[lbo-talk] You can't bluff someone who's not paying attention (was: Gore'n'War)

kelley at pulpculture.org kelley at pulpculture.org
Sun Apr 11 14:06:09 PDT 2004



>
> > And Saddam's supporters in the Security Council --
> > in particular France and Russia -- would suddenly see
> > a different prospect before them. Instead of LUCRATIVE
> > OIL PRODUCTION CONTRACTS WITH THE SADDAM HUSSEIN
> > regime, they would now have to calculate the
> > economic and commercial opportunities that would
> > come from INGRATIATING THEMSELVES WITH THE FUTURE
> > GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ.

Mike, in David Mamet's _House of Games_ explains how the confidence game works: "The basic idea is this. It's called a _confidence_ game. Why? Because you give me your confidence? No. Because I give you _mine_."

Mike demonstrates this to Margaret, the psychoanalyst, in a bus station. Mike appears to be waiting for a money wire. He strikes up a conversation with a guy also waiting for a wire. Turns out he was in the Marines. Mike says, to paraphrase, "Oh yeah. I was a Marine, too." Mike looks at the guy, all dewy-eyed and says, "Hey, if my wire arrives before yours, I'll spot you your bus fare." Without asking for any money, Mike has just used a social norm (solidarity) to force the other guy to feel obligated to give Mike bus fare, too.


>This is PNAC saying "it's about oil," for their UNSC opponents.
>
>-- Shane

I'm not quite sure what you mean. That it was the pretense they were using to convince the Security Council why they had strategic interests in the ME?

I disagree, if so. I've put key phrases in upper case, above. Wolfowitz says that the situation under Clinton was one favorable to France and Russia. They merely had to deal with Saddam and they'd have lucrative oil contracts. The goal of a new Iraqi government is to make things less favorable for them. Surely, being in the position of ingratiating oneself to a new regime isn't favorable to them, given that they see the u.s. as a threat, not Saddam. (acc. to neocons).

As I pointed out in the prelude to hostilities in Iraq, the neocons see the entire world as an enemy. They have never wanted multilateral relationships, especially not when it comes to Iraq. They want to be the only ones running that show or to simply have stooges along for the ride. They were especially unconcered about Fr. and Russia because they believe Iraqis to be distrustful of those two countries because of their ties to Saddam.

Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus, according to Kagan, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/Editorial_Feb.2_98.pdf>

"Given that the United States is unlikely to reduce its power and that Europe is unlikely to increase more than marginally its own power or the will to use what power it has, the future seems certain to be one of increased transatlantic tension. The danger--IF IT IS A DANGER--is that the

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ United States and Europe will become positively estranged. <...> The day could come, if it has not already, when Americans will no more heed the pronouncements of the EU than they do the pronouncements of ASEAN or the Andean Pact. <...>

The task of containing Saddam Hussein belongs primarily to the United States, not to Europe, and everyone agrees on this — including Saddam, which is why he considers the United States, not Europe, his principal adversary. In the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East, and in most other regions of the world (including Europe), the United States plays the role of ultimate enforcer. <...>

Americans are "cowboys," Europeans love to say. And there is truth in this. The United States does act as an international sheriff, self-appointed perhaps but widely welcomed nevertheless, trying to enforce some peace and justice in what Americans see as a lawless world where outlaws need to be deterred or destroyed, and often through the muzzle of a gun. Europe, by this old West analogy, is more like a saloonkeeper. Outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloonkeepers. In fact, from the saloonkeeper's point of view, the sheriff trying to impose order by force can sometimes be more threatening than the outlaws who, at least for the time being, may just want a drink.

From Power and Weakness, Robert Kagan, Policy Review June 2002 http://www.newamericancentury.org/kagan-052002.htm

If it wasn't about securing a favorable geo-political position from which to force Europeans to ingratiate themselves to the "new" Iraqi government, then what was it about? And why would anyone ingratiate themselves to that government if it weren't for oil? Do you disagree what I said to Doug in the post prior to the one you've responded to?

Recently, Michale Pollak, I believe, pointed out that Iraq is different from SE Asia because of the oil and that's why the u.s. won't leave. How is it about oil now, but not about oil, then? Remember, I have said it was not _only_ about oil. Rather, that it was one of three major factors: geo-political posturing on the world stage to intimidate Europe, Russia, China, to secure mil presence in the ME, andthe use of threats from abroad to subdue the "homeland." (Weberian analysis of geo-political power which, as I recall, is one of the theorists that neocons tend to rely on for for policy analysis.)

I don't think the neocons are at all surprised by recent events.

Kelley

Mike, in David Mamet's _House of Games_ explains how the confidence game works: "The basic idea is this. It's called a _confidence_ game. Why? Because you give me your confidence? No. Because I give you _mine_."

Mike proceeds to demonstrate what he means. Mike and Margaret enter a bus station. Mike appears to be waiting for a money wire. He strikes up a conversation with a guy also waiting for a wire. Turns out he was in the Marines. Mike says, to paraphrase, "Oh yeah. I was a Marine, too." Mike looks at the guy, all dewy-eyed and says, "Hey, if my wire arrives before yours, I'll spot you your bus fare." Without asking for any money, Mike has just used the combine bond to force the other guy to feel obligated to give Mike bus fare, too.

It isn't just about the Security Council opponents against war in Iraq. It's about them as opponents, period. They're--Europeans and everyone else--are the enemy that had to be intimidated most of all. We are THE imperial power and the way to maintain that power is to not follow in the footsteps of the Europeans who are from Venus, while good 'merikans are from Mars! As I maintained before hostilities broke out, the neocons never wanted unilateral cooperation.

From <<http://www.newamericancentury.org/Editorial_Feb.2_98.pdf>http://www.newamericancentury.org/Editorial_Feb.2_98.pdf>:

Given that the United States is unlikely to reduce its power and that Europe is unlikely to increase more than marginally its own power or the will to use what power it has, the future seems certain to be one of increased transatlantic tension. The danger--IF IT IS A DANGER--is that the United States and Europe will become positively estranged. Europeans will become more shrill in their attacks on the United States. <...>

The task of containing Saddam Hussein belongs primarily to the United States, not to Europe, and everyone agrees on this — including Saddam, which is why he considers the United States, not Europe, his principal adversary. In the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East, and in most other regions of the world (including Europe), the United States plays the role of ultimate enforcer. <...>

Americans are "cowboys," Europeans love to say. And there is truth in this. The United States does act as an international sheriff, self-appointed perhaps but widely welcomed nevertheless, trying to enforce some peace and justice in what Americans see as a lawless world where outlaws need to be deterred or destroyed, and often through the muzzle of a gun. Europe, by this old West analogy, is more like a saloonkeeper. Outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloon keepers. In fact, from the saloonkeeper's point of view, the sheriff trying to impose order by force can sometimes be more threatening than the outlaws who, at least for the time being, may just want a drink.

From Power and Weakness, Robert Kagan, Policy Review June 2002 http://www.newamericancentury.org/kagan-052002.htm

If it wasn't about securing a favorable geo-political position from which to force Europeans to ingratiate themselves to the "new Iraqi" government (i.e., the u.s.), then what was it about? Do you disagree with what I said to Doug in the post prior to the one to which you've responded?

recently, Michale Pollak, I believe, pointed out that Iraq is different from SE Asia because of the oil and that's why the u.s won't leave. Carrol has said the same thing, offlist. So, if it's about oil now, why wasn't it about oil all along? (Remember, I have _NOT_ said it was _only_ about oil, rather that it involved three major factors: geo-political posturing and securing advantageous geo-political position on the world stage (for the New American Century), establishing a secure mil presence in the ME, and use of threats from abroad to subdue populace internally.

I don't think the neocons are at all surprised by recent events. Indeed, I think they hoped for them. Those events legitimate our continued presence.

Kelley



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