[lbo-talk] Re: Looking for a way out

John Bizwas bizwas at lycos.com
Tue Nov 23 16:44:42 PST 2004


The exchange with M.G. continues:


>>When the economic, political and national security costs of the destruction outweigh the ostensible benefits - a point that is being pressed upon the administration, as the Boston Globe article illustrates, by its closest friends as well as opponents like us.>>

Well, it might be the case, though, that the Stanley Roaches and Greenspans of the world have read the ziocons, neocons and even some zioliberals far too benignly--as well-connected, intuitive-thinking economists are wont to do. What if, instead, the real destruction is the destruction of the US's system of economic, monetary, political and military alliances that gave us 'globalization' and the WTO? Perhaps they think that some chaotic revision of the whole thing is necessary to re-assert US dominance. Perhaps a lot of these ideologues for the new model Repug party (as well as a nationalist but pro-Israeli faction of the Democrats--well, most all of the Dems then) really want a major revision of the post-war system, since trade deficits, a devalued dollar, and overwhelming mountains of debt can't work in that system anymore. Simply put, sooner rather than later, the US would be asked to join the 'regimes' and 'regimens' that the World Bank and IMF and the WTO asks of all other favored trading partners, and now the rulership is saying, FUCK NO, we can't do that.


>>JB: ...in the historic case of SE Asia, the US didn't officially occupy all the countries it was bombing.>>

MG
>>You're kidding, right? The half million US troops in Vietnam weren't an
"occupying power", but there at the "invitation" of the Saigon regime?>>

There is a distinction here, so don't get coy. The UN has officially recognized the USuk alliance's occupation of Iraq. That means, officially, the alliance is in charge of Iraq. Even with the installation of the Allawi puppet regime, the alliance is the official occupying power. Besides, if you read more generously what I wrote, you might figure out that you yourself had been talking about Laos, Cambodia and N. Vietnam in terms of all the bombing the US was doing. That's way, way different than the US bombing the country it officially occupies. War crimes trials of historic proportion are entirely due, which will just make the ziocons and neocons (and a lot of their zioliberal backers) even more desperate to incinerate any system that could go after them.


>>JB: Do you really think Bush and CentCom are going to let a Sunni Council and al-Sadr form a coalition government?>>

MG:


>>It won't win over the entire Sunni and Shia restistance, but it wants to split and coopt some of them. "To move forward, both the U.S. and the
interim government probably will need to set aside concerns about negotiating with representatives of groups that might have actively supported the insurgency with money, weapons and foot soldiers...Before the Fallujah invasion, the coalition of Sunni groups negotiating with the U.S.>>

It simply can't not have it both ways. What it wants is Kissinger in Paris or 'six nation' talks with Kim il Jong (a known madman with sexual perversions and many, many nukes, right?). But the situation is different, entirely. As I said earlier, the Fallujah operation was a malignant attempt to split the Sunni and the Shia resistances--as are recent kidnapping and assassinations of prominent Sunni clergy (as were earlier bombings of Shia festivals). If there are elections in Jan. next year and al Sadr participates, then the US will have succeeded. My itching intuitions tell me it's not going to be so easy, but al Sadr hardly wants to be a martyr now either.

Meanwhile, as I also said, it's very doubtful the US military can do anything besides drop bombs on the rubble of Fallujah, so insurgents of all types have their 'killing zone', and they intend to kill as many US troops as possible between now and the election. So as the puppet regime's phony elections approach, will al Sadr start campaigning as a politician against any occupation, against the destruction of Najaf and Fallujah, against the forced refugee status of 500,000 Fallujahns, against a totally failed 'reconstruction'? The key as to who is right about who and what will prevail is al Sadr. But history is contingent. If the US doesn't outright kill al Sadr, Allawi's thugs might do it regardless.


>>insisted, among other things, on..." (WSJ, Nov 16); "Asia Times Online
contacts in Baghdad confirm that Muqtada is frantically negotiating with Sistani: the crucial point is how many parliament seats Muqtada will get if he joins a united list of all major Shi'ite parties in the January elections." (Asia Times, Nov 19)>>

Sistani isn't even supposed to be a power broker in any political set up to begin with. Asia Times is usually a very iffy source, and quite often a straight conduit for planted stories. Al Sadr's militancy depends on his leadership; his political force is a broader-based group of groups. There are pro-al-Sadr people who are going to join a political process, but the real al-Sadr people are going to, by their very nature, make demands that neither the US nor Allawi can live with.

The key question here is: can al-Sadr claim his 'birthright', defeat the non-Arabic speaking Sistani, and assert a Shia-based Iraqi nationalism? Sistani's status is much too much pumped up by the US because it hopes to manipulate Iran's influence to its own benefit. I think, my intuition itching again, that time will show Sistani is a spent force. His Nero act over Najaf and Fallujah proved that to me--and I'm intuiting, most Iraqis as well.


>>Leaving aside the "socialistically oriented", what are we arguing about
then - over whether the Americans will endorse this outcome? >>

If you haven't studied the movement that al Sadr is leading, then perhaps you ought not even to leave out my characterization of it. Don't be so dismissive, OK?


>>That's the point. They may have no other choice to get their troops out other than to not only accept, but to forge, a broad coalition of the contending Iraqi forces.>>

Why do you read the national security state so simplistically? If taking the troops out of Iraq means a loss of budgets, they won't take the troops out of Iraq. If they have to orchestrate a civil war to justify staying, they will. I would argue they have already done that. It's the militant Sunni (many of whom also opposed Saddam) and al-Sadr vs. Allawi and the Kurds. With their multi-media productions, apparently CentCom can even get most Americans believe such phoniness as the idea the US presence prevents the Sunni militants and al-Sadr from starting a civil war. Quite clearly, they have emerged as largely in agreement on a post-US agenda, and are willing to lose blood getting it. The US will do anything in its power to prevent this nationalistic coalition from taking political power.


>> Probably an unstable coalition which would fall apart after they
leave, but they'll cross that bridge when they come to it. >>

There is no way that they are going to do that. They would prefer to stay until the country falls apart while they are there. Again, I would argue, that's pretty much what has already happened. They can't govern and reconstruct, so no one else will be allowed to govern and reconstruct. The bridges have been burnt. CentCom can't go home. And they also promised to get the f- out of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia once the newly democratized compradore of Iraq built their permanent bases for them.


>>Right now, it seems to be more important to get their troops out and end end the chaos.>>

You read the national security state much too benignly. We got a hint of what you are hoping for here in that first dream-like state Kerry achieved in his first debate. Then all talk of that sort of thing disappeared entirely from the campaign, with both Kerry and Edwards promising to kill as many terrorists as possible, including any terrorists in Iraq who resist the rule of law. Back to the lies because the truth was too, too awful to contemplate.


>>Only the appearance of a broad coalition involving elements of the armed Iraqi resistance could provide that kind of cover -- a US withdrawal "by agreement" with a new Iraqi government seen as enjoying broad popular legitimacy.>>

The destructio of Fallujah says otherwise. Allawi in Iraq will be less popular than Karzai in Afghanistan (though at least Karzai can say he is 'Pashtun', and identify with the majority ethnicity of Afghanistan). Both sides (the USuk coalition vs. the anti-US Sunni-Shia coalition) are at their end games. Something has got to give, and give it will.

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