Thursday, October 28, 2004
Through a Kashmiri gate
The Big Idea | G. Parthasarathy October 27
Addressing the English Speaking Union in Karachi on April 11, 1999, just six weeks after what was labelled as a 'historic' bus journey by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Lahore, Pakistan's then relatively unknown army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, stated that the Lahore Declaration advocating a 'composite dialogue process' was nothing but 'hot air'. He proclaimed, "India is a hegemonic power. Low-intensity conflict with India will continue even if the Kashmir issue is resolved." Musharraf then knew that soldiers of his Northern Light Infantry had seized hilltops overlooking the strategic road linking Srinagar and Leh.
He believed that the Indian army that had endured ten years of 'low intensity conflict' in J&K didn't have the stomach to recapture the hilltops through frontal assaults involving high casualties. He was proved wrong. The Kargil misadventure led to Pakistan being labelled as an irresponsible country, coupled with American pressures to respect the 'sanctity' of the LoC. A few months later, a former director general of the ISI was asked at a seminar in Islamabad what the aims of the ISI were. He replied, "Our aim is to weaken India from within and we can do it."
These assertions by high Pakistani military officials contradict the oft-repeated Pakistani claim that there can be no durable peace till the 'core issue' of Kashmir is resolved to its satisfaction. There were several rounds of discussions between India and Pakistan between 1972 and 1989. Pakistan never raised the issue of J&K or described it as a 'core issue' in any of these discussions.
The first time that Kashmir was formally raised was shortly after the shameful surrender of the V.P. Singh government during the Rubaiyya Sayeed kidnapping in December 1989, when Pakistan's then Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yakub Khan met his Indian counterpart I.K. Gujral. The jubilation in the Valley that accompanied Rubaiyya's surrender persuaded Pakistan that it should transfer its attention from fomenting low-intensity conflict in Punjab to a 'jehad' by ISI-trained Pakistani nationals in J&K.
Finding political collaborators in J&K wasn't difficult. The All-Party Hurriyat Conference came up under ISI tutelage, with substantial encouragement from Robin Raphael in the US State Department. Pakistani diplomats in foreign capitals used to joyously proclaim then that not only was Kashmir going to fall into their lap, but the Indian Union itself will consequently disintegrate.
Pakistan has to be dealt with a multi-pronged strategy. Most importantly, we have to strengthen communal harmony and promote respect for pluralism within India. Pakistan will see the futility of seeking 'parity' with India only when we are at peace domestically, our economy is growing at 8 per cent per annum and our armed forces possess the capability to inflict unacceptable damage in response to Pakistani sponsored 'low-intensity conflict' - whether in Kashmir, Punjab or the North-east.
Kashmiri disaffection was accentuated primarily by rigged elections like those held in 1987. The 2002 elections were the first truly fair elections in J&K in nearly two decades. While any domestic dialogue proc-ess has to be inclusive, we shouldn't pamper separatists with Pakistani connections. There is no consensus or dialogue within Kashmir about what people want and how they should proceed. Pakistani journalists who visited Jammu and Srinagar recently encountered a variety of views ranging from condemnation of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism to calls for either independence or autonomy. New Delhi should support an intra-Kashmiri dialogue aimed at evolving realistic and consensual ideas for the future.
The ongoing 'composite dialogue process' with Pakistan is not going to be without pitfalls. We should foster greater interaction between the two countries. It is only when we understand each other better and cease to be 'distant neighbours' that we can address more difficult issues. Moves to promote tourism, reopen the rail link through Rajasthan and promote travel through Amritsar should be expedited. Youth and professional exchanges have to expand. Our security establishment is as guilty of discouraging such exchanges as its Pakistani counterparts. We're also discussing steps to reduce tensions and enhance cooperation. There's no scope for sentimentality or misplaced generosity in this dialogue. We should not become energy-dependent on Pakistan through projects like the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline unless Pakistan gives us transit facilities to Afghanistan and ends discrimination in trade, investment and business collaboration.
Likewise, there should be no pullback from our positions beyond the Siachen Glacier unless Pakistan agrees to acknowledge existing ground positions and redeployment positions on signed maps. It is only when Pakistan realises that we have the patience and perseverance to take measures that will keep its costs for anti-Indian hostility high that it will moderate its behaviour and ambitions on Kashmir.
New Delhi should not dilute adherence to the provisions of the Parliamentary resolution of 1994 declaring the whole of Kashmir an integral part of India until the contours of a mutually acceptable framework are evolved. Any talk of moving the LoC eastwards is irresponsible. The only possible framework would involve extensive and identical autonomy granted by India and Pakistan for the entire state of J&K, including PoK and the Northern Areas.
We should endeavour to make Kashmir a region that unites rather than divides India and Pakistan. This would involve the free movement of goods, services and people across the LoC. There should be as free access for Pakistanis to visit, do business and invest in Srinagar as there would be for Indians in Skardu, Muzaffarabad or Gilgit. When restrictions on free movement of goods, services and people across the LoC end, both Indian and Pakistani currencies can become legal tender throughout J&K. These moves will have to coincide with significant progress in efforts to establish Safta and a South Asian Economic Community. It is meaningless to permit free trade and investment across the LoC while retaining barriers against such cooperation across the international border.
Institutions could be set up that include freely elected representatives on both sides of the LoC and of the governments of India and Pakistan, to address issues of common concern, like in Northern Ireland. We should soon establish transport links between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, Kargil and Skardu and Jammu and Sialkot, without procedural delays. Pakistan has changed the demographic composition of both PoK and the Northern Areas with Punjabi, Mirpuri and Pashtun settlers. This will have to be reversed if J&K has to be given a special status.
There are examples in Europe where contentious issues have been imaginatively addressed. These have involved substantive autonomy short of independence. We could look at how issues between Finland and Norway over the Aland Islands were addressed. The 'Andorra approach' of a co-principality is not particularly relevant, but contains interesting features. There are also innovative ideas in the agreement involving Italy and Austria on South Tyrol, the Trieste model and the Northern Island model.
While all these examples may be useful, they wouldn't be entirely relevant in dealing with an issue that arose because of the circumstances under which India and Pakistan emerged as separate Nation-States in 1947. There is no dearth of lawyers and constitutional pundits in India and Pakistan. They can provide innovative suggestions once the basic framework for addressing the Kashmir issue is agreed upon. But no effort for reconciliation can move forward as long as the Pakistan establishment resorts to 'low-intensity conflict' and terrorism to 'weaken India from within'.
The writer is former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
© HT Media Ltd. 2004.