> >They both serve the interests of particular national/ethnic
> >bourgeoisies and manipulate working class patriotism to achieve
> >their political aims in support of enhanced accumulation.
>
> The national/ethnic ruling class (landlords and bourgeoisie) have
> tended to come to anti-colonial nationalism more slowly and
> reluctantly than peasants, the working class, and the petit
> bourgeoisie have
Not necessarily, e.g. modern Irish nationalism began within elements of the Anglo-Irish bourgeoisie and spread "downward" from them, until it reached everyone except the bulk of the (northern) protestant petty bourgeoisie and working class. (cf http://www.tau.ac.il/tarbut/readers/syllabi/suzman-2-ethnicity.htm )
And I don't know how one could possibly justify the above generalisation logically, or on the basis of much historical evidence, since the configurations and balances of class forces --- i.e. settlers v. compradors v. nat bourg v. proletariat --- are so different from one colony to another and fluctuate within them.
> Also, leaders of anti-colonial nationalism may very well be
> socialists or left-wing populists, who come under attacks by those
> whose economic interests are threatened by their politics.
True, although these forces don't tend to last long unless they either (1) swing some kind of revolution, or (2) form an alliance with elements of the capitalist classes.
> Nationalism and national
> capital are not the same thing.
Perhaps not when they first appear, although throughout modern history there has been a distinct tendency for successful left nationalist movements to gradually slide into neo-bourgeoisies (e.g. too many to mention).
> >Industrial development always means domination, usually by a
> >national or comprador bourgeoisie (except in the Soviet-type states,
> >which relied on another form of domination).
>
> There are differences in degrees of domination, with different
> impacts on peasants and the working class.
IMO a Lenin-type approach is needed for a minimal-pain route to development. I mean there may well have been no (capitalist) industrial development in (e.g.) Indonesia had the groundwork been left to the left-nationalists under Sukarno. In other words, the rise of Suharto was necessary for both imperial capital _and_ Indonesian capital to prosper _in_Indonesia_.
> >>The only way for people to "contest the concrete form in
> >>which'progress' had taken them by the throat" is to construct their
> >>own national state (Nairn 1977).
> >
> >Or an "internationalist" state, as in the case of the
> >(pre-Stalinist) Bolsheviks.
>
> You mean the internal composition or foreign policy of the USSR?
Both, pre-Stalin anyway. I mean that Bukharin devised "socialism in one country" out of necessity --- i.e. the anticipated western European revolutions failed to fire --- _not_ out of a sense of nationalism. (Whereas Trotsky's solution to the problem was "permanent revolution".) None of the main players were nationalists, except for Stalin.
> The national bourgeoisie are, more often than not, content with
> playing economically lucrative if politically subordinate positions
> in the politics of global capitalism
Here we get into a definitional problem; in development literature, what you have described is generally referred to as a _comprador_ position, rather than a national bourgeois position. A national bourgeoisie, by definition, is generally opposed to (e.g.) the increased competition which comes with neo-liberalism.
> >As I've said before there is no
> >correlation between historical dominance/resistance to imperialism
> >and the later fortunes of a society. In fact, some of the most
> >"colonised" peoples are later the least "annihilated".
>
> If you've said it before, I've missed it. What comparison do you
> have in your mind?
The particular point/comparison I've made before is that Thailand and Ethiopia, neither of which was formally colonised for very long (if at all), have experienced very different economic histories in the last half-century. Which suggests to me that internal class dynamics (including intra-ruling class dynamics), are more significant in terms of development than the role/s or disinterest of imperial powers. Also (e.g.) Hong Kong and Singapore, neither of which even existed as cities prior to the British Empire, have clearly been the sites of both massive social trauma _and_ economic success. Like other tiger economies, both of these are doing much better economically than some faded imperial powers.
> >>This critique was important as it emphasized that cosmopolitan
> >>internationalism was - and is - a creed of the centre:
> >
> >Ah, that eternal and mythical centre which is so hard to find....
>
> Hard to find any center if you are set on not seeing it. Not so hard
> to find it if you are pushed around by it, I'm sure.
The point is that --- apart from Russia in the early 1920s --- where have cosmopolitan internationalists actually been in charge of a cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic state?
> >"Crypto-imperialist" in what sense?
>
> Like many others [Aflaq] assumed
> that the French Communist Party favoured the independence of French
> colonies, but this illusion was broken in 1936 when the Popular Front
> government left the colonial structure intact, and the Syrian
> communists accepted this as an accomplished fact.
I'm not here to defend the strategies of the PCF and the 3rd International in the 1930s; however, there was the bigger picture of the fascist threat in Europe, the Popular Front, etc. The PCF did not hold power in its own right and its coalition partners did not support decolonisation.