> MG:
> > by itself promotes individual resignation. Nevertheless, as someone who
> > appreciates constraints, you can't disregard that the greatest
constraint
> on
> > social change is, in fact, a relative lack of hardship -- as is
presently
> > the case except for certain pockets in Western society.
--------------------------
> I disagree with that statement. Eastern European societies under the
Soviet
> rule were remarkably free from hardship, yet a push toward social change
> there was remarkably strong. The above argument ignores the fact that
> 'social change' does not necessarily involve violent protest action - as
> many dinosaurs from the 1960s seem to think. It involves all kinds of
> changes; from family roles to input in the political process...
> I would go as far as arguing that Western democracies underwent more
social
> change at all levels - from persons, to family, to doing business to
> politics than any other country in the world...
> Another factor is the intensity and effectiveness of propaganda. US is
> perhaps one of the most heavily propagandized society on the face of the
> Earth, and that propaganda diffuses and channels any attempt at social
> change. So the relative reluctance of many people to embrace social
change
> here is more likely to be a result of propaganda rather than lack of
> hardship. In fact, people experiencing the most hardship are usually
those
> who are most resistant to social change (cf. rural areas of PA and I am
> pretty sure other "backward" regions), while middle class is probably
> over-represented in various social movements. The same can be said about
> the Islamist movement - it recruits mainly middle class followers, not the
> downtrodden masses.
-------------------------------------
You appear to saying change is happening all the time, at all levels of
society, and who can disagree with that? I thought we were talking about
more concentrated convulsive and often violent changes involving large
numbers of people, and the combination of desparation and hope which gives
rise to these periodic mass efforts to escape distress. Your point about
Eastern Europe, though, is well taken, and you could have added China. These
were "quiet revolutions" (counter-revolutions, more accurately) aimed at
capitalist restoration. Marxists were quite unprepared for this momentous
reversion to private ownership, and had dismissed entirely that it could
come about non-violently. You've reminded me otherwise, but I still see
politics, yesterday and today, as essentially turning on the division of
property, with large-scale disputes around this issue mostly being settled
by force, between or within nations.
As to your other points, I don't think the domestic propaganda machine - that is, culture rather than economics - is a sufficient explanation of the conservatism of lower-income Americans; nowhere was propaganda more pervasive than in the USSR and China, but it proved incapable of containing the changes described above, which were economic in origin. Nor do I agree these Americans are inherently conservative - there are no fixed social characteristics for any people -- and I've already noted that absolute hardship in itself is not a trigger for change, but that an external shock is required. Finally, like all social movements, the Islamist leadership is drawn from the wealthier educated classes, but its growth has clearly been among the downtrodden. Were conditions to sharply deteriorate in the US, I expect the the social movements there would also rapidly grow long working-class tails.
MG