On Sun, 18 Apr 2004, Miles Jackson wrote:
> This is a useful thought exercise. At this point, if the LBO cabal had
> complete control of the U. S. government and was able to dictate foreign
> policy, what would we do about Iraq?
Immediately arrange an election to appoint a legitimate transitional government -- which, it must be made clear from the outset, will have the power to order the US to go. W/out that power, no government can be legitimate. And without having the backing of a legitimate government, the continued presence of the US can only make things worse for all parties concerned.
Even if you imagine the worst case scenario as the overwhelmingly most likely -- which I don't -- whichever worst case you choose, it will only be more likely after 10 years of occupation. The only difference will be that we'll have wasted 500 billion dollars and everyone in the country and the middle east will loathe us even more passionately than they do today.
On the contrary, leaving now, when requested -- which no great power has ever done -- will gain us unprecedented goodwill and credibility that we can gain in no other way. We will, with some hestitation and confusion, have actually gotten rid of an evil dictator and then left the country to its people, which everyone in the world would acknowledge as two good things. If things go terribly wrong past that point, it won't be entirely our fault. And, ironically, if we want to set off democratic shock waves, that would be much more effective than anything else we could do.
> Complete withdrawal of U. S. troops at this point is tantamount to
> ceding control of the country to another brutal dictator or religious
> junta.
I don't take that as a foregone conclusion. The dominant clergy in Iraq are not theocratic and sound like Rousseau when they talk about democracy. Mainstream shiites are against having clerics in government on principle because they feel it is inherently corrupting -- that's their explanation for which God didn't let Ali become caliph. Khomenei was a huge deviation in this department, and 20 years later even the majority of the people in Iran don't like it anymore. As for a strongman dictator, there is as yet no candidate. There are also many signs of unprecedented unity and deep national feeling.
The idea that only the US is holding things together is a misconception of the problem. There are two security problems in Iraq. The first is huge amounts of violence directed at US forces. The best way to fix that is to remove US forces. The other problem is total lack of security on the streets for average Iraqis -- about which the US has so far done squat. Our leaving won't make that worse. On the face of it, there is every reason to believe our leaving will make both problems better. Iraq certainly needs an effective police force. We have spectacularly failed to provide it with one.
I don't deny dreadful things could happen. There could be civil war with the Kurds, there could be chaos, there could be lebanon. But if those things could possily happen now, they'll be just as possible after a long occupation only more so because our stay will incubate such forces just like Israel's occupation of Lebanon created Hezbollah. Every moment we stay without a legitimate government we make things worse, both for the country and for the US.
There are certainly things that could be done to forestall the worst case scenario if we were asked to leave. The US can use its power to keep outside countries from invading, for example, which gives a country a lot more breathing space. And if it does unfold badly, we and the whole world will have time to watch and plan and develop an alternative structure for fixing it, having seen at least one way that didn't work. That would be a proper context and stimulus for creating a transformed UN that would be up to such a task. That is the first order of business if you really want a new but stable international order that goes beyond Westphalia. You need a UN that doesn't exist yet. But which we need.
It is not entirely impossible that, given the clear and open choice, the various parties in Iraq might decide that they fear each other more than they fear us, and that if they clearly had the power to make us go, they might ask the US to stay for a transitional period -- or more likely (and more desirable for all concerned) US troops largely diluted or replaced by others. Those are the only terms under which a limited guerrilla war could be won in any meaningful sense of the term "won" -- that is, if there still was a guerilla war to be won once there wasn't an occupation for it to be against.
There you have it, Miles. A coherent, realistic course of action that will never be implemented. I'm not sure how much use it is. Except that I think it's more coherent and plausible than anything I've seen the pro-occupation side offer thus far.
Michael