Johnson's Russia List #8390 2 October 2004 davidjohnson at erols.com and davidjohnson at starpower.net A CDI Project www.cdi.org
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JRL RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT Issue No. 25 October 2004
Editor: Stephen D. Shenfield shenfield at neaccess.net
For back issues go to the RAS archive at: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/jrl-ras.cfm
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CONTENTS --------
Introducing the issue
BESLAN AND THE CHECHEN CONFLICT
1. Book notice: life in a war-torn society
2. The aftermath of Beslan: the local dimension
3. Beslan and corruption
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INTRODUCING THE ISSUE
I thought I should open this issue with a group of pieces pertaining to the tragedy at Beslan. I don't have a general analysis of my own to offer, though it seems to me that much in the special issue of the RAS on Chechnya (No. 7, April 2002) remains relevant. So does the ethnographic study of Chechen society at war by Valery Tishkov, an English-language edition of which has just appeared (item 1).
However, I draw attention to two aspects of the Beslan episode that have been neglected in most commentaries. The first is the impact on LOCAL politics and ethnic relations (item 2). Beslan is not just a town somewhere in Russia. It is in a specific ethnic region, North Ossetia, and that matters. My second theme is the crucial role that corruption plays in making terrorist attacks possible (item 3).
Beslan has given Putin a pretext and opportunity further to strengthen presidential power. In particular, regional governors will henceforth be appointed not elected. The second section contains two pieces on presidential power, one on Putin's reform of federal-regional relations (item 4) and the other on the crucial but rarely analyzed institution of the presidential decree in Russia and Ukraine (item 5).
The next section focuses on two questions concerning the future shape of the Russian economy: the likely effects of accession to the World Trade Organization (item 6) and the problem of corruption in bankruptcy proceedings (item 7).
Under "Demography" we consider a specific aspect of Russia's demographic crisis -- the mortality of middle-aged men. Why has their death rate risen so high?
In the "Russia and the World" section we look at two of the businesses that help to shape the interaction between Russia and other countries--arms exports (item 9) and transnational matchmaking (item 10). Is there a connection between item 10 and item 8?
In the history section, we look at an important study of the cultural and intellectual development of the Tatars--Russia's second most numerous ethnic community after the Russians--in the late tsarist period (item 11). Then a reminder of what life was like in Stalin's death camps (item 12).
To add variety to our subject matter, this issue has two new headings, though I don't plan to include them in every future issue. One is on problems of Russian language (items 13 and 14). Is "YO" a separate letter of the Russian alphabet or not? And why is the fourth finger of the hand called in Russian "the finger without a name"? Finally, I offer a few reminiscences of my early encounters with Soviet reality as an Esperantist (item 15).
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BESLAN AND THE CHECHEN CONFLICT
1. BOOK NOTICE: LIFE IN A WAR-TORN SOCIETY
Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society (University of California Press, June 2004)
This is an abridged translation of Valery Tishkov's penetrating ethnographic study of Chechnya in the throes of war, which "Nauka" published in Russian in 2001under the title "Obshchestvo v vooruzhennom konflikte: Etnografiya chechenskoi voiny" [A Society in Armed Conflict: Ethnography of the Chechen War].
The author is director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The book is highly recommended for many reasons, but above all for the unique testimony it contains from interviews with 54 Chechen informants, including 15 who fought in the war of 1994--96. Even those who do not accept Professor Tishkov's theoretical interpretations will find this material extremely valuable. The ugly daily realities that underlie the ideological camouflage on both sides are exposed to the light of day.
Regrettably, only about half of the original text has been translated and much has been lost in the process of abridgement. So I recommend that you read the Russian edition if you can.
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BESLAN AND THE CHECHEN CONFLICT
2. THE AFTERMATH OF BESLAN: THE LOCAL DIMENSION
SOURCE. Institute of War and Peace Reporting <info at iwpr.net>, Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 252 (Special Report on the Beslan Tragedy, 9/8), No. 253 (9/15), and No. 254 (9/23)
The dominant concern in North Ossetia, as in neighboring Ingushetia, is the Osset-Ingush conflict, which centers on the territorial dispute over Prigorodny Rayon. (1) Both Ossets and Ingush have tended to view the Beslan attack through the lens of their local conflict.
Russian TV identified two of the hostage takers as Ingush. (2) Rumors that circulated among Ossets exaggerated this report. Many Ossets came to believe that the majority of the terrorists were Ingush and only a minority Chechens. Moreover, they believed that some of these Ingush terrorists were residents of North Ossetia; some even claimed to have spotted Ingush neighbors among them.
In early September spontaneous rallies took place in North Ossetia at which calls were made for revenge against the Ingush. One demand was for the expulsion of all Ingush from North Ossetia within three days. Tension was especially high in Prigorodny Rayon, but in Vladikavkaz too (the North Ossetian capital) the situation was very dangerous.
On September 4, hundreds of young people set off in an ugly mood for the suburb of Kartsa, where there is an Ingush community, and a pogrom was only averted by the intervention of the South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity, who persuaded the crowd to turn back.
Anti-Russian and anti-Putin slogans were also heard at the Osset rallies. This appears strange in view of the traditional reliance of the Ossets on Russian support in the face of perceived threats from other Caucasian ethnic groups. The demonstrators were angry at the failure of Russia to protect them. According to one observer, they felt that the Russians are "incapable of anything except lying." No high-ranking official had even come to Beslan until the crisis was over.
Among Ingush, conversely, rumors circulated that some of the terrorists had been Ossets, and even that the attack had been orchestrated by extremist Osset politicians as a provocation, for the purpose of whipping up hatred of Ingush and scuttling recent improvements in relations between North Ossetia and Ingushetia.
There were also fears of an imminent Osset attack on Ingushetia. Perhaps Putin too thought there were grounds for such fears, as on September 4 he ordered the closure of all North Ossetia's borders, both with Georgia and with other Russian regions.
NOTES
(1) "Prigorodny" means adjacent to a town or city, the city in question being the North Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz. The Russian word "rayon" means district or county. When Stalin deported the Ingush (together with the Chechens) in 1944, Prigorodny Rayon, previously part of Ingushetia, was incorporated into North Ossetia. Most Ingush demand its return. Armed hostilities took place in the district in 1992.
(2) A great deal of confusion surrounds the personal and ethnic identity of the terrorists.
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BESLAN AND THE CHECHEN CONFLICT
3. BESLAN AND CORRUPTION
Russian officials used to attribute a large part of the blame for the continuation of the Chechen insurgency to the failure of Georgia and Azerbaijan to prevent fighters from making use of their territory as a base and refuge, from moving freely across their borders in and out of Chechnya, and from smuggling in arms and supplies. (1)
This theme has lost its former salience. Russia now has the military cooperation it sought from its neighbors in the South Caucasus, and with their assistance Chechnya's southern borders have been effectively closed--at least to the extent that mountain borders can ever be closed. The Pankisi Gorge in northern Georgia is no longer a safe haven.
And yet the insurgency continues on as large a scale as ever. Given the closure of the borders and the massive presence of federal forces in Chechnya, how do the insurgents / terrorists keep going? Where do they get guns, explosives, and so on?
There is only two possible answers: from the Russian black market in arms and directly from the federal forces themselves, sold by corrupt servicemen and officials. This is what Putin has in mind when he links Beslan to the problem of corruption. Or part of what he has in mind--the leakage of information, for instance, is also closely linked to corruption.
The insurgents / terrorists are not short of money, thanks in large measure to their Saudi backers. (2) Nor are they short of recruits seeking to avenge tortured and killed relatives and friends, thanks once again to the same federal forces. So they have everything they need for more and more operations like Beslan. And there is no prospect of significant change in any of these circumstances in the foreseeable future.
NOTES
(1) In the case of Azerbaijan, by way of Dagestan, although that was always a very difficult route.
(2) When someone offered one of the terrorists in the school in Beslan all the town's money, he replied that they were not interested in money.
===== Nu, zayats, pogodi!
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