Kelley wrote:
> A sociologist like Richard Harvey Brown, though, argues that, just
> because all schools of sociological theory rhetorically construct
> _sociological_ truths, this does not mean we must deny that an
> extra-discursive social reality exists. What he denies is that it can
> be isomorphically grasped. Hence, we cannot appeal to an
> extra-discursive social reality as the final arbiter of disciplinary
> disputes--let alone the final arbiter of disputes between sociological
> practitioners and their publics (or, customers, if you're a Dean :).
If we have direct experience of reality, we can use that experience as a basis for criticizing and changing the ordinary meaning of language (as does, for instance, Whitehead). If we don't, the necessary epistemological implication is "solipsism of the present moment." Direct experience of reality doesn't necessarily imply that we can fully know reality. In fact, it may show, as Whitehead claims, that knowledge is incompleteable so that the critical revision of meaning can never come to an end.
On your assumption ("we cannot appeal to an extra-discursive social reality"), what ground is available for your interpretive claims about Brown's argument?
Ted