"This theory... is only a metaphysical expression for the old jus
talionis...Plainly speaking, and dispensing with all paraphrases,
punishment is nothing but a means of
society to defend itself against the infraction
of its vital conditions, whatever may be their character."
Social self-defense is compatible with the deterrent example, rehabilitative, and exclusionary rationales for punishment. It excludes the retributivist rationale.
Shane Mage
"When we read on a printed page the doctrine of Pythagoras that all things are made of numbers, it seems mystical, mystifying, even downright silly.
When we read on a computer screen the doctrine of Pythagoras that all things are made of numbers, it seems self-evidently true." (N. Weiner)
>My last word on this, although if there is any demand
>for it I will post the short discussion I have of
>Marx's two distributive principles in my paper on
>
>...Ted then points to the part where Marx says that
>retributivism is a "metaphysical expression for the
> old jus talionis" and concludes that therefore it:
> can't provide a rational justification for
> punishment in any society
> including the first form of communism.
>
>Well, the text is pretty ambiguous: I don't see the
>need to go over the stuff I said before about how MArx
>says this theory is the only thing that even counts a
>theory of punishment because it respects human dignity
>and doesn't treat people as objects.
>
>Given that this short ambiguous text of three pages is
>almost everything he says about retributivism, I am
>inclined to agree with Murphy that there's no fact of
>the matter about Marx's view as captured in his
>writings. You could cosntruct a retributivist Marxian
>view, as Murphy does, or a nonretributivist view, or
>maybe argue taht we don't want or need either a
>practice or theory of punishment under any phase of
>communism, as a lot of the people on this list seem
>think.
>
>I will only note that Ted's view that punishment
>doesn't promote human development
>
>(he says: Retributively
>> inflicting suffering isn't positively developmental
>> for either children
>> or adults)
>
>
>and therefore cannot be Marx's view presupposes a
>particular controversial view of Marx -- that the
>promotion of human development is Marx's supreme
>value, that he's some sort of (to use the technical
>philosophical jargon) eudiamonistic consequentialist
>(how's that for a mouthful!). That is not a silly view
>and it has been plausibly defended, for example, by
>Richard Miller.
>
>But it is not my view. I think that Marx's supreme
>value, like Hegel's is freedom, and this is consistent
>with, and may require, retributivism as a theory of
>punishment. I won't argue for this here and don't want
>to get into that discussion now.