17 September 2004
Sea-change: the focus shifts
By Ayaz Amir
For 56 out of the 57 years of Pakistan's existence as an independent entity, its entire military posture rested on the doctrine that the principal threat to it was from India.
The weapons systems procured by Pakistan, the placing of its cantonments and airfields, the aim of its war exercises, the rhetoric and thinking of its military commanders, the battle cries of its soldiers, were inspired and shaped by this threat. The leitmotiv of its foreign policy was India. The justification of acquiring a nuclear capability was the same.
All of Pakistan's wars have been fought with India. In 1971 Pakistan was dismembered by a combination of East Pakistani nationalism and Indian tanks and bayonets (with no small help, it must be admitted, from West Pakistani stupidity). All of Pakistan's disputes, from the major one of Kashmir to smaller ones such as those over the Wullar Barrage and Sir Creek, are with India.
Against this backdrop of unremitting hostility, the thaw in relations over the last year or so is all the more striking. Guns have fallen silent along the Line of Control in Kashmir.
True, a solution of the Kashmir dispute remains as elusive as ever but in other areas the two countries are moving steadily ahead. The eastern front on which Indian and Pakistani armies have battled twice in the past and where, in a fresh upsurge of hostility, they moved to battle positions two years ago, no longer gives the appearance of a potential battle zone.
This improvement in relations with India is a good thing and should have happened years if not decades ago. Hostility with India has weakened Pakistan, not strengthened it.
This doesn't mean we forget our differences or forgo our stand on Kashmir. But justice for Kashmir and the people of Kashmir can be demanded without going to war or remaining in a state of permanent confrontation with India.
After all, the Kashmir dispute was there even pre-1965. But in the period from 1947 to 1965, despite the trauma of partition and the genocide which accompanied it, India and Pakistan enjoyed fairly normal relations. The 1965 war, the brainchild of a self-appointed field marshal, changed everything, causing an iron or bamboo curtain to come up between the two countries.
If that curtain is now being pulled down, even if very slowly, it is something to applaud not condemn. But this applause will be tempered by the realization that this development owes less to subcontinental vision than to American pressure and prodding.
For pacifying Afghanistan and prosecuting its war against the Taliban or Al Qaeda, the United States needed the active cooperation of the Pakistan military. Only thus could the Taliban or 'jihadis' fighting the American occupation of Afghanistan be held in a nutcracker, American forces pressing them from that side and Pakistani forces pushing them from here.
It was therefore in the US interest to wean Pakistan away from its fixation with India so that the Pakistan military, its hands free, could better serve American interests in Afghanistan.
In this aim the US has largely been successful, in no small measure because General Pervez Musharraf, who cut his political teeth by vowing to stand up to India, has proved such a loyal and understanding ally.
The result is nothing short of miraculous. Physically, the bulk of the Pakistan army may still have its sights fixed on the eastern front but mentally there has been a sea-change.
For the first time in the country's history, the focus of the military has swung sharply from east to west. In theory the 'enemy' may still be India but in reality, this being a function of Pakistan's client status vis-a-vis the US, the enemy is whoever the US says is the enemy.
Pakistan hasn't abdicated sovereignty. The logic of its post-Sep 11 relationship with the US has led it to abdicate the right to think for itself. Some dangerous consequences are flowing from this state of mind. In the name of the "war against terror" the Pakistan army is finding itself pitted against some of its own people.
Is this an exaggeration? If it is, what's happening in Waziristan? Read the papers and even though efforts are on to control or filter the news coming from there, Waziristan is beginning to sound very much like Fallujah.
The military says it is battling foreign militants out there. That may be so but why are civilians, including women and children, dying as a result of air strikes? There were foreign fighters holed up in and around Wana. Question is how did they come there and when? Why did it take so long for the military authorities to wake up to their presence?
In any event, the question of the foreign militants has been overtaken by other events. The tactless manner in which military operations have been conducted, often resulting in loss of innocent lives, has inflamed local feelings, driving many locals to take up arms against the government. Every day reports pour in of fighting between the tribesmen and the army.
Nothing like this has ever happened before. Prior to 1947 troops of the British Indian army were stationed permanently in the tribal areas. It was the Quaid-i-Azam who on his first visit to the tribal areas as governor-general ordered Pakistani troops to leave the tribal areas, on the grounds that the tribesmen were loyal citizens of Pakistan and needed no one to keep them peaceful.
Since then, even though relations with Afghanistan have often been hostile, it is the tribesmen themselves and para-military forces who have kept the peace in that rugged area. Now 56 years later, the Pakistan army is engaged in combat with its own people.
First it was the Ahmadzai Wazirs who were said to be truculent. Now the Mehsoods too, whom the British were never able to subdue, are said to be up in arms. These are dangerous portents filling Pakistani hearts and minds with unease.
Nor is this all for down south unrest is sweeping Balochistan too. The grievances of the Baloch are many and while some of these may well be exaggerated, it is hard to escape the feeling that the Balochs feel exploited and neglected. If this is true, they need to be engaged in dialogue, not told that the army is building three new cantonments in the province.
What for? For the pacification of the Baloch? For 57 years Balochistan got along very well without these cantonments. In any case, cantonments were meant for India. If peace, even if induced by America, is breaking out on that front, should it imply the opening of fresh fronts elsewhere? Have we learned nothing from East Pakistan?
We need to take pause about the headlong course we are pursuing. Going along with the Americans is fine but not at the cost of alienating our own people. When Gen Ziaul Haq teamed up with the CIA and other forces to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, he was heedless of the consequences for Pakistan. When the Soviets withdrew thus fulfilling American objectives, the Americans walked away, washing their hands off Afghanistan. We were left holding the wreckage.
The same thing in a different setting is happening again. In the name of fighting Al Qaeda we are hurting our own people. Far from being satisfied, America is asking us to do more. We are even expected to win George Bush's re-election for him by working overtime to catch some 'high-profile' targets to help influence the American electorate.
Peace with India should mean turning some of our swords into ploughshares and reducing the role of the military in national life. It shouldn't mean dismantling one hostile frontier only to erect it in some other place.
© The DAWN Group of Newspapers, 2004