[lbo-talk] RE: "Wahhabism" (was: Re: Beslan...)

[Chris Doss]

This is a big topic and I'm short of time (and don't
have the info to comment on some of it), so I'm just
going to quickly comment on a couple of points.

--- John Bizwas <bizwas at lycos.com> wrote:


First, I'm just not very interested in the spiked
article -- sorry, it just doesn't shed much light,
positive or negative, on the situation IMHO so I'm
going to forget about it and pass on to material that
I think is relevant. Mea culpa.

> Made all too abundantly clear by all sides in the
> matter, including Putin's government announcing
> efforts to re-double mutual efforts in the struggle
> against terrorism with Israel (oh, or maybe he
> hadn't noticed that this country is a major exporter
> of state-sponsored terror, perhaps not, he's a busy
> guy, fighting terror and taking tips from Sharon).

Why shouldn't Russia cooperate on information sharing
with Israel? Israel has a lot of data. So does Saudi
Arabia, with which Russia concluded an anti-terrorist
agreement a couple of weeks ago.

> 

> Yet other reports deny this while talking of
> Ukrainians and turncoat anti-terrorist police hired
> in Ossetia. I'm all ears if you've got the lowdown
> because I really do want to understand and know
> more.

I believe you are referring to the Ingush policeman
who was implicated? None of these contradict each
other. Basayev mentioned Chechens, Ingush, Slavs,
Arabs and others. The information I have been receving
is very contradictory.


> 
> Which segues to discussion of the Igor Rotar
> article. First off, like the spikedonline article, I
> can't quite grasp the ideology that motivates the
> article. I mean, I'm not a Russian Orthodox
> nationalist nor am I someone who thinks Clinton was
> a leftist. Nor would I cite Huntington to support a
> thesis. But I will try to be generous here:

I don't know if you are implying that Rotar is a
Russian Orthodox nationalist or not. I have no idea if
he is, but Russian Orthodox nationalism is quite weak
(note the rapidly declining prestige of the
arch-Russian Orthodox nationalist Solzhenitsyn, who
thinks Russia should abandon all the non-Christian
territories so as to have a purely Slavic Orthodox
country). Rotare is probably trying to be trendy by
tossing in a Western reference (and he's writing for a
Western audience, after all). Few people in Russia
believe that a "clash of civilizations" is in the
works. I think that if such a class does occur, it
will be because Bush is creating it.


> So is an opponent of the opposition in Tajik a
> pro-establishment person? And what is that
> establishment? I'm confused. There seemed to be a
> lot of interference in independent Tajikistan from
> Iran and from Russia. 

And from Uzbekistan and Turkey, AFAIK.

> 
> Asking in all earnestness now, did some Shia
> fundamentalists(a major minority in Tajikistan) form
> a unity front with Sunna fundamentalists in the
> Tajikistan conflict? I would predict Iran backing
> Shia factions, as they did in the Afghanistan civil
> wars of the 1990s. Do you have a profile of the
> major viable factions? At the start, and now that a
> more stable form of post-Soviet government has
> emerged?

I don't know Tajik history very well at all, so I have
no comment. "More stable" should I think definitely be
understood in terms of "stable only against an
alternative of civil war." Tajikistan is in bad, bad
shape. 1/7 of Tajik citizens are in Russia working as
Gastarbeiters.


> I doubt that because apparently some of the
> criticism was coming from Shia groups backed by Iran
> and , as far as I know, there is just no way to
> refer with derision to them as 'Wahhabi' in any
> serious way. 

"Wahhabi," as the study I sent illustrates, is not
understood in a sophisticated sense but the people who
use it in the fSU. It is a blanket term for "those
foreign-influenced Muslims who barge in and tell us
how we, supposedly fake Muslims, should live our
lives."

> 
> This makes sense and seems quite reasonable. Sharia
> law is one way of imposing a system that treats
> everyone on the same footing (however, traditional,
> fundamentalist, and with different rights according
> to gender), at least in theory. It can be
> interpreted, declared and manifested in practice as
> a 'fair' system of rule for many traditional
> systems, and people of various backgrounds can adapt
> to it even as it evolves in actual practice over
> time. In other words, it is one way in the world to
> overcome ethnic differences and even quell
> conflicts.     
>

In fact I believe that one of the main reasons for the
growth of "Wahabbism" in Chechnya from 1996-1999 was
to quell tribal conflicts by providing a unifying
ideology that transcended clan ties. Chechnya,
especially in the mountains, is a tribal society
(actually kinship-based, but I'm not going to split
hairs). There are about 160 different Chechen "tribes"
(teips), who historically have been fighting each
other whenever they haven't been more-or-less united
against an external force. I think that this is
probably a significant factor that caused Chechen
society (what was left of it), which had been sort-of
united against the Russian Army from 1994-1996, to
immediately collapse into inter-clan bloodshed after
Chechnya achieved de facto independence. The
introduction of Shariah was probably an attempt to
rectify this.
 

> So one distinction that might need clarified here
> is, are these national identities really a
> post-Soviet form quite analogous to 19th century
> nationalism (where the artifices of state and the
> mother culture and language become the basis of a
> new religion)? One drift of your ongoing argument
> Chris, is that they aren't traditional nationalists
> but something else. I deny the Huntington thesis of
> supercultural groupings in inevitable conflict. 

I deny the Huntington thesis as well. I do not believe
(in contradistinction to the article) that "Wahabbism"
in the sense I'm talking about is usually similar or
supplemental to nationalism. I think that, in many or
most cases, it serves as a _substitute_ for
nationalism. It served to some extent, for instance,
to unite the various Chechen clans, which have very
little concept of being part of a single "nation" at
all.

Moreover, nationalism in the fSU, execpt perhaps in
its Russian form, is pretty much a spent force, and
has always been largely an ideology of the
intelligentsia. "Wahabbism," on the other hand, has
attracted, not the intelligentsia, but rural, poorly
educated, and very very poor people. In Uzbeksistan,
for instance, it is not (mainly) people in Tashkent --
which is educated, cosmopolitan, and affluent by the
standards of Central Asia -- but the people who live
in villages.

Let's use Chechnya, as it is the quintessential
example. Who supported the nationalists and, later,
the "Wahabbis"? It was not the Chechen intelligentsia,
who fled en masse from 1991-1996 and no live mostly in
Moscow and St. Petersburg. Nor was it the plains
Chechens, who are more urbanized and de-tribalized,
had more access to education and income from the oil
industry, and are historically more-or-less
pro-Russian. The people who supported them were mostly
mountain Chechens, who live by farming, are largely
uneducated (especially today, given 10 years of
conflict), base their lives around their teip
membership, and are very poor. They were the ones to
whom the ideas of "Chechen exceptionalism" and later
"Wahabbism" appealed. 

(By "Chechen exceptionalism" I mean the idea,
expressed by Nukhayev and others, that Chechens,
uniquely out of all the Caucasian peoples, have the
capability to form an independent state without
Russia. This is because, so the ideology goes, the
Chechens are historically alien to civilization and
therefore can do without the blandishments of cities,
electricity and so forth that are only possible with
the assistance that Moscow can provide. Later this
became transformed into the idea that the Chechens --
as the numerically largest Caucasian people and the
only ones who have remained true to their roots -- are
destined to lead the Caucasus, by force if need be,
back to the premodern ways of their ancestors.)

On
> the other hand, I also tend to theorize and hope for
> some supergroupings that can reconcile differences,
> find commonalities. If, for example, western
> Trinitarian Christianity, its proponents and
> believers, could come to recognize Islam as the
> major line of evolution of NON-TRINITARIAN branch of
> CHRISTIANITY, might they come to see that there is
> more in common than in conflict?

I agree with you.

> 
> BTW, even Russians cite the 'destructive' influence
> of the West.  

That depends on which Russians -- certainly today the
pro-Western forces in Russia are in serious decline
(they are associated with the Yeltsin era, selling out
the country's interests, etc.).
> 
> Well, that's a nice little leap of 'therefore', but
> I'm not sure I can make it. The Uzbek vs. Tajik
> dichotomy is one largely created by Russian dominion
> over the region, and they are basically,
> linguistically speaking, Turks. 

Uzbek is a Turkish language. Tajik is Persian,
although yes they were Turkified because of the
invasion of the Khans. Tajikistan, unless I am wrong,
has only had one experience of statehood before 1991
-- the 10th-century Perso-Arabic Samanid empire.
Uzbekistan experienced statehood from the 1500s until
the fell to Russia around 1850. The people who are now
the Uzbeks subjugated many of the Tajiks in the 1500s
and created vassal states, if I am not mistaken. So
the Uzbek-Tajik dichotomy precedes their assimilation
into the Russian Empire. Tajikistan is also largely
rural and tribal -- the tribes can't even decide on a
single anthem they all like -- and is almost a classic
example of a failed state. Uzbekistan has a large
educated, urban population and is a nominally
functioning state. So there are big differences
between them.

Both republics were kicked out of the USSR. They did
not want to leave.

> 
> Also, the US wanted Turkey to assert influence in
> the region to offset Russian and Iranian power, but
> then also worried about fundamentalists in Turkey
> asserting too much power. Now the US even has
> military bases in the region, while Turkey's
> government  is more keen on getting into the EU and
> pursuing a European future.

I have heard a great deal of speculation about
Turkey's role in the region, but little hard data. Do
you have anything handy?



		
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