At 2:15 PM -0500 27/3/04, Yoshie Furuhashi argued:
>The virtue of the Condorcet method is its ability to eliminate the
>pressure on voters to vote to defeat the least desirable candidate
>rather than reveal their true preferences, by allowing voters to
>rank the candidates (like Instant Runoff Voting) and by refusing to
>eliminate the candidate with the least first choices (unlike Instant
>Runoff Voting).
>
>That Ralph Nader turned out to be the Condorcet Winner in 2000 shows
>how unusual the 2000 election was, according to Bruce C. Burden:
>
>[...]
>The Condorcet criterion is a desirable method of choosing among
>multiple candidates because it sets the threshold of victory high.
>Condorcet argued that a winning alternative ought to be capable of
>defeating all other alternative in head-to-head comparisons. That
>is, A should be the victor only if she beats both B and C in paired
>situations. . . .
This premise is quite irrational. Whether or not a candidate would prevail in a head to head contest with any other particular candidate is not relevant if it isn't a head to head contest. That is, if there are other candidates as well. So what decision voters would have made if the options were completely different is hypothetical, entirely immaterial.
Besides which of course, in the case in point Nader would not have had the slightest chance of prevailing in a head to head ballot with Gore for the US presidency. The assumption here, that 100% of Bush voters would have preferred Nader to Gore, seems completely mad. To deny them the right to vote for the candidate of their choice, Bush, as the supporters of the Condorcet system seem to advocate, is contrary to every principle of democracy to start with. But it wouldn't work out as the author of this article supposes anyhow, more likely the frustrated Bush supporters would simply boycott the election. And Gore would have won.
Only a crank or a democraphobiac would advocate an electoral system designed to elect candidates who are the least offensive though. There is nothing desirable about the Condorcet system. Its is a system which seems primarily designed to thwart the will of electors and prevent even an overwhelming majority of constituents from being able to elect a candidate with radical policies which offend any significant minority. It is a poisonous recipe for conservatism. It is utterly antidemocratic.
But of course, I would just like to emphasis again, it is in no way shape or form a system of proportional representation. In fact it is almost exactly the opposite of PR.
Bill Bartlett Bracknell Tas