Relativism and Rorty (Was Re: [lbo-talk] Democracy and Constitutional Rights)

andie nachgeborenen andie_nachgeborenen at yahoo.com
Sat Aug 14 10:24:21 PDT 2004


Maybe I wasn't clear enough that I totally agree with Miles that we should be very aware that we might be wrong about just about anything that we believe. I can't right now imagine a plausible argument that 2+2=5, or that mass murder is OK, or that the truth is what is written in the Bible. That doesn't mean that I might not be mistaken in rejecting those beliefs. As Miles says, in the past, people have come to reject beliefs and values that seemed to them just as bedrock as Western liberalism does to me. imagine This sort of fallibilism, ro give it a fancy philosophical name, is bedrock to Western liberal values -- moral and other. Where I guess I disagree with Miles is the idea that the awareness that I might be wrong about a belief in the abstract gives me any reason to doubt any particular belief that I have.

For example, sometimes you see in a book or a paper -- I've written this myself -- something like this footnote: "Thanks to Richard Posner for his helpful critical comments on this paper. He is not responsible for the errors it contains."

Now, when I write a paper, I believe that everything in it is true, or I wouldn't right it. But at the same time, I know there must be mistakes, even if Judge Posner was kind enough to go over the paper and make criticisms and correct what he thinks are my mistakes (and sometimes he persuades me). But I don't know where the mistakes are, or I would correct them, right?

However, on Miles' view if the matter, it seems that my awareness that there must be mistakes in the paper means that Judge Posner's views (which are generally orthogonal to mine, except about pragmatism in geberal and the virtues of markets, which I don't take as far as he does) are just as true as mine even where we disagree. Or are "true for him" while mine are just "true for me." And I don't see that this follows at all.

Or maybe Miles' idea is that I should believe my deepest beliefs less strongly because I knwo they might be shown to be wrong. But I don'ts ee this follows either. AJP Taylor, a socialist hsitorian, was being interviewed for a job as a don at an Oxford College in the 30s, where his political beliefs were known. He was a young star, but the old dons were nervioust that he might be a Commie. (That wasn't a fatal disqualification then, but it wasn't a recommendation. As it happens Taylor was a far-left Labourite, but not a Commie.) The interviewer said rather delicately, I understand you have, ah, strong views. Taylor replied, brilliantly in my book, Yes, strong views, weakly held. I think he meant by that that there were things that he believed and cared about passionatelly, and would fight and die for, but if someone came along with an argument that he hadn't thought of, or if circumstances changed, he wasa ware that he might have to give up those views or values, even if he couldn't

see how just then. But in the meanwhile, he'd believe them strongly, especially if no doubts arose.

Btw, I think I actually live by this credo, for what it is worth. That is why I no longer call myself a Marxist and I do call myself a liberal democrat (small l, small d). A decade ago, I would have told you that I would never do either such thing, that I could not see how it was conceivable.

jks

Miles Jackson <cqmv at pdx.edu> wrote:

On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, andie nachgeborenen wrote:


> So help me here, I don't see what exactly is wrong with -- in the end --
> thinking that our own moral views, the ones we hold -- are correct.
> Maybe I am missing something. Please tell me what it is.
>
> jks

Justin is absolutely correct when he ties moral certainty together with certainty about other forms of knowledge. Each is an example of saying "X is correct". What I frankly don't understand is Justin's unwavering confidence that he is correct, whether discussing epistemology or morality.

If we consider even just the last 1000 years of human history, there have been many people like Justin that have claimed that their beliefs are self-evident and obviously true. Today, we consider many of these beliefs wildly wrong (e.g., the moral correctness of slavery, the existence of Satanic witches). --A simple question: How many of the beliefs that people in our society today consider to be self-evident and correct will be considered wildly wrong a thousand years from now?

Call me optimistic, but the wonderful thing to me about human beings is that the social structures they create are dynamic: we adapt, we learn from the past, we try out new things, and our societies change. This will continue to happen; thus many of the beliefs we are certain about will be discarded and ridiculed in the future (e.g., I think there will be a time when people in physics assess Einstein the way that we assess Newton: an important scientist, but fundamentally wrong about important stuff.)

--And just so concerning morality: how many of the moral beliefs we are certain about will be considered barbaric and wrong in the future?

As I'm writing this, I'm realizing why this is important to me: I have faith that people can think up stuff that hasn't even occurred to me, and in many ways it may be preferable to what I know or believe. I think we should leave an opening for that: hope for the future, I guess.

Miles

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