> >I guess some western sympathisers with the Iraqi resistance are hoping
> >for a
> >mounting backlash in the US. But I'm not encouraged by the historical
> >precedents on that score, e.g. in spite of the 50,000 US dead, Vietnam
> >appears to have had few long-term political effects.
>
> Oh, it did. It inhibited the U.S. from direct military interventions
> (except cakewalks like Grenada), encouraged the use of proxies (e.g.,
> the contras), ended the draft. Even the Bush admin understands the
> political math that there are severe limits on the number of
> casualties the U.S. forces could sustain. Even the present level of
> casualties is causing him political trouble. They probably thought
> the invasion of Iraq would turn out to be more like Grenada than it
> has.
>
> Doug
>
>
> --I think that is the point I've been trying to focus on, like it or
> not this resistance was really not anticipated by the war party,
> whether it ramifies itself in the bush or hitchsonian form. nor is it
> anticipated that there will be resistance, armed and otherwise, to this
> illegal occupation in one year and two years time, though of course it
> will still exist and likely grow. the hope, from what was rather
> apparent in the early moments of the 'victory' was to march on to Syria
> and Iran and somehow transplant the experience of peacefully imposing a
> puppet government of privatizers in these countries.
> The reality is, for better or worse, that almost nothing in the US or
> Britain has occurred that is responsible for holding up those plans,
> and in Iraq, whatever one wants to say about the form of resistance
> that has emerged, there has occurred activity that has slowed up the
> Bush-Blair onward march plan.
>
> Steve
I don't call the 25 years from the fall of Saigon to the invasion of Afghanistan "long term" in foreign affairs, but anyway...
If the resistance-sympathisers in the US really wanted to end the occupation and to greatly reduce the risk of foreign invasions by US ground forces, they would be out there campaigning for Kerry (considering the Democrats' history post-LBJ). A prospect which wouldn't fill me with much enthuaism, I must admit, but then I'm also "cynical" enough to also see some perverse advantages for the US left (possibly the world left) in having a lame duck ultra-imperialist administration in Washington, for at least another four years...when it comes to situations like US presidential elections and/or insurgencies by (discredited) nationalist forces and religious fanatics, I'm tempted to think: "que sera, sera".
Even if the Iraqi insurgents did not exist, there would be nowhere that the US could now realistically invade without a huge risk of losing, simply because the US military would still be stretched to the limit. Occupations tie up large forces, even without resistance. N.Korea is armed to the teeth. The Iranian and Syrian govts are far more popular with their own people than Saddam's was, and an invasion of either of them now might well draw the antipathy of the other and neighbouring peoples. Cuba and Venezuela would also be difficult (to say the least). The cabal needs some kind of pretext --- which takes years to build up by propaganda --- and how many other regimes provide ready-made ones?
Steve, I suppose the Iraqi Communist Party's support for privatisation (by an elected Iraqi govt) only further condemns them in your eyes? Regardless of why they they might think privatisation is a good idea at the moment?
regards.
Grant.