>The fundamental problem is this semi-feudal system of local control
>of national elections, which is probably unique to the US.
But that's part of the whole screwed-up picture of a system designed to limit popular power - the three branches of government, the Senate, the layers of state and local government (we have something like 80,000 governmental units in this country), etc. Dan Lazare told me that no one outside the U.S. ever reads the Federalist Papers <http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/federalist/>, but they're worth a look. My fave is #10 <http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/federalist/federalist.10.html#fed10>:
>AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed Union,
>none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to
>break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular
>governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character
>and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous
>vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan
>which, without violating the principles to which he is attached,
>provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and
>confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been
>the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere
>perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics
>from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious
>declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American
>constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot
>certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable
>partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the
>danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are
>everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens,
>equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and
>personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the
>public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and
>that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
>justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force
>of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may
>wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known
>facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true.
>It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that
>some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously
>charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found,
>at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many
>of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing
>and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private
>rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other.
>These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness
>and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public
>administrations.
>
>By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting
>to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and
>actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed
>to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
>interests of the community.
And what are some of these mortal dangers?
>A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal
>division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,
>will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a
>particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is
>more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire
>State.
Doug