Also, if it's not too presumptuous of me and you want something to "prep" youself with, here's a great interview Peter had on the post-Beslan situation with Rob Ware, who is probably tied with Lieven as the foremost authority on the Caucasus writing in English.
Q&A: R.B. Ware - Chechnya's future By Peter Lavelle Published on September 07, 2004 MOSCOW, Sept. 7 (UPI) -- UPI's Moscow-based analyst Peter Lavelle spoke with Professor Robert Bruce Ware, noted expert on the North Caucasus, about what to expect in Chechnya in the aftermath of Russia's tragic hostage crisis.
UPI: Do you think the Beslan hostage crisis will change Kremlin policy in Chechnya and the North Caucasus in general?
RBW: The shake-up of security officials and local leaders has already begun, but it is unlikely to go high enough or deep enough to eliminate the incompetence and corruption that plague the administration of this region at all levels. Renewed emphasis will probably be placed upon operations by the undisciplined, demoralized, and corrupted federal troops and security forces that are already the second-greatest contributors to the instability of the region, after the terrorists themselves.
The changes that are sure to be neglected are those that are most important. The North Caucasus needs genuinely democratic procedures. Moscow attempts to control this region through the hierarchical power structures that are traditional to Russian culture. This results in Moscow's installation of local leaders who offer few virtues apart from their loyalty. Moscow seems unable to appreciate that many of the North Caucasian peoples have democratic traditions that extend back for several centuries. If Moscow would guarantee democratic practices, the local people would respond with gratitude and loyalty. Legitimately elected governments would promote stability, whereas corrupt Moscow loyalists can only undermine it.
The North Caucasus needs programs for economic development. Moscow subsidizes 80 percent of the Dagestani budget and 85 percent of the Ingush budget, but much of these funds line the pockets of local elites. Local bureaucrats, in search of bribes, pillage any local business that shows signs of growth. Currently, the only growth industries in the North Caucasus are narco-business, terrorism, and law enforcement. The anxiety and despair of the local people feeds narco-business, which proliferates through efficient hierarchical organizations. Some of the narco-business is controlled by terrorists who thereby finance their operations. Narco-business and terrorism create jobs in law enforcement, especially because North Caucasian Islamists are targeting law enforcement officials for assassination.
The North Caucasus needs help for small businesses, including micro-loan programs. North Caucasian cultures are traditionally entrepreneurial. They will build their own economies if they are given a chance.
Q. In the aftermath of hostages crisis, do you worry we could see intense ethnic conflict in the region?
A. When the Chechens were deported in 1944, part of their territory was given to the neighboring republic of North Ossetia, where it is known as the Prigorodny District. When the Ingush tried to return to this territory after 1957, they faced strong resistance from the North Ossetians. In the early 1990s, the North Ossetians fought a brief-but-bloody war with the Ingush over this territory, and won with the help of Russian troops. Since then they have been settling South Ossetians into this territory. When Ingush have settled, or have been settled, in the Prigorodny region, they have been met with hostility from the Ossetians, and Ingush children have been denied opportunities to attend schools with Ossetian children. Beslan, where the recent school tragedy occurred, is not in the Prigorodny District. However, it is possible that some of these problems formed a backdrop to the tragedy. Certainly they will figure in increasing tension and between Ossetians and Ingush, to w hich this tragedy will contribute. Isolated clashes are likely.
Moscow claims that its troops are reinforcing the Chechen border to fend off potential reprisals against Chechens. Many of the North Caucasian peoples harbor anti-Chechen sentiments, which will now grow stronger. Many Russians harbor anti-Caucasian sentiments, which will also intensify. All of this will exacerbate regional problems. Because there were already a number of tense situations in the region, these events contribute to possibilities for larger, and more widespread, confrontations. There is also a potential for violence in the North Caucasus to exacerbate recent violence in the South Caucasus, particularly in South Ossetia, but also in Abkhazia. It is likely that there will be similar terrorist attacks in Dagestan. The Caucasus is now a tinderbox, and the Islamist terrorists in the region appear to be trying to strike more and more sparks in hopes that the whole place will go up in flames. Nevertheless, outside of Chechnya there are tremendous forces for moderati on and interethnic accommodation among many of the cultures of this region. We should now be watching the Caucasus with grave concern, while placing our hopes in the judicious good sense that has kept most of the societies of this region from going over the edge.
Q. How has North Ossetia changed? Being traditionally loyal to Moscow, is it possible that North Ossetia will find it necessary to be more self-reliant in the face of terrorist activity in the region.
A. The greatest threats faced by most North Caucasians are terrorism and the Islamist extremism that the locals call "Wahhabism." Despite its numerous problems, Russia remains by far the most reliable guarantor against these threats. Though they may have reservations, most North Caucasians see Russia in this light. The tragedy in Beslan is pushing most North Caucasians, and certainly most North Ossetians, further toward Moscow. At the same time, we already have seen increased vigilantism directed against ethnic Ingush in North Ossetia. There were similar trends towards vigilantism and citizen self-protection in Dagestan following the invasions from Chechnya in 1999. People in this region were already heavily armed.
For example, Dagestani law enforcement officials sponsored a program for the voluntary surrender of arms from Oct. 1, 2003 to Dec. 1, 2003. Among the weapons that were surrendered were (more than a ton) of explosives, including large quantities of hexogen and ammonite. Also surrendered were 57 artillery rounds and missiles, three guided anti-tank rockets, 6,807 grenades, 1,256 detonators, 1,151,033 bullets, 962 rifles and pistols, 291 grenade launchers, and three flame-throwers. Dagestani officials estimate that the surrender program recovered only a small fraction of the weapons, ammunition, and explosives circulating in Dagestan, since most of those wishing to dispose of these items would be better compensated on the black market.
Q. How has or will the hostage crisis impact Chechnya's internal political environment? Not only are terrorist groups opposed to Moscow-installed leaders, but have conflicts among themselves. How have recent events played into that dynamic?
A. This is an unfortunate turn of events for the cause of human rights in Chechnya. There will now be less external pressure for reforms within the loyalist Grozny regime. This decline will be in accord with the aims and intents of militants and Islamist terrorists operating in Chechnya since chaos and abuse will assist them in their efforts to locate new recruits and funding. Chechen militants have always been a highly fluid and fragmented group. Still it is impossible to sustain the conventional Western distinction between Islamist terrorists and so-called "moderates." For example, former Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov was a radical Islamist by the time that he imposed sharia law upon a largely unwilling Chechen population in 1999. He was implicated in the Moscow hostage crisis in 2002. He claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist attacks upon civilians and police officials in Ingushetia in June 2004. Aslan Maskhadov is an Islamist terrorist. The best thing that can be said for him is that he controls few fighters. It will now be more difficult for militant apologists such as Akhmed Zakayev and Illyas Akhmadov to sustain the convenient, but illusory, distinction between moderates and terrorists. In Beslan the terrorists shot fleeing children in their backs. Yet the people of the North Caucasus have seen this same savagery from these people for years, even during the "moderate" Maskhadov regime. Unlike many Western commentators, they are not deceived by artificial distinctions between militant "moderates" and militant extremists.
Q. It is reported that a number of foreign Arab nationals were among the terrorist operation in Beslan. To what degree do you think the North Caucasus is still another expanded front for radical Islamists?
A. There are differing reports regarding the racial and ethnic identities of the Beslan terrorists. It will take a few days for the dust to settle. There are currently 80 to 150 Arab fighters in the North Caucasus. Their numbers were a little greater a few years ago. Interestingly, some of the North Caucasian Islamists have taught themselves to speak Arabic. But the greater problem is the funding from international Islamist organizations that keeps the militants going. There is no question that the North Caucasus is a front for international Islamist activity, and that it has been such for more than a decade. Radical Islam arrived in Dagestan in 1990 and was entrenched in Chechnya by 1993. In April 1994, Chechen commander Shamil Basayev took a contingent of Chechen fighters to train at a terrorist camp in Afghanistan. Arab fighters in Chechnya such as Ibn ul Khattab and Abu Walid had clear ties to international Islamist groups and served to channel funds from Islamist org anizations into Chechnya. The connections between Chechen militants and al-Qaida connected "charities" such as Benevolence Foundation are clearly documented.
Q. Some have commented that Russia is the weakest link in the war against radical Islamists. How do you respond to this?
A. Russia is an important link in the global war against radical Islam. Given the folly of the war in Iraq, I don't think that any link is weaker than the United States. The United States should provide full military support to Russia, minus American troops. Foreign troops would seriously destabilize the North Caucasus, and would soon be kidnapped and tortured. However, the United States should also link military support to improvements in Russian command and control, since corruption and abuses on the part of Russian federal security services and troops are a source of instability in the region. The United States should also use military support as leverage with which to persuade Russia to improve its support for economic development, democracy, and human rights in the North Caucasus.
(Robert Bruce Ware is associate professor of philosophy at Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville. After receiving his doctoral degree from Oxford University in 1995, he conducted field research in the North Caucasus. He is also the author of numerous articles and papers on the region.)
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