Free Intelligence Briefing
Originally Posted on January 26, 2004
Japan in Iraq: Deploying Troops, Greasing Hands and Seeking Oil
Summary
The Japanese have paid tribal leaders near the southern Iraqi city of As Samawa a lump sum of 10 billion yen ($95 million) to provide security for Japanese forces that will soon be stationed there. Tokyo sees the "investment" as more than a simple bribe to ensure that Japanese soldiers are not shot, but rather as the first step toward resurrecting Japanese claims to Iraqi oil.
Analysis
News broke Jan. 26 that Japan is paying local tribes in and around the southern Iraqi city of As Samawa 10 billion yen ($95 million) in a lump sum to purchase security for its incoming 1,000-strong security force.
While a portion of the cash undoubtedly will go toward security, the primary reason for cutting the check -- and deploying to Iraq in the first place -- is to revive Japanese economic interests in the region.
The media are having fun with the report; most articles about the issue are rather tongue-in-cheek commentaries about how Japan is paying the Iraqis not to attack them. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's office did little to dispel this impression with a Jan. 26 release stating, "It is rather cheap if we can buy security for our soldiers with that amount of money."
The news reports are missing the point.
Certainly Tokyo is casualty-averse. The ongoing Japanese deployment -- an advance contingent already is in As Samawa, and the rest are expected to arrive by early February at the latest - - will be the first Japanese troops in a "combat zone" since World War II. The bulk of the Japanese population is opposed to the deployment and opposition leaders have called for Koizumi to step down for violating the constitution, which expressly forbids offensive military actions.
But, as yet, not a single attack on coalition forces in As Samawa has injured -- much less killed -- one foreign soldier. There is far more to this than Tokyo simply trying to purchase the good publicity that comes from a lack of body bags.
The United States has enunciated clearly that states with minimal-to-no presence in Iraq will have minimal-to-no involvement in the country's reconstruction and gain minimal-to- no benefit from the country's oil. Washington has, in effect, bluntly informed everyone that if countries want to protect -- or even have -- commercial interests in Iraq, they will need to station forces there because the United States will not protect their interests for them. This, of course, encourages other countries to sign on to the U.S. vision of a new Iraq, and with every country that decides it wants a piece of the pie, the United States gets a new foreign force to assist with the occupation.
Japan is sending 1,000 troops into a city with no serious security concerns and spending $95 million to buy protection for them.
This begs the question: What is Japan buying?
A closer reading of Koizumi's statement gives an idea of what Japan's real interest might be. It states, "It is more important for the Japanese government to make one-time payments to the leaders than to pay them a salary. That will help their local economy and benefit Japan's foreign policy toward the new Iraq."
First of all, one-time payments do not purchase continual protection; they acquire something more concrete. Second, Japan's plans include involvement in the local economy and hold ramifications for overall Japanese policy toward Iraq.
That brings us to the crux of the issue: oil.
For Japan, garnering oil is a critical consideration. Energy-poor Japan imports more than 99 percent of the 5.2 million barrels per day of the crude it uses. A Japanese consortium representing such big names as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marabena, Itochu, Tomen, Chiyoda, JGC and Toyo already is negotiating with the Iraqi provisional government over staking claims to Iraqi oil fields.
And indications are that Tokyo has placed its "security fee" in just the right hands. In 2003, local Iraqi tribal sheikh Abdul Ameer al-Rikaabi, whose al-Rikaab tribe remains the pre-eminent powerbroker in the area around As Samawa and An Nasiriyah, visited Tokyo as Japan was deciding where its troops should be stationed. According to an Iraqi Stratfor source in the United States, al-Rikaabi once counted himself among former leader Saddam Hussein's most powerful allies, but after a falling out became a staunch anti-Baathist.
For Japan, the foray to As Samawa will be a return to Iraq, not a completely fresh start. In the 1980s Iraq was a leading source for Japan's all-important crude imports and -- just before the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis shut off the flow -- Japan was in the final stages of negotiating access to Iraq's billion-barrel Al Ghavraf field. Initial expectations -- with the technology available in the 1980s -- were that the field would produce 130,000 barrels per day.
Its location?
Less than 40 miles due east of As Samawa.
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