> But remember, originally they wanted to pastoralize Germany and
impose a
> punitive peace. They only reversed course under pressure from
communism
> and the left.
A formulation which is open to misinterpretation. 'Communism and the left' continued to want to pastoralize Germany and impose a punitive peace long after Secretary of State Morganthau's plan was shelved in Washington. It wasn't because of the left's desire to re-build Germany that Washington felt under pressure, but for fear that if they didn't the soviets would take this demoralised country by force.
-------------
Hari Kumar tries to make the case that Soviet agriculture did well under Stalin. But we all know that the USSR lost millions to famine in the thirties. We also know that the USSR was *importing* grain from the USA in the 1980s.
There is no getting away from the fact that Lysenko's bad science was enforced as a dogmatic belief because it was supposed to demonstrate the superiority of 'Marxist' science. (A child of six could have explained to Stalin that Marxism has no special insights into natural laws if he had been allowed to, but not, apparently to Hari.)
---------
Quoth Doug on the Iraqi resistance:
|
| "Dunno about that - the capitalist hyena press, or at least the NYT
| branch of that beast, reports that the occupation forces have been
| fairly successful at arresting leaders of the resistance. And it's
| not likely that they could have captured Saddam himself without some
| help from the locals."
|
Possibly, but many popular resistance movements were troubled by informers. The Provisional IRA always found it difficult to secure a majority of the catholic population, let alone any measure of protestant support, while the war was on. But still it was, I suggest, a legitimate anti-imperialist movement, with popular roots, by virtue of its all-Ireland aspirations. (Ironically, it has since becom
I find it difficult to assess what is going on within Iraq, whether the movement is popular or not. Clandestine activity is not necessarily evidence of elitism - it might just be a necessity. I have been more struck by its comparative audacity and success than its failures. Certainly killing local policemen is not necessarily taboo, if they are widely seen as collaborators.
But as far as I can see the elan of the Iraqis who are taking on the western forces and their local allies does not arise out of confidence in their popular base. Rather they are encouraged by the indecisiveness at the core of the occupation.
No doubt Iraqis read the papers, too. They must have noticed that the US failed to secure Western support for the invasion. They must have noticed the rows over weapons inspections and intelligence. And they must have seen the demonstrations in western capitals as well as arab ones against the war. They will have noticed, too, that their current military rulers keep insisting that they do not want
It seems likely that some Iraqis are emboldened to take action less by the degree of popular support on their own side, than west's nervous fluttering.
If my assessment is not too far off the mark, it is also what one might expect in the international context. Nationalist movements per se have been in abeyance in the post-Cold War era - except in the imagination of the Great Powers, who were wont to see every local leader as a 'nationalist' challenge to their rule. But the uncertain nature of western domination has tended to provoke conflicts.