The Hindu

Sunday, May 04, 2003

Pakistani nuclear weapons

By M. R. Srinivasan

The distinguished American foreign policy analyst, Selig Harrison, in a
recent article in the International Herald Tribune, had stated that Pakistan
has 48 nuclear weapons and enough fissile material in storage to make 52
more, thus making a total of 100. This must come as a frightening piece of
information to most Indians. To those familiar with nuclear matters this is
no surprise.

Pakistan has been producing enriched uranium required for the bombs from the
late 1980s. They could have by now accumulated the amount of bomb-grade
material referred to by Selig Harrison.

The uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta, where the bomb material is made, was
built on the basis of drawings and technical information stolen from Holland
where A.Q. Khan was working. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of Pakistani
agencies located in western Europe and North America were procuring various
equipment and materials required for the Kahuta plant, in a clandestine
manner. These items included maraging steel, high frequency power
generators, high-speed flash cameras, systems for making uranium
hexafluoride, special purpose valves and so forth.

There were many instances where several Pakistanis or their agents were
charged by Western Governments with indulging in unlawful activities. After
the usual excitement in the media for a while, no punitive action was ever
taken. Hence, Pakistan built the plant to produce nuclear weapons material
essentially on the basis of materials and technology obtained from Europe
and North America.

In the later stages of its quest for nuclear weapons, Pakistan found another
collaborator in China. In exchange for letting China learn about the
centrifuge process for enriching uranium (a process superior to the old
fashioned diffusion process which China then had), Pakistan is reported to
have received from China designs for a nuclear weapon, of early Chinese
vintage. There are also reports that China supplied the trigger devices for
the early Pakistani nuclear weapons.

For several months, we have been seeing reports about nuclear cooperation
between Pakistan and North Korea. North Korea has supplied Pakistan with
missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and also the technology for
producing the missiles in Pakistan. While the U.S. administration is in
possession of full evidence of the two-way trade, namely, Pakistani nuclear
know-how and supplies for North Korean missiles, it is studiously
maintaining that such cooperation stopped after Pervez Musharraf came to
power.

Recently, North Korea admitted that it was in possession of a few nuclear
weapons. If this is a fact, it is almost certain that North Korea would have
an enriched uranium device, derived from Pakistani technology. A.Q. Khan is
reported to have visited North Korea over a dozen times prior to 2001. Even
if Gen. Musharraf were to be believed, it would be a case of closing the
stable door after the horse has bolted!

There have been persistent reports that Saudi Arabia has bankrolled the
Pakistani nuclear programme over many years and that senior Saudi Ministers
have had access to the sensitive Pakistani facilities. No one is aware of
any secret Pakistan-Saudi Arabia agreement in this matter. A matter of great
worry for India and indeed the world is that there are a number of jehadi
scientists in the Pakistani programme. A few maintained links with the
Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. It is clear that there are many more such
persons in the Pakistani nuclear establishment and that they might pass on
technology and even weapons-grade material to terrorist organisations.
The U.S. has been claiming all along that prevention of proliferation of
nuclear weapons and missiles is an important and continuing agenda in its
foreign policy. Yet, in the case of Pakistan, it did little or nothing to
prevent that country from acquiring nuclear weapons.

At that time, the excuse was that the U.S. needed Pakistan as an ally to
fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Now when Pakistan is openly assisting
North Korea acquire nuclear weapons, the U.S. is forced to keep quiet
because it thinks it needs Gen. Musharraf to fight terrorism. The U.S. has
also convinced itself that Gen. Musharraf will work towards restoring
democracy in Pakistan though he has no intention of relinquishing his post
as Army Chief, while continuing to be President. While this duplicity may
not hurt the U.S., at least in the near term, it has serious implications
for India.

There is no alternative for India except to maintain an overwhelming
superiority in the number of nuclear weapons relative to Pakistan. Equally,
India has to ensure it has an adequate number of missiles of appropriate
range to ensure that its nuclear deterrence is credible.

Since India has reiterated its commitment to `no first use', it will have to
brace itself for the effort and expense involved in creating a second strike
capability of requisite magnitude.

On the diplomatic front, we must do all we can to explain patiently to the
U.S. how its policies relative to Pakistan are hurting India and forcing it
to divert resources from developmental goals to security. We must continue
to educate the U.S. public of the consequences of U.S. policies which from
an Indian perspective are short sighted. Indeed, some of these policies are
indirectly encouraging Islamic fundamentalist forces in Pakistan to continue
terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India. Such
forces could strike at U.S. interests too in due course of time.

If the new initiative of the Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, were to lead to
meaningful talks, the two countries could discuss nuclear confidence
building measures also, as indeed was envisaged in the Lahore Declaration.
However, Pakistan has to be told clearly that tactics of nuclear blackmail,
as practised by it in the recent past, can hardly augur well for the
resolution of Indo-Pak. differences. An Indo-Pak. agreement could among
other things also lead both countries to reduce, over time, expenditure on
defence - conventional and nuclear - and thus release resources for
socio-economic development.

(The writer is a former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.)

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