>
>Isn't this idealism the logical implication of the kind of "materialism" CB
>is defending i.e. doesn't the conception of reality involved require
>experience (including experience of time and space) to be interpreted as
>consisting wholly of experience of secondary qualities and not at all of
>direct experience of "reality"?
>
>If this is true, the implication for epistemology is solipsism - "solipsism
>of the present moment" actually.
>
>Asserting the reality of the materialism would therefore be
>self-contradictory.
>
>In fact, any assertion about reality other than the solipsism, e.g. any
>assertion about the reality of Russia, would be self-contradictory.
>
>Ted
>
Kant is at the other extreme from solipsism; the noumenonal world is very
real. Just ineffable.
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