[lbo-talk] How Mr Pugliese Should Learn to Bowl a Googlie Without Forced Emigration to India or the West Indies. Part 1 Agriculture in the USSR.

Hari Kumar hari.kumar at sympatico.ca
Sun Feb 15 07:30:22 PST 2004


The recent strands on how poverty stricken the USSR was, and hwo Stlain had so destoyed its agricuature & well being, reminded me of a fiarly long-winded book on Lysneko & Modern day gene Thoeries - that I had done some 15 years ago. I am certian none would wish to wade thru' that. Nonethelss some excerpts are worth perhaps consdiering. While the vlaiant googlies of Mr Pugliese are certianly meritorious & deserve the Stakhanovite Medal of Google, he will be no cricketer I regret. For the googlie that he missed wa refenrces that perhaps even the msot hostile to my views here, might accord some noddign repsect to - Levnis & Lewontin in the "Dialecticla biologist". So - Forgive me Doug, but I precis just some portions of this in two posts. I shall be scruplous to your limits oif nubmemr of posts. Shoudl a 1 or 2 bytes be exceeded, i ask that you extned me the smae courtesy that you do to others - I am certainly not a prolific poster here. For those interested in the whole tedious lot, go to; http://www.allianceML.com/Lysenko/lysenkotable.html

THE CRISIS IN POST WAR AGRICULTURE AND THE STALIN PLAN TO TRANSFORM NATURE After the growth of the population in the USSR by 1929 to 12% more than in 1917, and with an area of grain under production only 90 % of the pre war figure, and a continued increase in land parcellation (24.5 million households in 1928), the move to collectivisation by Stalin was totally necessary. This resulted in an immediate increase in the Expansion of the Sown Area. This is depicted below in Table One drawn from McCauley, Martin. "Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture." London 1976. p. 25. & CUT& McCauley's Source: Summary of Fulfilment of the First 5 Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR (Moscow 1933) p.159.

&There has been some dissension as to whether or not the policy of collectivisation had adequately dealt with the agricultural problems of the USSR. However, even hostile forces to Stalin are forced to acknowledge that in general the measures were successful: "By the great expansion of acreage under collective cultivation and the imposition of very low prices on the produce of that acreage, the government achieved its main goal : enough grain was delivered to the state each year.. The Bolsheviks had reason to begin, as early as 1932, the periodic boasts that they had solved Russia's grain problem. In other senses they could not .. overlook the fact that grain yields per hectare had declined. The average for the periods from 1930-1934 was ..14% lower that the average for 1925 -1929." Joravsky, David : "The Lysenko Affair"; 1970; Harvard., p.64-5. "Even as critical an expert observer of the Soviet agricultural scene as Naum Jasny could not deny that: 'The socialization drive in Soviet agriculture achieved to a large extent its major purpose of serving as a basis for the industrialization drive."

Harry Shaffer in : Soviet agriculture, an assessment of its contribution to economic development. Ed Harry G Shaffer. Kraeger Press London, New York 1977. p.62. But even before the Second World War and the consequent devastation of the USSR, there was a continuing need to expand the area of arable land. Stalin pointed out in 1929: "The question of cultivating unused and virgin land is of tremendous importance for our agriculture.. the pivot of the revolutionary movement in Russia in the old days was the agrarian question.. one of the aims of the agrarian movement was to do away with the shortage of land. At that time: 'There were many who thought that the shortage of land was absolute, ie. that there was in Russia, no new land suitable for cultivation. And what has actually proved to be the situation?.. Scores of millions of hectares of free land were and are still available in the USSR. But the peasants were quite unable to cultivate unused and virgin lands, they longed for "soft" land for the soil which belonged to the landlord, for soil which could be tilled with the aid of peasant implements by individual labour. It is not surprising therefore that our Grain Trusts.. equipped with tractors, is now able to place under cultivation some 20 million hectares of free land.. unoccupied by peasants and unfit for cultivation by individual labour with the aid of small wretched implements." Cited by M.McCauley, p.23.

Thus the innovations such as the Machine and Tractor Stations. There is little doubt that in the countryside, these averted the potentially crippling lack of suitable machinery. But a further impetus towards farm expansion was now present. Despite the blatant lies that we discussed above on the so-called "famines", it was true that a serious situation existed in agriculture. A potential famine in the Ukraine, did exacerbate the crisis in the countryside. In the winter of 1927-28 5 million hectares of winter wheat perished. By the Summer 1928, a large expert group: "Toyed briefly with the notion of treating winter wheat that could be planted in the spring but they dropped the notion as impractical. The scientists at the meeting had also tried to overcome the belief of many practical delegates that certified pure breeds of wheat were more susceptible to winter killing than the mongrel peasant varieties.. Iakovlev the chief of agricultural journalism and propaganda had given public support to this..belief. everybody (including Iakovlev) agreed, on the extreme difficulty of solving.. winter killing. Vavilov: 'One must not shut one's eyes to the great difficulties, to the enormous amount of work that alone can lead to a basic solution of the most important tasks'.. Disaster struck again.. about 7 million hectares of winter wheat perished in the winter of 1928-9." Joravsky, David : "The Lysenko Affair"; 1970; Harvard. , p.61. The dire straits of the Ukraine were conducive to the support of Lysenko, who had : "A plan of action.. "super-early sowing ", and "sowing close to the winter." p.61 Joravsky. &&&&..CUT&&&&&..

It is of obvious interest, that current Western texts on soil management cite practices quite similar to Williams. Thus J.H.Stallins when discussing soil conservation in areas of wind erosion says:

"In the Great Plains.. the safest practice is to return all fields West of the 20 inch rainfall belt..to grass, at best on a rotation basis for a period of 5-7 years. Such a rotation is more likely to maintain much needed crop stubble and other residues for wind protection to improve soil structure and to promote other favourable conditions than is the conventional cropping system ..." Stallings JH, "Soil Conservation"; New Jersey 1957. Prentice - Hall Inc; p.248.

In fact, contrary to the agricultural crisis being the fault of Stalin's policies, Western authorities suggest that it was since Khrushchev led the abandonment of the rotational scheme of Williams, that major agricultural deficits began in the USSR:

"The virtual abolition of the grass land system of crop rotation (ie.Travopole system of Williams) without enough fertilizer and cultivation equipment to make such an undertaking a halfway acceptable risk proved costly in the long run in terms of soil deterioration and depletion of fertility that is not easy to restore." Harry Shaffer p. 69. In "Soviet Agriculture. An assessment of its contribution to economic development ".

McCauley compares the similar Northern areas of Saskatchewan Canada and Kazahkstan USSR, and finds similar weather and land problems. He points out:

"A most striking difference in the agronomical practices between the two areas under study is the amount of clean fallow regarded as necessary in Saskatchewan. It averages between 30- 4 % even higher in certain parts. The Soviets employed 10-15 % during the Khrushchev years." McCauley, P.173.

Much scorn has been heaped on the ambitious proposals post Second World War, to transform the Steppes of Russia from a hostile wind swept area to an arable farming area. These plans were termed the "Stalin Plans to Transform Nature". But modern Western sources acknowledge the general value of wind breaks:

"The utilization of trees as windbreaks in humid areas where wind erosion constitutes a problem is relatively simple." p.257 J.H.Stallings Op Cit. "Shrubs and tress make good windbreaks and add greatly to a North Dakota homestead.. windbreaks and tenacious grasses and shrubs are especially effective.. rye planted in narrow strips across the field is sometimes used on peat lands. All of these devices for wind erosion control whether applied in arid or humid regions and whether vegetative or purely mechanical are after all, but phases of the broader problem of soil moisture control." The Nature and Properties of Soils. p.565-4. Nyle C Brady. Cornell University and USAID. McMillan New York 1984. The German invasion of the USSR had wreaked an utter devastation. There was an urgent need post Second World War to extend agriculture, after the Second World War, into wherever possible.

"The sown area of the vast RSFR in 1945 was 25 million Ha less than in 1940. In the USSR the sown area decreased by 36.6 million Ha between 1940 and 1945. In Kazakhstan the drop was 770,000 ha." McCauley, p.30. -------------------------------------------------------Pt 2 coming------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



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