<DIV>Yeah, it's a quasi-Kantian argument. No, I'm not a utilitarian. No, I do not really want to get into why just now. I've debated with this with Luke ab extensio over some years on the list. Someone asked for an argument sketch in defense of retributivism. Best I can do right now. jks<BR><BR><B><I>Jim Farmelant <farmelantj@juno.com></I></B> wrote:
<BLOCKQUOTE style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #1010ff 2px solid">Jim F: <BR>Wasn't that really Kant's argument in *Critique of Practical<BR>Reason*. After having disposed of the traditional arguments<BR>for God, immortality, and free will in *Critique of Pure Reason*,<BR>Kant in his second Critique attempted to show how these<BR>beliefs could be justified on the grounds that they are<BR>necessary postulates of the moral life.<BR><BR>* * * <BR>As I understand Mill, he is arguing that, first, we cannot equate<BR>the origins of a feeling such as our desire to punish those who hurt <BR>us or other members of our social group, with a morally compelling<BR>rationale for that desire. For Mill, our desire to punish malefactors<BR>can only be defended to the extent that it can be shown to enhance<BR>social utility, </BLOCKQUOTE></DIV><p><hr SIZE=1>
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