>Actually I have, several times. But I'll repeat an analysis I stole
>from Garry Wills' Nixon Agonistes. In the 1950s, Wills argued,
>liberals and leftists complained about how Eisenhower sucked, and
>assumed when they got a vigorous Dem into office everything would be
>better. But things didn't get much better, so a lot of people
>decided that it's wasn't a matter of party or personnel but The
>System. That's why the 60s happened.
I think the 60's happened because material circumstances had changed, necessitating cultural change. However cultural attitudes had been stuck in a pre-war model. So the social revolution of the 60's happened a bit like an earthquake, because so much pressure for change had built up.
> I think a similar thing happened in the 80s-90s sequence - the
>problem in the 80s was Reaganbush, but after a few years of Clinton,
>it became clear to a lot of people that the problem was The System.
>Thus the growth in campus activism, the (anti)globo movement,
>Seattle.
Unfortunately for this theory, it is not at all clear that, after a few years of Clinton, a lot of people did come to the conclusion that "the problem was The System". Enough, if not most Americans, came to the conclusion that the problem was the Democrats, so they voted for the Republicans instead. Hence an eventual Republican victory is the only inevitable result of a Democrat electoral victory. Which seems quite pointless if you think about it.
A tiny minority may have realised that the problem was the capitalist system. A slightly larger minority may have concluded that neither the Democrats or the Republicans were the answer (which is not at all the same as rejecting capitalism, though it is probably a step along the road) and voted Green.
After a few years of the Republicans, most Americans will inevitably decide that the problem is the Republicans and again vote for the Democrats. And so it goes, like mice on a treadmill. So long as great credence is given to the fantasy of the contest between Tweedledee and Tweedledum, many people will even be attracted to the notion that all that is necessary is to get rid of that incompetent Tweedledee (or Tweedledum) and replace him with Tweedledum (or Tweedledee). Which will, at least for a time, blinker them to the realisation that neither is the solution.
I'll elaborate on that, because it is important. The notion that people will be so disillusioned by the failure of Tweedledee that they will abandon electoral politics ignores the fact that disillusioned voters are more likely to decide that electing Tweedledee was a good plan, it was just not executed correctly. A different Tweedledee is all that is necessary and they will probably become immersed in the shenanigans of the party to try to get it "on track" for next time.
>I'd also argue that it's good for radicals when politics is more
>about the party in power not doing enough good things than when it's
>about trying to defend the social gains of the 20th century against
>a gang of knuckle-dragging cretins.
No, this doesn't sound good at all. The "radicals" for whom politics is about "the party in power not doing enough good things", will be sucked into the black hole internal party politics, from which (according to the laws of physics) no good can ever come. If this is what you mean by good things perhaps coming from the election of a Democrat administration in Washington, then you may very well be right about it being an outcome, but it is poor judgement to believe it is a good outcome.
For some reason I assumed that the "good things" that you hoped would come of it were more ambitious than the hope that good people would be sucked into internal party politics. That is no place for radicals, you have said as much yourself. It is certainly no strategy for radical politics.
Bill Bartlett Bracknell Tas