> I don't mean to say that every culture is a world unto itself,
completely walled off from other cultures. To the extent that
I share values like fairness or justice with the lawyer brigade,
I can participate in some meaningful language games with and
about them. However, the force of my argument--whether or not
my argument is construed as a good one--is still determined
by the local social context, not by the content of my argument
itself.
I am not sure what this means. On one hand there seems to be an acknowledgement that communicatioin requires sgared values like, e.g., fairness. On the other hand there is this retreat to localism and the (bad) Rortyian claim that all that matters is whether you can get the target audience to accept your particulat brand of mumbo-jumbo regardless of what it's any good -- reducing all communication to advertising. A really contemptible notion, I always told Dick. He'd shrug. Of course I know that you have to tailor the message to the audience, but I guess I am reallys tuck on the boring Enlightenment idea that truth and validity and siundness ought to count for something. No doubt that is why I am a poor propagandist.
> For instance: if I say "Judges shouldn't let obviously
guilty defendants go free because of a violation of
constitutional rights", how will the statement be construed?
At a professional association meeting for lawyers, I'd be
laughed off the stage;
Obviously you are not real familiar with the values of lawyers and judges. None of my pro bono habeas clients have a chance, whether or not their rights have been violated, and even if they can jump through all the hoops of Bill Clinton's Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (really the name of the thing!), because they are probably guilty, or anyway do not have credible claims of actual innocence. And I could say taht at a meeting of lawyers or judges and everyone would nod, because it' strue.
> at my father-in-law's house, I'd get a "damn straight" and another beer. This doesn't mean that my father-in-law's crowd is wrong (or right) about the issue; it just means they share different beliefs and actions than lawyers as a group do.
No, actually, their values aren't so different. However, it seems to me to actually matter not just what is the sociology of the formation of the beliefs of various groups, but also what is the correct position, don't you think? I think the escirvation of habeas corpus is an evil. It's really not to the point to say, Oh, you jsut think that because you are a Guildie and an ACLUnik. It's really the other way around, I am a Guildie and an ACLUnik, I spend a lot of my time defending those hopeless cases for free, because I think habeas is an important right. It's not just that my circles have one set of beliefs and your dad's and the federal courts and Congress have another. I'm right and their wrong, that matters.
> Sure, people are going to have criticisms of lawyers. But
should these criticisms have practical or moral
authority over lawyer culture? That's a difficult question,
strangely analogous to the female genital mutilation
issue I brought up earlier.
No it is NOT. The answer to this one is easy and obvious: Of course in a democracy the values of ordinary people should have practical and moral authority over those of a minority of specialists. I can't even imagine hwo you might think anything else. Taht practical and moral authority is what makes it a democracy. Of course the views of the majority may be wrong, and left wing wackos like myself may be needed to carp, annoy, criticize, agitate and change popular opinion. But the alternative to democracy is rule by Philosopher-Kings, self-styled and generally self appointed.
> On one hand, lawyers are a
knowledgeable subculture; they've thought legal issues
through far more rigorously than nonlawyer "outsiders".
Why should the outsiders impose naive constraints on
lawyers (e.g., a stipulation that a lawyer shouldn't
effectively defend a client if the lawyer thinks the
client is guilty)?
That bit of due process was imposed by nonlawyers when the Constitution was ratified. Of course they might amend the Constitution, get rid of due process and the 6th amendment, and the possibility of their commiting sucha disaster is part of what makes this a democracy. Although I'd fight it tooth and nail of course.
> On the other hand, lawyers are not a completely isolated
culture, and if their beliefs and actions have a
negative impact on others (as judged by the outsiders),
I think there's a reasonable moral argument for
external authority.
An absolutely overwhelming argument, actually,
> I acknowledge that this is a complex moral dilemma.
No it's not.
> I guess I tend to lean toward the former position
because of the practical value I place on social
diversity. Yeah, it's a buzzword right now, but
I think the analogy between social diversity and
biodiversity is apt: Just as an ecosystem
effectively adapts to changing conditions if it
consists of diverse plant and animal species,
human societies can effectively adapt to
new social conditions and come up with creative
solutions to problems if the societies consist
of people with diverse beliefs, values, and
perspectives.
This is a lot of doubletalk. Why is democratic authority over policy equivalent to abolition of diversity of perspectives?
jks
--------------------------------- Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - 50x more storage than other providers! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <../attachments/20040817/33e88526/attachment.htm>