"If you look at the past and present records of Washington's invasions and subversions, it's clear that Washington has been best at helping pro-Washington regimes suppress domestic challengers, that it has been better at subversions (from Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Afghanistan to Yugoslavia and Ukraine) than invasions, and that the peoples targeted by it (with the great exceptions of Cubans and Venezuelans) have been generally better at fighting against its invasions than protecting their governments from its subversions or overthrowing pro-Washington regimes." ------------------------ Yes, which is exactly why there was so much anxiety and opposition within the US and international ruling class in the leadup to the invasion of Iraq. Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Kissinger, Clinton, Gore, Kerry, etc. considered the Baathist regime a nuisance rather than a threat which could be contained and squeezed and, in time, either housebroken (like Libya) or overthrown from within. They didn't share the swaggering confidence of the Wolfowitz-Rumsfeld-Cheney crowd that the war would be a cakewalk, widely supported by the Shias and Kurds, with relatively few US casualties, and paid for out of Iraqi oil revenues. For the Democrats and Republican old guard and the US general staff, an invasion didn't warrant weakening the US's alliance system and international standing, and diverting its attention and resources from other theatres like North Korea. In general, they considered the early Bush regime a maverick one in its foreign policy dealings with America's allies and foes alike, one which would destabilize a very favourable global situation which had emerged for the US after the collapse of the USSR and the integration of China in the capitalist world economy. These reservations were not only privately held, but publicly aired and vigorously debated in the popular press. The invasion has so far confirmed their views.
Subversion is their preferred option because it is less costly and less publicly noticeable and objectionable than invasion. It's success derives from the higher US standard of living which is a powerful lure for the world's peoples, who often suffer from the illusion they can reproduce it by simply copying its political and economic forms and doing the US's bidding. Corrupt governments which have already alienated their people or governments which preside over a deterioration of living standards are obviously the most vulnerable. Governments like the Cuban and Venezualan which are perceived as incorruptible, as stubborn defenders of national sovereignty, and which demonstrate a concern for the social welfare of their people are the best counter to the universal subversive appeal of higher US living standards. But even though these are necessary conditions, they may still not be sufficient, as Central and Latin American history (Nicaragua, Chile, Guatemala) unfortunately demonstrates.
Notwithstanding that invasions are ostensibly less successful than subversion, it doesn't follow that targeted regimes would prefer to be invaded rather than subverted, and I don't think you meant to imply as such in your remarks.
John Bizwas wrote:
"The Clinton administration commissioned studies to involve the use of the US military's ground forces...planning before and after the 1998 act of legislation involved the use of US ground forces." -------------------------------------- Undoubtedly such planning was undertaken. Contingency planning is a regular, congressionally mandated, requirement of US defence policy under all administrations. The Clinton administration also continued to develop contingency plans for nuclear war, but there is as much evidence it was actively preparing a massive ground assault on Iraq by US troops as there is that it was actively preparing for a nuclear war - which is to say, none.