[lbo-talk] Counter-Insurgency (LBO-Talk = Outliers)

Charles Brown cbrown at michiganlegal.org
Mon Feb 16 09:59:11 PST 2004


From: "Seth Ackerman"

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Let me ask you a few questions. In about two days of nonviolent demonstrations last month, Sistani and his forces accomplished what the armed resistance failed to do in months of blowing stuff up: They forced the US to scrap its plans for choosing a new Iraqi government. Doesn't that alter your assessment of the effectiveness of armed struggle in this situation?

^^^^^ CB: There is the old dialectic of militant/moderate , by which the moderate reaps the benefits of the militant's pressure on "the Man". For example, no '67 civil insurrection (riot) in Detroit, no '73 election of Coleman Young as Mayor. It's sort of our good cop/bad cop routine.

But for the armed struggle, no Sistani successes.

^^^^^^

Another question: All signs now point to the US caving to Sistani on elections. A likely outcome at this point is an agreement for a temporary handover of sovereignty to the Governing Council (formal "end" to occupation) June 30, followed by free national elections late this year to choose a permanent government. Sistani insists only an elected government should be allowed to sign a status-of-forces agreement with the USA. The US may be forced to cave on that too. Under that scenario, a year from now, Iraq will have a democratically elected government and independence from the US. None of this is guaranteed, the US is liable to try all sorts of tricks, but that's the direction things are heading in and Sistani has enormous leverage. So why is armed struggle necessary, unless you're fighting for Sunni dominance as opposed to national independence?

^^^^^^^

CB: Same answer: If the U.S. didn't fear the armed struggle turning into a Viet Nam, they wouldn't be moving so fast in response to Sistani. Sistani is able to say, "do you want me or them ?"



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