualities if it mediates exchange between independent peasants and craftsmen than it does mediating exchange within capitalism.) From this perspective, one always has to consider context and combination. If you are willing to accept in principle that under some set of extreme circumstances, ie., in a particular context, capital punishment may be acceptable, then our discussion becomes not one of absolutes but, rather, whether the context in Cuba in any way justified capital punishment. (I.e., as George Bernard Shaw said in another context, we've established the principle, and we're just haggling over the price.) But, then, you really DO have to investigate the context--- and not be satisfied with making ill-informed comments about repression in Cuba.

Although I've argued in the past about the necessity to separate the capital punishment question from the spy trials, I now think that the two issues need to be understood together--- i.e., that the actions of the Cuban government in both cases must be placed in a particular context. There are two questions that I think everyone needs to ask: (1) why, after several years of a moratorium on capital punishment (which has meant that terrorists who bombed hotels, resulting in a death, in Cuba are still alive in prison despite receiving a death sentence), did the government apply the death penalty in the case of the hijackers of a small ferry? (2) Given the clear isolation and ineffectiveness within Cuba of the 'dissidents', why did Cuba choose this time to surface 12 undercover agents who were so well-placed that they included the head of the Pro-Human Rights Party, the 'dean of Cuba's independent reporters' (so trusted by the US Interests Section that he had a permanent pass into the US Interests Section) and the secretary of one of the best-known dissidents-- so trusted that she had her e-mail password)? I.e., why throw away years of investment in intelligence now?

In part, the obvious answer is the escalation of the US campaign to overthrow the Cuban government--- starting from James Cason's taking of office as Head of the US Interests Office in Havana. (His actions--- including the setting up of a Cuban political party--- are well-documented.) Add to this the recent welcoming of hi-jackers in the US; rather than returning them to Cuba and sending the signal that hijacking is not rewarded, they are out on bail (and walk the streets of Miami along with other Cuban terrorists). Add to this the fact that, despite an annual quota established by treaty for a minimum of 20,000 legal immigrants from Cuba, since October (the beginning of the year), the US Interests Section had by March given out only 505 visas. Add to that recent statements from US officials that they would view a mass illegal emigration from Cuba as a threat to national security, the demands in Miami that Cuba be next after Iraq and Rumsfield's comment that there was no intention of attacking Cuba 'now'---- and you can understand why Cuba might feel that the US was attempting to provoke an incident in order to justify an attack. But, there's more than just the direct provocations and assaults on Cuba.

The essential context in which to understand Cuba's actions is the US war against Iraq--- both the execution of that war and the powerlessness of opposition to it. The US determination to go ahead despite the historic world-wide demonstrations against the war revealed that, whatever long-run effect the mobilisation might have, in the immediate situation the demonstrations could not stop an aggressor nation determined to have its way; i.e., as long as there was business as usual, no high costs to be felt by the aggressor, every country was on its own. Cuba was on its own. (Do you think that the leaders, eg., in Venezuela were not making the same observations when watching the US proceed to ignore the UN and world opinion?) This is why the Cubans speak about a Nazi-Fascism stalking the world. In this situation, I think Cuba opted for its own 'shock and awe' campaign. It surfaced its undercover agents to demonstrate to the US how skillful Cuban intelligence is. (Lest anyone not get that message, Felipe Perez Roque underlined it at the press conference, noting 'that no one in Cuba is a fool, that we have revealed only a small part of what we know; ... our people have learned to defend themselves.') And, Cuba took the dramatic and painful act of executing the hijackers. As Fidel told the foreign participants to the Marx conference at an unannounced evening gathering (and subsequently told a Mexican journalist), the choice was between those deaths and many more which would result from the US plan to provoke an immigration crisis which would be used 'as a pretext for a naval blockade, which would inevitably lead to war'. '"We know full well this has a price, since a great number of friends - and many of our best friends - for various reasons, whether religious, humanitarian or philosophical, are opposed to the death penalty," Castro explained. But he insisted that "we didn't have the right to hesitate, and we will not hesitate."' That part was meant to send a message both to those within Cuba, thinking about hijacking planes, etc and being let out on bail in the US, and also to those within the US planning for Cuba to follow Iraq. The message was that Cuba was prepared to do what is necessary to defend itself.

I think that some of those friends of Cuba who are criticising Cuba at this moment should explain what they would do at this time--- not by reference to what they would do in their ideal socialist society but what they would do in Cuba's shoes in this real situation. And, if they differ from what Cuba has done, they should explain why they think they know better the real threat that Cuba faces than Cuba's own intelligence network. And they should explain what they are prepared to do to help Cuba defend itself.

in solidarity, michael

--------------------- Michael A. Lebowitz Professor Emeritus Economics Department Simon Fraser University Burnaby, B.C., Canada V5A 1S6

Currently based in Cuba. Can be reached via: Michael Lebowitz c/o MEPLA Calle 13 No. 504 ent. D y E, Vedado, La Habana, Cuba Codigo Postal 10 4000 (537) 33 30 75 or 832 21 54 telefax (at night): (537) 33 30 75



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