Monday, September 20, 2004
Pakistan at tipping point
The power struggle within will only escalate with time
Jasjit Singh
Five years after the army coup, Pakistan appears to be arriving at another defining moment in its history. The issue is not just one of Pervez Musharraf staying on or not as army chief, but the road his country will take in the coming months and years.
The economy has perked up in the past two years and should be a source of some optimism. But it seems to have had little or no impact on the common man. There has been no let up in domestic religion-based terrorism. There have been three known assassination attempts on Musharraf since December, besides aborted attempts to assassinate the prime minister and a top army commander. More significantly, perhaps, there appears to be an emerging political crisis which will undoubtedly stretch to the full Musharraf's commando instincts to survive.
The economy has done well, what with a good monsoon last year, IMF aid, debt write-offs by the US and its allies, and substantive inflows of foreign exchange from the expatriate community under pressure of measures introduced after "nine-eleven." But official figures of a dramatic jump in per capita income are more due to other factors than any actual rise in the people's earning capacity. In fact, the World Bank estimates that the country will have 50 million people below the poverty line by 2010 (up from 40 million in 2000).
Little has happened to modernise the 15 lakh madrassas (religious seminaries, many of them centres for imparting training for jihad) in the country although Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and General Musharraf have a vision to transform them. Changing the madrassas to a more modern secular framework may take much more than another decade with concerted efforts which are not yet in evidence. These and other factors continue to sustain a deep emotional and ideological commitment to religion with a significant proportion resorting to radical extremism and terrorism in the name of religion. And the Pakistani army remains a leading partner in this process.
Musharraf is committed to cooperate with the US and its war against international terrorism (read Al Qaeda). But in spite of nearly a year-old, much hyped "hammer and anvil" US-Pak combined operations on the Afghanistan borders using helicopter gunships and combat aircraft, more reports indicate the dominance of the militants rather than the success of the combined operations. Islamabad, of course, is using these opportunities to obtain more weapons for its military (like 18 F-16s against a demand for 70) as it had done when it was a frontline state for the US last time in Afghanistan.
The pressure to curb domestic terrorism, now impelled by the need to control the increasing frequency of assassination attempts targeting the top leadership, in which the significant involvement of military and ISI personnel is a new phenomenon, would no doubt lead to deeper tensions on strategy and tactics within, and a reaction by Islamists outside. The fact that this is taking place concurrently with Islamabad's "cooperation" with the US in its War against Terror creates the ingredients of an explosive situation. Continued support to jihadis in J&K and eradication of domestic terrorism, leave alone terrorism abroad, can hardly achieve tangible results in either. But Musharraf is unwilling to jettison the jihad in Kashmir even as he claims that no terrorism will be allowed from Pakistani territory.
What does this imply for us? One, there are signs that a shift in Pakistan's Kashmir jihad strategy is underway. It will try to sustain terrorism in J&K with minimum infiltration to project disassociation with it in support of the oft-repeated statement that no terrorism would be allowed from Pakistani territory. We need to remember that Musharraf is all set to eliminate the Taliban, not the jihad in Kashmir. Ready acceptance of a cease-fire on the LoC, allowing the fence to be built uninterrupted, repeated claims by Pakistan that no infiltration is taking place, etc. all point to this shift. Pakistan's deniability, then, would have an increasingly receptive audience in the west while terrorism would continue in J&K and pressures on India to contain the "indigenous" violence and improve its human rights record will increase.
Two, Pakistan seems to be heading for difficult times due to its domestic power struggle. Prime Minister Jamali had started to show signs of being less pliant than he was expected to be. So he had to go, and go quickly. Since no other political leader could be trusted after the political vacuum created by Musharraf was filled by religious parties and groups, the only option was to elevate Shaukat Aziz and the corresponding political jugglery of an interim prime minister. Aziz and his cabinet have promptly pressed Musharraf to stay on as the army chief to ensure the continued centralisation of power.
Three, the MMA has shown little inclination to cooperate with Musharraf; the old romance is over. The Islamic parties' new-found political clout in addition to their traditional street power presents a new dimension after the recent changes. Musharraf needs them and can't act robustly to control them. This also means that he can't control religious terrorism in and outside Pakistan even if he wants to, which itself is debatable.
If the struggle for power and influence between the Musharraf-led government and the religious parties is aggravated, the scenario could yield any of the following possibilities. The army may be able to build the strength of political parties (even with one of the exiled leaders returning) and evolve a modus operandi for a balance of power, especially since all elements of dominant control by the army would remain in place.
Alternately, any marginalisation of religious parties, perceived or real, could trigger an upheaval since they would be unlikely to readily reconcile to a reduced role in the national power structure now. If the army does not go back to barracks, and the religious parties who retain street power and have tasted political power do not go back to the mosque, there could be an accommodation between them, or a conflict. The emerging tensions between the various centres of power are more likely to lead to the latter.
© 2004: Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.