1. The Bush administration didn’t really expect the “inadequate opposition” to win the referendum.
2. Though disappointed, it is nonetheless relieved by the decisive character of the Chavez victory because it ensures domestic stablility in Venezuela for the next two years while the US is a) “preoccupied with engagements elsewhere” and b) “needs steady oil supplies to guarantee stability in international markets, help its economy and prevent further increases in oil prices, which are bound to influence voters in an election year.”
3. The opposition needs to accept its defeat and revamp itself to make itself more acceptable to the population, which sees it as too closely tied to the oligarchy and old dictatorships. This means developing a more “credible” leadership and programme which “appeal to the traditionally neglected majority of Venezuela's poor”. (This will be a neat trick to pull off, since the Chavez government is already addressing the needs of the poor while the opposition is the instrument of the country’s middle class and the rich.)
4. The Chavez victory “will accelerate the radicalisation and implementation of his revolutionary agenda”, which will involve an “inevitable crack down on the opposition” and “a climate of fear based on intimidation”. But the writer doesn’t provide any specifics to back the allegation, beyond suggesting the (not unreasonable) possibility of a purge of public sector opponents and restrictions on the oligarchy’s control and inflammatory use of the media.
5. To protect the opposition, the OAS should be enlisted to threaten Venezuela with expulsion if it violates the civil liberties guarantees in the new Democratic Charter of the Americas. (ie. The US will the pressure the OAS to pressure the Lula and Kirchner governments to pressure the Venezuelans). NGO’s (eg. Amnesty International) should also be encouraged to monitor Venezuela and report on any human rights abuses.
MG ------------------------ The need to protect civil rights in Venezuela By Marco Vicenzino Financial Times August 18, 2004
Following Hugo Chávez's victory in the Venezuelan referendum there will no doubt be a flurry of rhetoric about national reconciliation. However, reality will soon set in. Mr Chávez's victory will accelerate the radicalisation and implementation of his revolutionary agenda. It will inevitably include a crackdown on the opposition, particularly government employees and others dependent on the public sector, and greater limitations on press freedom, particularly for private television stations. Mr Chávez will use the remaining two years of his presidency to neutralise remnants of the opposition and guarantee an easy re-election in 2006. That election will probably take place in a climate of fear marked by intimidation to discourage voter participation and prevent the opposition from organising effectively.
Until now, the coalition of opposition parties has been united againstMr Chávez but divided over nearly everything else, thus allowing itself to be regularly undermined by the government. Barring the emergence of irrefutable evidence of fraud and manipulation in the weekend referendum, the opposition's only option is to focus on the 2006 presidential election. With two years to come up with a credible leadership and convincing political programme, it must appeal to a cross-section of Venezuelan society and promote a leader and message with which ordinary Venezuelans can identify. But credible opposition leadership should have very limited ties to pre-Chávez governments. The message must be devoid of militant rhetoric and divisive oratory. Most importantly, it must appeal to the traditionally neglected majority of Venezuela's poor, whom Mr Chávez has so effectively dominated by addressing their needs and concerns. When Mr Chávez's approval ratings sank to around 30 per cent a year ago, he launched his “social missions” initiative with more than $1.7bn of state oil money allocated to health, education and free food programmes for the poor. Although fiscally irresponsible in the long term, the initiative yielded the necessary votes to guarantee victory in the referendum.
In the absence of proof of wrongdoing, however, the Organization of American States and the Carter Center, led by Jimmy Carter, endorsed the referendum's results. Both entities were instrumental in the mediation between Mr Chávez and the opposition that led to the referendum. In particular, the patient and skilful diplomacy of Cesar Gaviria, the outgoing OAS secretary-general, was critical in preventing bloodshed. Both the OAS and Mr Carter must now bring the process to closure. However, the work of the OAS in Venezuela is not over. In September, Miguel Angel Rodriguez, the former Costa Rican president, will be inaugurated as the new secretary-general of the OAS. Venezuela must remain high on his list of priorities, particularly in the climate of increasing political radicalisation. He must actively try to ensure that Mr Chávez upholds Venezuela's obligations under the Democratic Charter of the Americas, signed on September 11 2001, which protects the civil liberties of all citizens of the Americas. Failure to comply with obligations can result in expulsion from the OAS. The OAS member states must support the secretary-general in his efforts. His success will be partly determined by his ability to persuade, but his leadership will only be as effective as the OAS member states permit. In addition, influential non-governmental organisations must remain fully engaged in Venezuela to report abuses publicly.
The US was resigned to a Chávez victory before the referendum. Because of its preoccupation with engagements elsewhere and the inadequacy of the Venezuelan opposition, it has taken an ad hoc approach to Venezuela of plodding from crisis to crisis. Although clearly dissatisfied with the referendum's result, Washington must be relieved at the prospect of the restoration of domestic stability in Venezuela, at least until the country's 2006 presidential election.
The US needs steady oil supplies to guarantee stability in international markets, help its economy and prevent further increases in oil prices, which are bound to influence voters in an election year. Mr Chávez, meanwhile, needs steady revenues to subsidise his “Bolivarian Revolution”, the success of which ultimately depends on the oil price. Although the secure flow of oil remains a mutual priority and concern for the US and Venezuela, the US must emphasise the need to protect the rights of all citizens of the Americas by co-operating and co-ordinating with the OAS and other member states.
The writer works for the International Institute for Strategic Studies-US, in Washington
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