[lbo-talk] Re: techno terror vs humans

C. G. Estabrook galliher at uiuc.edu
Thu Aug 25 14:52:02 PDT 2005


But Iraq is far more important to the USG than Vietnam ever was. Vietnam was a demonstration war, and Indochina per se had little real value for the US. Nevertheless the US fielded an expeditionary force four times as large as the one in Iraq, for many more years, and murdered correspondingly many more people.

Iraq has oil, and control of Mideast oil has been the cornerstone of US foreign policy for generations. The major war aim has been to establish secure bases in the midst of the world's greatest energy-producing region, and the US simply won't give that up. There's a long way to go before we can say the war is lost, even if the US doesn't attain its maximal aims soon, or at all. --CGE

---- Original message ----
>Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2005 17:04:08 -0400
>From: Dwayne Monroe <idoru345 at yahoo.com>
>...
>Using Chomsky's definition of "win" in the Vietnam case --
that is, the
>accomplishment of most strategic and policy objectives even
after
>failure to achieve the "maximal" objective of complete
control -- and
>applying it to Iraq, we can project a far better than fifty
percent
>chance that the US has lost or will lose in this instance.
>
>Although the precise details of the Bush admin's goals
remain, in some
>quarters, a topic of flame broiling debate (perhaps even
within the
>corridors of the White House and the Pentagon) we can infer
from the
>available evidence -- speeches, position papers, PNAC stuff,
actual, on
>the ground behaviors, etc -- that the establishment of bases,
control of
>Iraqi politics and economics and the creation of a gigantic
pivot point
>for ME regional "power projection" were surely on the list.
>
>But there are exquisite complications.
>
>
>Current moves of even former shadow puppets such as Allawi
and Talabani
>towards Iran, the pressing demands of the Kurds for things
that do not
>necessarily serve Washington's interests or integrate with
its goals,
>the rise of al Sistani and Shia power, the rise of al Sadr
and the Shia
>poor, the deadly, ruthless efficiency of the Sunni
insurgency, the
>immense, globally observed object lesson of US incompetence in
>neutralizing a lesser equipped force, the persistent failure
to reliably
>establish power, medical and other services -- among other
factors -- do
>not appear to add up to a strategic win of any sort.
>
>It doesn't seem to me, from a review of available information
to-date,
>that this time, Washington will be able to enjoy a strategic
victory
>even as its military only accomplishes, at best, a "control
the ground
>we stand on" stalemate.
>
>I think both the "maximal" and the ancilliary objectives are
melting
>away, like ice in an oven, right before Washington's eyes.



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