The Hindu Business Line Wednesday, Oct 08, 2003 What price the Sri Lanka peace process? G. Parthasarathy Efforts by Sri Lanka to reach a peaceful settlement to the prolonged ethnic conflict appear to have reached a dead end. By bending over backwards to accept the demands of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mr Ranil Wickramasinghe, has alienated an influential section of majority Sinhala opinion, though a significant part of the population has welcomed the halt to the terrorist violence, says G. Parthasarathy. WITH the media remaining obsessed with Pakistan, very little attention is being unfortunately devoted to developments in our other neighbours that could have crucial implications for peace, stability and progress in our neighbourhood. This is particularly so of the developments in Sri Lanka where the efforts to reach a peaceful settlement to the prolonged ethnic conflict now appear to have reached a dead end. The Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mr Ranil Wickramasinghe, has bent over backwards to accept demands of the LTTE that would have been unthinkable even a few years ago. In the process, he has incurred the wrath of the President, Mrs Chandrika Kumaratunga, and alienated an influential section of majority Sinhala opinion, though a significant part of the population has welcomed the halt to the terrorist violence. But this situation has not arisen without the Sri Lankan Government paying a price. The Government and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement in February 2002. Under this, large portions of the Northern and Eastern Provinces came under LTTE control. The LTTE agreed to halt all raids, ambushes, assassinations and forced conscription. A monitoring mission with international observers was established. Five rounds of talks facilitated by Norwegian diplomats have since been held between the SLG and the LTTE in Thailand, Norway and Germany. The international community has shown its readiness to encourage the peace process by holding a Peace Support Conference of donors in Oslo on November 25, 2002. The Japanese, who are great believers in "Cheque Book Diplomacy" premised on the belief that a promise of funds can get people to respect their wishes, got into the act. The LTTE, however, chose to stay away from a donors' meet convened earlier this year in Tokyo. While it was agreed during the third round of talks in Oslo that the two sides would seek a federal political framework for Sri Lanka, the LTTE chief, Mr V. Prabhakaran, himself has never renounced his belief in armed struggle, or his determination to establish an independent Tamil state (Eelam). He obviously feels that his armed forces came very close to forcing the Sri Lanka Army out of Jaffna not too long ago and is encouraged by manifestations of a sense of tiredness and helplessness to maintain the country's unity on the part of the ruling elite. The Government has conceded the demand for "internal self-determination" to the LTTE. More important, this so-called "internal self-determination" has been agreed to in "areas of historic habitation of Tamil-speaking people". In effect, the Government has conceded a longstanding LTTE demand for merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces at a very early stage of the negotiating process, without having obtained a firm commitment from the LTTE to disarm, respect democratic principles, allow Tamil parties such as the EPDP to function freely and renounce its struggle for a Tamil Eelam.On April 21, the LTTE announced its decision to spurn further negotiations. On the eve of the Tokyo Donors Conference, the LTTE upped its ante and asserted that it would return to the negotiating table only if Colombo agreed to the establishment of an Interim Administrative Council (IAC) for the North-East. It reiterated its earlier demand for "self-determination". What exactly does Mr Prabhakaran mean by Interim Administrative Council? When the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of 1987 was signed, Mr Prabhakaran had voiced a demand for such a Council that would enable him to function as an un-elected ruler of North-East Sri Lanka. He never had any intention of seeking a popular mandate in multiparty elections. He has systematically eliminated every Tamil leader in Sri Lanka who dared to challenge his hegemony. He obviously knows that once an Interim Administrative Council is set up, he will exercise total control over all economic and reconstruction assistance from international donors and will create a situation wherein international donors start dealing with him as the Head of Government in Sri Lanka's North-East. The LTTE has run a parallel government in the North-East ever since the ceasefire came into effect. LTTE cadres collect taxes; LTTE courts administer their version of justice, and the entire law and order machinery is LTTE-controlled. The writ of the Sri Lanka Government runs exclusively in high security zones controlled by the Sri Lanka Army. The LTTE has also used the ceasefire to terrorise or eliminate all political opposition. It today runs a one-party state. The LTTE has also used the ceasefire to acquire weapons, so that it can mount offensives. Given the low morale and the high rate of desertions within the Sri Lanka army, such an offensive would either lead to a prolonged stalemate accompanied by a resumption of terrorist violence, or in a defeat of Sri Lankan forces. India's response to the problems faced by the Sri Lankan Government has naturally disappointed it. The Navy has assisted in dealing with LTTE attempts to obtain weapons and supplies from abroad. But, when the Sri Lankan forces were on the verge of collapse, all that New Delhi could do was to offer to evacuate them from the Jaffna Peninsula. The ruling coalition in New Delhi includes parties that have LTTE sympathies. An impression has been created that India is, therefore, not prepared to act strongly enough to protect the unity and territorial integrity of a friendly neighbour. This has encouraged the LTTE to make demands that would result in the establishment of a confederation in Sri Lank as a prelude to the establishment of a separate Tamil Eelam. A separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka ruled by a fascist one-party dispensation will have serious repercussions on the internal security. India will have to take some hard decisions on the developments in Sri Lanka. It is faced with a strange situation when a Member of the Union Council of Ministers who has sworn allegiance to the Constitution voices support and sympathy for the LTTE — an international terrorist organisation whose leader is wanted in India for involvement in the assassination of a former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. Mercifully, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister has made it clear that she will act strongly against the LTTE and its supporters. New Delhi should take decisive steps to signal to the LTTE that it will not allow it to prevail militarily under any circumstances and that it will not relent efforts to bring Mr Prabhakaran to face trial in India by all available means. As a first step, Parliament could approve legislation authorising Government security agencies to use covert operations to apprehend those wanted for terrorist offences and bring them to India to face trial even if they are on foreign soil. Second, a clear message should be sent to the LTTE that India would use air power to thwart any attempt by it to eject Sri Lankan forces from the Jaffna Peninsula. Naval surveillance of the North East should be tightened. Steps for the joint development of port and oil storage facilities at Trincomallee must be considered. Only then will the LTTE display a measure of realism in negotiations with the Sri Lankan Government. And the 1987 experience has shown that despite the exertions of those who profess support for the LTTE, public opinion in Tamil Nadu will endorse measures that New Delhi takes to force the LTTE to see reason. (The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.) Copyright © 2003, The Hindu Business Line.