Yoshie asked:
> Have you guys actually made historical comparisons of various
> imperialist wars and anti-war movements against them in their first
> years?
Yes, as it happens. And I note that your figures don't count Iraqi police/army deaths at the hands of the resistance! Or the relatively small size of the US forces in Vietnam before 1965, vis-a-vis those in Iraq in 2003-04.
More importantly, my understanding is that -- whatever the real strength and "quality" of the S.Vietnamese forces may have been -- US forces were only numerically larger than the local forces for a very short time.
That is to say, I think you are underestimating (as so many do) the extent to which Vietnam was a civil war. According to one source I've seen, as early as 1952 the French-controlled Vietnamese Army had 60 battalions -- roughly equal to the Viet Minh at the time -- and was already doing more of the fighting than the French regular army.
The US Army is perhaps not the most reliable source on Vietnam, but nevertheless:
"At the time of the 1954 armistice, the Vietnamese armed forces numbered about 205,000 men and consisted primarily of infantry units under French officer and noncommissioned officer cadres. This force included 152 infantry battalions, 2 airborne battalions, 2 imperial guard battalions, 2 highlander infantry battalions, 2 armored cavalry squadrons, 6 artillery battalions, and 5 engineer battalions. Under TRIM guidelines these units were reorganized into four standard field divisions of 8,100 men each and six light divisions of 5,800 men each and a number of territorial regiments. The air and sea elements were smaller, ill-equipped, and poorly trained.
Following the June 1954 cease-fire, and the subsequent division of the country, Army strength decreased rapidly. The primary cause was a high desertion rate during the redeployment of troops from North to South Vietnam. During the reorganization period, French officers and noncommissioned officers were withdrawn, and a lightly armed auxiliary force was inactivated. Army strength decreased even more sharply after 1954, while navy and air force strength gradually increased. The armed forces as a whole, however, remained below the 150,000 level supported by the United States."
* * * *
"Activation of new units created by the force increases was to be completed by the end of 1961. However, by the end of August, Vietnamese armed forces strength was only about 153,000--far short of the 170,000 goal."
* * * *
"At the beginning of 1972 South Vietnamese combat strength was formidable: about 120 infantry battalions in 11 divisions supported by 58 artillery battalions, 19 battalion-size armored units, and many engineer and signal formations. On the front line were thirty-seven Ranger border defense battalions (mostly former CIDG units) and in reserve, twenty-one Ranger battalions and both the airborne and the Marine divisions. This powerful force of almost 429,000 men (South Vietnam Army and Marine Corps) was supported by a Navy of 43,000 men operating 1,680 craft and an Air Force of 51,000 men flying well over 1,000 aircraft, including about 500 helicopters.
The territorial force became stabilized at about 300,000 Regional Forces and 250,000 Popular Forces men, marshaled into about 1,679 Regional Forces companies and 8,356 Popular Forces platoons. The Regional Forces group and later Regional Forces battalion headquarters and administrative and direct support logistic companies were created to assist sector and subsector headquarters in managing these growing forces; however, the trend toward incorporating them into larger units--brigades and divisions--was generally resisted successfully.
[...] The greatest expansion in supported levels occurred in the National Police forces, which rose from 16,900 in 1962 to 116,000 and in the local militia, which rose from 1 million in 1969 to more than 4 million by 1970. It should be noted that the militia forces were at best part-time personnel, and their organization, the People's Self-Defense Force, represented an attempt to involve all levels of the population in the war effort, whatever their military value."
[Brigadier General James Lawton Collins, Jr., 1991, _The Development and Training of The South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972_ , Department of the Army, Washington, DC. http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/devtrainrvn/index.htm
regards,
Grant.