You would think that if the invasion of Iraq was primarily an American war for oil, with the Bush administration the instrument of US oil interests, the US occupiers would simply have invalidated the Lukoil concession and awarded it outright to Conoco. Why did the latter feel the need to move in behind Lukoil to exploit Iraq's oil in anticipation Lukoil's claim will be recognized? Similar pre-invasion concessions awarded to France's Total and other non-US companies are also expected to be honoured.
The Lukoil-Conoco deal seems to be another illustration that the avowed unilateralism of the Bush administration and invasion of Iraq did not reflect an effort by US capital to drive its European and other rivals from the field in an effort to attain absolute global hegemony. Big Capital prefers international stability and negotiating the division of the spoils to wasteful and uncertain conflicts which jeopardize profits and the integrity of the system -- at home and abroad. There is much more interpenetration of competing national capitals since World Way I, and there has not been any serious intercapitalist conflict since WW II.
This is why the Bush administration's reckless adventure in Iraq was out of step with influential sectors of the US ruling class and the international bourgeoisie who were (correctly) alarmed by its destabilizing effect on the world economy and the Middle East. The administration has since been forced back into line. It suggests also that those who see Iraq as a template for the future unilateral direction of US foreign policy under a bellicose Kerry or a Bush administration may be jumping to conclusions. A global economic crisis, with its epicentre in the US, could see a reversion to intercapitalist rivalry under national flags in conditions of scarcity, but that is not the current paradigm. The US interest in managing its complex relationship with emerging rival China, rather than confronting it, can be viewed the same way.
Marv Gandall