[The NYT article attached below fills in a lot of little holes, and one big one: it explains in one sentence why the Marines, who supposedly trained for months to introduce a gentler kinder counterinsurgency strategy, were so ready within a week to scrap it all and go back to the policy of the iron fist (excuse me "Iron Grip"). Mattis, the division's commander says it was always his plan to precede the soft approach with a short hard attack that showed Fallujah who was boss:
Before showing their "velvet glove" approach, however, the Marines also
wanted insurgents to feel their mailed fist. "We will move precisely
against the enemy elements and crush them without harming the
innocent," General Mattis said in his [email] message [to the
reporter].
[Hence the whole soft approach hinged on this part going perfectly. It seems never to have occurred to them that it might not, which is quite a grave flaw in the plan. What seems to have happened is that the Marines made their initial mailed fist patrols, got strong counter-reactions, got pissed, and then the next week, the four contractors got killed -- and on many accounts, the death of the four contractors was intended and received as a direct response to the killing of Fallujans by Marines the week before. So the marines then reverted to SOP, all mailed fist all the time. But given the big flaw in their initial two-step plan -- Step one: hit them in the face and presume they'll just sit there and take it *and then their neighbors will look forward to working with you* -- it looks like their unplanned Plan B, all fist all the time, was always by far the most likely outcome.]
[If we now get back to the original softer approach -- if the Marines are prevented from going in, when they now giving every sign of champing at the bit -- it looks like it won't be the Marines that brought it about, but rather that the political authorities imposed it on them. The Marines presumably still have the resources, the training (and maybe the facial hair), although presumably the gung-ho attitude and optimism about it wroking are seriously frayed. It seems clear that idea that it should be preceded with random hard strikes for the pure purposes of demonstrating toughness was a bad one that set it seriously backwards.]
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/28/international/middleeast/28SIEG.html
The New York Times April 28, 2004
NEWS ANALYSIS
The Siege of Falluja, a Test in a Tinderbox
By ERIC SCHMITT
W ASHINGTON, April 27 The siege in Falluja is a case study in mistaken
assumptions, dashed hopes, rivalry between the Army and the Marine
Corps, and a tragedy that became a trigger, Pentagon officials, senior
officers and independent military analysts said Tuesday.
The chain of decisions leading to the standoff that has made the city
of nearly 300,000 people in the Sunni heartland a symbol of the
insurgency also illustrates conflicting military strategies and
shifting political aims. The fate of Falluja has become a possible
harbinger for all of Iraq.
Some critics say the immediate showdown is a result of the Marines'
overreaction to the killing and mutilation of four American private
security contractors on March 31. "They've gone to the sledgehammer
approach," said Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution. Even before the contractors' deaths, however, the marines
ran into sporadic but stiff resistance last month as they took over
responsibility for the area from departing Army soldiers. Marine
commanders defended their response, which was to throw a cordon of
troops, tanks and artillery around the city, try to avoid civilian
casualties and prepare for an urban battle to root out some 2,000
insurgents.
In recent days, commanders have said they are taking great pains to
avoid an all-out attack. "Every attempt will be made to solve the
problem peacefully before resorting to a military offensive against
terrorists inside the city," Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, the top Marine
general in Iraq, said in an e-mail message.
Dealing with Falluja has gone from strictly a military matter for
commanders in Iraq to a broader political debate involving President
Bush and his top national security aides in Washington, who have
voiced concerns that images of fierce fighting in Falluja will stir
uprisings throughout Iraq and outrage throughout the Arab world.
Some Marine commanders grumble that the stop-and-start negotiations
are giving insurgents more time to restock and refortify their
defenses, putting marines' lives at risk and postponing what they say
is an inevitable American attack.
The decision to delay any immediate offensive into Falluja is still
very tenuous, Pentagon officials said Tuesday. Military commanders are
unwilling to accept the status quo, while intelligence suggests that
backing off would encourage a new generation of opposition, and
postpone big problems until closer to the transfer to Iraqi
sovereignty on June 30. There is little sign that resistance is
weakening.
If there is any glimmer of hope for a negotiated settlement, American
and Iraqi civilian authorities are eager to grasp it. But the idea of
sending joint American-Iraqi patrols deep into the city has been put
off several times, since American commanders said Tuesday that the
Iraqi forces who were being asked to take part were not yet capable of
doing so without putting themselves and the marines at risk.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said Tuesday that "if at some
point the military decides that the string has run out, then they will
tell us that and take appropriate action."
"Now, does that mean that something can't be worked out?" he
continued. "No, I wouldn't say that, or else we wouldn't be where we
are."
The standoff in Falluja has been building for more than a year.
American units have come and gone so often in this hotbed of Sunni
resistance that they have had little time to understand their
surroundings. Falluja was initially occupied last year by the 82nd
Airborne Division, which was soon replaced by the Third Armored
Cavalry, which in turn was replaced by a brigade of the Army's Third
Infantry Division. Last summer, the Third Infantry handed the town
back to the Third Armored Cavalry, which was soon replaced by the 82nd
Airborne Division. Last month, the marines replaced the 82nd Airborne.
By December, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., the division's
commander, spoke of being on a "glide path" to victory over the
insurgents, at least in Al Anbar Province, in western Iraq. By
February, the 82nd Airborne had largely pulled back from patrolling
Falluja, putting more responsibility in the hands of the Iraqi Civil
Defense Corps and the Iraqi police. But in early April, those Iraqi
forces largely folded under fire.
Although reluctant to criticize the Army publicly, the marines
replacing the 82nd Airborne said the Army's practice of staying out of
town allowed the security situation in Falluja to fester. For weeks,
General Conway and other Marine commanders had boasted they would
shift tactics to work more closely with local people, to gain their
trust, and, in the process, glean intelligence about insurgents'
locations. This strategy drew on the Marine Corps' "Small Wars"
manual, which derives from their 20th-century interventions in Central
America.
Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, the First Marine Division commander,
reminded his forces in a message as they arrived last month that he
had added the warning, "Do no harm," to the unit's motto of "No better
friend, no worse enemy." Before showing their "velvet glove" approach,
however, the Marines also wanted insurgents to feel their mailed fist.
"We will move precisely against the enemy elements and crush them
without harming the innocent," General Mattis said in his message.
Almost immediately after taking over from the Army, marines came under
fire. A convoy was ambushed. Patrols pushing into town for the first
time in weeks were met with mortar and rocket fire, and had to pull
back. Then the four contractors from Blackwater U.S.A. were killed.
"Certainly the reason we went into Falluja included the killing of the
four contractors, but Falluja was not a garden paradise before then,"
Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the chief spokesman for the American military
command, said Tuesday. "Falluja has been a problem, a significant
problem for the coalition and for Iraqi security forces for many, many
months."
In the Pentagon's view, Falluja was boiling. There had been 27 attacks
on occupation forces, Iraqi security sites or American administration
targets in the three weeks before the Blackwater killings. Because of
that, planning was already under way to go in and clean out insurgents
in Falluja.
The planning was accelerated after the Blackwater attack because those
killings were viewed by the Pentagon and local commanders as
premeditated, and the population cheered indicating the dangerous
political effect of allowing a Falluja-based insurgency to remain.
Some Army officers said marines had stirred up a hornet's nest without
responding swiftly and forcefully enough. "The threat in the Al Anbar
Province was flat out afraid of the 82nd paratroopers," said one Army
officer who served near Falluja.
But Maj. Kevin Collins, a Marine operations officer in Falluja, put
the Marines' attitude this way, "If you chose to pick a fight, we'll
finish it."
Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington for this article,
John F. Burns from Baghdad and John Kifner from Falluja.
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