Friday, December 10, 2004
Alexander Nicoll: Europe`s quest for new capabilities
OUTSIDE IN
Alexander Nicoll / New Delhi December 10, 2004
Europe’s armed forces have been through an extraordinary squeeze since the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, demand for their participation in foreign operations has risen sharply, and these operations have required capabilities that they did not possess.
On the other, they have found that the money they are allotted by their governments has been steadily reduced.
This contradiction lies at the root of most of what one reads about European defence. Hardly a day goes by without someone bemoaning Europe’s inability to derive the capability that it should from the $220 billion or so that it spends each year on defence.
It may be not much more than half of the Pentagon’s budget, but it is still quite a lot of money. It will not rise in real terms, so the important issue for European nations is to obtain much better value and more usable defence assets from the available resources.
The picture is in fact not nearly as negative as it is often painted. After all, since the Soviet Union collapsed, European troops have found themselves involved in a wide variety of new theatres: Iraq (twice), Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan (with bases in neighbouring countries), East Timor, Sierra Leone, Congo, and at sea in the Indian Ocean and around the Horn of Africa.
After 9/11, NATO European surveillance aircraft were actually involved in watching over US air space.
Thanks to the wide range of tasks covered by these operations, European countries have developed new skills, particularly in peace-keeping, and have managed to increase the number of troops available for foreign deployments.
There is no denying, however, that the operations have severely taxed Europe’s abilities to organise itself efficiently and to sustain the deployments. The tempo has exposed basic weaknesses: although European Union members have 1.8 million people under arms, they are only able to deploy a very small proportion of the total at any one time.
Most countries cannot mobilise people quickly. Even if they could, they do not have the transport aircraft to carry them rapidly to the theatre.
Once deployed, troops need to be kept supplied. But countries have not integrated their logistics and so this is cumbersome and expensive.
They lack the sort of surveillance and communications systems that are now seen as essential to improve efficacy and to operate alongside the soldiers of partner nations. They need to be armed—but mostly lack precision-guided munitions.
Most countries have conducted fundamental reviews of their armed forces. In fact, most have done this several times since the Cold War ended. Initially, the reviews cut spending but maintained the same basic force structures.
But this became inadequate: it was increasingly obvious that the missions of armed forces had changed and therefore that structures had to change, too.
This has been extremely painful for many: large cultural changes are involved, especially for the armed forces of the newer members of NATO and the European Union. Many are abolishing conscription and shifting to smaller professional armies.
These adjustments have a strong political dimension. Even as the British Army’s famous Black Watch regiment was deployed recently on a dangerous mission in the middle of Iraq, an argument was going on at home as to whether the Black Watch would be disbanded or retain its identity in the Army’s latest reorganisation.
Defence ministers have also had to adjust to rapid changes in the available technologies. New “network-centric” capabilities appear to offer the chance to achieve more capability with fewer people, and with less traditional equipment.
They therefore appeal to budget-minded ministers. However, the case is far from proven—particularly as the Iraq experience suggests that the need is for more “boots on the ground” rather than new gadgets. New technologies may help, but human skills are also required.
It is obvious to all European governments that they can get much better value from their defence budgets by working together more effectively.
Since almost all do not see a direct threat to the security of their own territory, their missions will almost all be intended to improve regional or global security. They will therefore always be operating alongside other countries.
One way to achieve value is for each to be able to provide specialist capabilities that complement rather than duplicate those of their partners.
Several steps have been taken over the past two years to improve Europe’s co-operative capabilities. All 25 European Union members have signed up to a European Security Strategy, which identifies some of the threats they have to face.
They have founded the European Defence Agency, intended to forge a coherent approach to capabilities that are needed, and to Europe’s defence industrial base. Brussels is also devoting much more money to defence technology research. Meanwhile, across town at NATO, a new fast-action Response Force is being set up.
These moves—and more—are essential because, much as we would like it not to be true, the need for intervention to stabilise potentially threatening situations is unlikely to diminish. The lessons being learned in this process will be valuable to all nations, including India.
(The author is Assistant Director of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.)
He can be reached at nicoll at iiss.org