Wednesday, Jul 14, 2004
New regionalism in Central Asia
By M.K. Bhadrakumar
The Central Asian states are looking to reduce their vulnerability to external interventions.
CENTRAL ASIA has become a testing ground for "new regionalism," characterised by incipient trends of multipolarity. Assumptions that the region, following the establishment of the United States' military presence there three years ago, was set to become an American sphere of influence are looking facile. The disastrous Iraq war and the consequent loss of American credibility - as the "champion" of democracy and human rights and as the guarantor of the security of globalisation - is impacting on Central Asian political consciousness. Recent developments point to the Central Asian countries moving towards "new regionalism" that would help reduce their vulnerability to external intervention.
This trend is underscored by three pivotal events in June. Following a summit meeting between the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and his Tajikistan counterpart, Emomali Rahmonov, in Moscow on June 4, the two countries agreed to enter into a strategic cooperation with wide-ranging political, economic and military dimensions.
Among other things, Tajikistan granted free of charge to Russia the right to use ad infinitum the Nurek space surveillance centre, one of the most advanced military establishments in the former Soviet Union with a capability to track satellites up to 40,000 km in outer space. Nurek is a Cold War legacy and is still one of only four centres in the world with such
formidable capability. There had been speculation that under American pressure, Tajikistan would turn down Russia's pending request. Mr. Putin and Mr. Rahmonov further agreed that Russian border guards would continue to man Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan.
This was also an issue on which Tajikistan had come under concerted Western pressure. Tajikistan is the only country in the region where Russian forces continued to be stationed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Again, Russia agreed to write off $300 millions in debt and offered extensive participation in Tajikistan's hydroelectric projects.
These agreements ensure a pronounced Russian role in Tajikistan for the foreseeable future. Given Tajikistan's sensitive location vis-à-vis Islamic radicalism, major powers have viewed the country as a vital beachhead. Lately, Western scholars have all but cited Tajikistan as a case study of the "decline" of Russian influence in Central Asia and of the region's steady drift towards a strategic tie-up with the U.S.
If the Russian-Tajik concord was important enough to be noted on Central nAsia's political chessboard, two subsequent events involving Uzbekistan in mid-June underscored the point that the winds of change are blowing across the region. Uzbekistan accounts for over 40 per cent of the region's population; it has by far the most powerful standing army in the region; it has an industrial and technological base; it possesses a rich and diverse base of agricultural and mineral resources and rare earths; and it is in geographical terms the hub of the region's communication links.
Not surprisingly, in the past three-year period, the U.S. Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, visited Tashkent as many as four times. Mr. Rumsfeld assessed with satisfaction during the last visit in February 2004 that "our relationship is strong and is growing stronger." The U.S. correctly estimated that the fastening of Uzbekistan in the stables of American regional policy would be winning half the Great Game.
Yet Uzbekistan has veered toward "new regionalism." On June 17, Tashkent hosted a summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan sought and obtained the privilege of locating the SCO's Regional Anti-terrorism Structure in Tashkent. At the summit, China made an offer of $900 millions as loan and trade credits. The SCO announced plans for its rapid deployment forces to stage war games in late July. SCO member-countries will coordinate on Afghanistan and to this end, will keep a Contact Group in Kabul.
The SCO summit meeting itself took place in an extraordinary setting. The day before the meeting, on June 16, Mr. Putin and the Uzbek President, Islam Karimov, signed in Tashkent a strategic partnership treaty which brought together several threads of cooperation in the political, economic, military and commercial spheres. The treaty commits the two countries to building a regional security system. It says "the sides grant each other... the right to use military facilities on their territory."
Apart from large-scale military exercises, the treaty opens the door to extensive military cooperation such as Uzbekistan procuring military hardware from Russia, training its personnel in Russian military academies, and coordination of the air defence systems. Russia's participation in the Uzbek military-industrial complex (for example, the Chkalov Tashkent Aircraft Production Company which manufactures IL-76 aircraft) and in Uzbekistan's uranium mining and enrichment facilities were also envisaged. The economic dimension involves Russia investing $2 billions in Uzbekistan's energy sector. (In comparison, cumulative American assistance for Uzbekistan since 1992 amounts to $900 millions).
For Russia, the agreements with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signal a commitment to regain lost influence in Central Asia. They augment Russia's special relationships with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. For Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, strategic partnerships with Russia underline the willingness to rethink the fundamental modes of their post-2001 alignments (gravitating towards the United States), and to explore new frontiers of regionalism attuned to national interests. The Central Asian leaders have articulated their disenchantment with U.S. policies in the region, including Afghanistan.
What are the factors inducing this shift in the co-relation of forces in Central Asia? Eduard Shevardnadze's summary ouster from power in the United States-orchestrated "velvet revolution" in neighbouring Georgia last December was surely a turning point. Central Asian political elites took serious note of the "regime change" in Georgia.
Their resentment of the intrusiveness of Western diplomacy began to be openly expressed. Meanwhile, an opportunity has presented itself in the new purposiveness of Russian (and Chinese) policy towards the region. But the crunch came with the Iraq war and the incremental depletion of American power and influence globally. The Central Asian states have been quick to sense that the "war on terrorism" could be heading in uncertain directions.
(The writer is a former Indian Foreign Service officer who has served extensively in Central Asia.)
Copyright © 2004, The Hindu.