Is suffering the only reasonable criterion for justifying or condemning human activity? If I say "we shouldn't violate a person's freedom", because I hold freedom to be a fundamental good, my argument is logically equivalent to the "avoid suffering" argument. I'm not trying to be obtuse; I'm just trying to understand why the avoidance of suffering must be the paramount criterion for determining moral behavior. Saying "it's obvious" or "it's common intuition" isn't a satisfying answer to me.
> Leave that aside, consider this scenario:
> experiments on a few short "people" are crucial to the
> development of a medical intervention that will save
> the life of millions of ill heighted people. By the
> principle of reducing suffering, wouldn't you and
> Singer be logically compelled to support the midget
> research?
I'm not a utilitarian, but isn't your question a valid moral question for a utilitarian? If you're not willing to do the experiments with the short people to reduce suffering for millions, you're not really a utilitarian, are you? (I guess the example you raise emphasizes my point: for most of us, there is more to moral decisions than a simple calculation of total suffering avoided or happiness gained! --And thus back to my questions about using "avoidance of suffering" as a moral justification for vegetarianism.)
Miles