Ayaz Amir Corner
28 May 2004
Moderation and modernism
By Ayaz Amir
President Musharraf spent time at a students' convention in Islamabad and delivered a lengthy speech. He is in a position to do things. He prefers making speeches, often at great length. Polonius's golden advice to his son about brevity being the soul of wit has never been highly regarded in the councils of the Islamic republic.
Take Gen Musharraf's call at the convention for reviewing the Hudood and blasphemy laws (the Hudood laws covering, for the most part, the mortal sins of drinking and adultery). "After all," he said, "these are human-made laws and there is no harm in reviewing them."
Stirring stuff except that after four and a half years in the saddle, it might not be unreasonable to expect the generalissimo to do something about these laws instead of repeating for the hundredth time the need to review them.
General Zia promulgated the Hudood laws through an ordinance. An ordinance can undo them. But Pakistan's mullahs are dead opposed to their repeal and Gen Musharraf, despite what you might think from his commando uniform, is given to treading carefully. So, in lieu of action, we get laudable declarations.
Hypocrisy, not Islam, is the fruit of these laws. But try telling this to a full-blooded maulana and you'll be threatened with hellfire. The rest of the generalissimo's speech too was notable for the usual suspects. He called for rejecting extremism and for making Pakistan a "tolerant, moderate and progressive nation."
Fine but who's given Pakistan its image problem as a jihad-friendly nation? Who espoused jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir? The army in command of politics or the people with zero input in decision-making? All right, times have changed and the army, under the impact of the attacks of September 11, has moved on, from jihad to a new state of blessedness called "enlightened moderation".
But when you are responsible for a mess in the first place, isn't some humility in order? Perhaps elsewhere but not in our climate. For the way army commanders now go on, you would think they had never heard of jihad.
Straighten this one out too. How on earth do you make any nation "progressive" when the army barricades democratic space and insists on running the show itself? Pakistan under Musharraf is no different from Indonesia under Suharto. The army permeating every institution of state, in the process destroying its own elan and crippling what it touches.
The only difference and for which--let there be no cavil about it--Musharraf is likely to be remembered is the scope allowed for freedom of expression. For all its other shortcomings, Pakistan remains a relatively open society, far better in this regard than most other Muslim countries.
Lest memories be short, this is a radical advance over the Zia years when no one could criticize the army directly, much less the ISI. Which leads to a strange paradox. Even as the military spreads its wings, it stands stripped of its holy cow status. The demystification of the army was long overdue. But it has accelerated under Musharraf, in part owing to the army's involvement in too many things.
Who knows this may be a good augury for the future. Change comes about when the old order is discredited. Or when it outlives its utility. Suhartoization is doing the military no good. The more it seeks conspicuous privilege, the more it goes into real estate and housing colonies, the worse becomes its image problem.
The discontent of the Ayub years was summed up by that evocative phrase "22 families": the industrial mafia in whose hands, it was said, national wealth was concentrated. Fairly or unfairly, what the 22 families stood for then, defence housing colonies stand for now.
In a different development, confirmation now comes from the president of what was known in "informed" quarters for some time: that some junior military personnel, mostly warrant officers and the like from the air force, are in custody in connection with the attempts late last year on his life.
It was suspected at the time that given the level of information seemingly available to the conspirators about the president's movements, there was an inside dimension to those attempts. So it turns out to be.
If rumour is to be believed, these personnel have had a pretty rough time in detention. They haven't been digitally photographed as at Abu Ghraib. But, according to the grapevine, their interrogations have been far from gentle.
The human rights industry in Pakistan is for the most part just that, an industry. So no point in asking any of its worthies to do something. But Amnesty International and the ICRC could look into this matter.
Of wider concern to the public should be the motivation of these individuals. What led them to take part--allegedly of course--in so dangerous a business? For over 20 years the Pakistan army, especially the ISI, was involved in various forms of jihadi activity: against the Soviets, then in support of their favourites like Hekmatyar, then in support of the Taliban.
At some point this activity also spilled over into Indian-occupied Kashmir. With the ISI as its auxiliaries were various jihadi organizations like the Lashkar-i-Tayyaba and, later, Jaish-i-Muhammad.
When this culture of jihad was in full bloom, it was considered the greatest thing happening in Pakistan. Indeed, right until the eve of September 11, General Musharraf subscribed as strongly to this orthodoxy as any of his peers.
His change of heart and that of the army command only came about the morning after when America piled on the pressure and it became clear that there was no way of avoiding a reverse gear on Afghanistan. From jihad Pakistan swung suddenly to "moderation", all in the twinkling of an eye.
In the first flush of this conversion, Musharraf maintained that the Kashmir policy would remain unchanged. Then as it became clear that signing on for American duty was a package and involved not only change in Afghanistan but also renunciation in Kashmir, the army command started singing a different tune, now proclaiming a war on religious extremism.
You can't blame some people for being confused and feeling betrayed. For 20 years they had heard one mantra, now overnight they were hearing another. What fed the sense of betrayal, however, was not simply the fact that Pakistan was renouncing old policies.
The u-turns could be explained and justified by reference with September 11 and the feelings of revenge and bellicosity those attacks had induced in the United States. Harder to explain was the blind passion with which Pakistan became a convert to the US cause.
Breaking ties with the Taliban was one thing. Actively helping America in its war on the Taliban, catching Taliban suspects and handing them over to the US--in short, carrying loyalty beyond the call of duty, way beyond the frontiers of necessity--was something a bit different.
This, I suspect, was the emotion which produced Pakistan's own crop of would-be Islam boulis (Islam bouli being the Egyptian radical who killed Sadat). It can be argued that whatever the stimulus, it is a good thing Pakistan has turned its back on the past. But, in any real sense, has it?
Gen Zia's military rule was the disequilibrium which produced jihad. Jihad may have ended but the disequilibrium in the form of another version of military rule remains, with the army still operating on the principle that it knows best for Pakistan.
Moderation was something forced on Pakistan. What Pakistan must seek for itself is 'modernism', a modern, forward-looking outlook on life which, if the past is any guide, it won't achieve as long as the army retains its stranglehold on politics and refuses to allow democracy to take hold.
© The DAWN Group of Newspapers, 2004