[lbo-talk] Would Gore have invaded Iraq?

[kelley at pulpculture.org]

At 12:57 PM 4/11/2004, Doug Henwood wrote:
>Dwayne Monroe wrote:
>
>>Apologies for not having specific references handy but
>>I believe the best argument (as in the most coherent,
>>not necessarily the most correct) put forward to link
>>'oil', understood broadly, to the invasion of Iraq is
>>the desire of neocons to ensure US dominance well into
>>the 21st century by placing a powerful American
>>military presence at the hub of world oil extraction
>>and shipment.
>
>Yes, we've discussed this before. And as I've said, I don't see how this 
>makes much sense - what really is gained by this "control" that couldn't 
>be accomplished by other means? It would be far more efficient to cut off 
>oil supplies to China, say, by blockading China or attacking tankers 
>heading there than it would be to turn off some taps in Iraq, which would 
>cause lots of collateral economic damage. It may be that they really think 
>this way, but it seems like a holdover from some other time, when control 
>of resources and real estate was more important.
>
>Doug

A strategy for supporting this enormous latent opposition to Saddam 
requires political and economic as well as military components. It is 
eminently possible for a country that possesses the overwhelming power that 
the United States has in the Gulf. The heart of such action would be to 
create a liberated zone in Southern Iraq comparable to what the United 
States and its partners did so successfully in the North in 1991. 
Establishing a safe protected zone in the South, where opposition to Saddam 
could rally and organize, would make it possible:

• For a provisional government of free Iraq to organize, begin to gain 
international recognition and begin to publicize a political program for 
the future of Iraq;

• For that provisional government to control the largest oil field in Iraq 
and make available to it, under some kind of appropriate international 
supervision, enormous financial resources for political, humanitarian and 
eventually military purposes;

• Provide a safe area to which Iraqi army units could rally in opposition 
to Saddam, leading to the liberation of more and more of the country and 
the unraveling of the regime.

This would be a formidable undertaking, and certainly not one which will 
work if we insist on maintaining the unity of the UN Security Council. But 
once it began it would begin to change the calculations of Saddam's 
opponents and supporters -- both inside and outside the country -- in 
decisive ways. One Arab official in the Gulf told me that the effect inside 
Iraq of such a strategy would be "devastating" to Saddam. But the effect 
outside would be powerful as well. Our friends in the Gulf, who fear Saddam 
but who also fear ineffective American action against him, would see that 
this is a very different U.S. policy. And Saddam's supporters in the 
Security Council -- in particular France and Russia -- would suddenly see a 
different prospect before them. Instead of lucrative oil production 
contracts with the Saddam Hussein regime, they would now have to calculate 
the economic and commercial opportunities that would come from ingratiating 
themselves with the future government of Iraq.
http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqsep1898.htm