jks writes:
> Here's the problem: there's a disagreement that is ineradicable
about what's moral.
So? You keep acting as if because there is disagreement we should just abandon the affort to come to agreement. When you adopt this position, you end up like Rawls, offering theory of justice, instead of pragmatic procedures to end injustice.
Rawls' theoretical musings are defective because they are not based on life as it is lived, but as an academic imagines it would be if we were totally rational beings engaged in best practices all the time. But this is not how people exist.
> Do you want antiabortion judges acting in defiance of Roe and Casey?
No, I want them to prevent injustices from occurring which are in direct conflict with the principles that have been agreed to (theoretically) in Rawl's social contract (and why is it only one contract? Why aren't there multiple contracts?). Isn't that what judges do when they declare a law unconstitutional?
> Sure, you want judges to enforce the correct moral views (yours) -- that
goes along with your idea that people are free to disagree as long as they do
what you think is right.
No, I want them to make sure that the laws that are passed are in conformity with the underlying social contract that permited the laws to be passed in the first place. If a social contract allows for the passage of laws that contravene it, what is the use of a social contract in the first place?
What makes the liberties that Rawls' imaginary beings decided upon any better/more moral that what I posit? Somewhere (there's a place for us . . . oops . . had a Broadway moment), sometime, somehow, someone or ones decide what basic rights people have. I much prefer it be real people instead of the population of an academic pipe dream (oops . . . I did it again).
The problem with Rawls is that once his imaginary friends decide on a list of liberties it is hard to get any others added. Guess it goes to prove that if you don't get in on the ground floor . . .
Brian Dauth Queer Buddhist Resister