I didn't see the movie yet, heard much about it (it played not too long ago at the Cinemateque in Tel-Aviv I know).
But a couple general things about this discussion:
- When examining the phenomenon of suicide bombings, it is important to realize that the timing of the attacks and target audience are often not specifically what you would expect. Often, these attacks have more to do with intra-Palestinian rivalry, among the various Palestinian factions positioning themselves vis-a-vis the Palestinian public.
- Palestinian non-violent protest, often done jointly with anti-occupation Israelis and internationals, is going on daily. And while this type of protest has become much more prominant of late, Palestinians such as Mubarak Awad have promoted non-violent action as early as the mid 1980's, when he established the "Palestinian Center for the Study of Non-violence." He was expelled from Palestine/Israel in 1988 by the Israeli authorities for his actions. But, in general, the great majority of actions against the Occupation are non-violent, usually individual or protest by a couple hundred at most. The first and second Intifada were in large part, non-violent protests.
- However, it must be admitted that the non-violent anti-Wall protests such as take place in Bi'lin and Aboud, though they in fact get the greatest coverage in the Western media and considered emblematic among the international left, are considered peripheral within Palestinian society in general.
- Suicide bombings are nothing but well-wrapped gifts for the hardline Israeli military and political officials to justify a continuation of the Occupation and portrayal of the Palestinian citizens of Israel as a fifth column. That isn't to say that the Israeli officals wouldn't attempt to portray the Palestinians as such otherwise, but the attacks make it just that much easier.
Ed Wrote:
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> This may sound wrong but in sheer terms of nationalist goals it <i>does</i> in fact seem effective. Lebanon and Gaza, home of Hezbollah and Hamas respectively, got free (sort of).
-These are not really analogous situations. You have to differentiate between Lebanon and Gaza, on the one hand, and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) on the other hand. I use Judea and Samaria for a point. Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon and Gaza were considered purely strategic security issues by the great majority of the Israeli establishment and population. There is little religio-nationalist investment in these territories outside of a small minority of Israeli extremists. Sharon made a purely pragmatic choice in redeploying from Gaza (as Barak did in S. Lebanon). Sharon gave up the Gaza Strip no one wanted, in order to solidify the control over the West Bank, considered of much more importance for ideological, as well as strategic and resource concerns (especially the issue of the water aquifers). Many more Israelis feel a historical/religious/nationalist, etc., connection to the West Bank, and though polls seem to show that the majority of Israelis would be willing to cede these territories, it isn’t the same situation as you had in Gaza or Lebanon.
Moreover, I am not so sure how large the influence of Palestinian anti-Occupation activity in Gaza actually contributed to the decision to redeploy from Gaza. I think that international pressure on Israel to do SOMETHING was much more influential than any Palestinian attacks, be they on soldiers or settlers within Gaza or in Tel Aviv, Netanya or Jerusalem.
Sharon saw the need to make some substantial yet symbolic move, after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the Wall, plus US pressure for Sharon to do something so that Bush could show some seemingly substantial accomplishment in the region. That, plus the internal Israeli complaints about the money going to the settlements, and somewhat the conscientious objectors. But, it is my understanding that the government, military and Israeli population would be willing to have continued paying the price of occupation if it weren’t for the international pressures.
A rise in suicide bombings is likely to entrench the Israeli public and play into the hands of the Israeli hard liners, and, at the same time, squelch international (at least make them more reluctant to do it explicitly) pressure on Israel to make serious concessions and give up the Occupation (when I speak of occupation in this sense, I am only speaking of the post-67 territories, and this isn’t to mean that I don’t recognize the Naqba, etc.).
While I wouldn’t say that this was the case before the first Intifada, and even into the second perhaps, now there has been a shift on the international scene, and the Palestinian cause has become (as far as I can see) an integral part of the global anti-War, anti-occupation, left/progressive, etc. agenda.
Not speaking here about ethics/morality etc., but purely from my understanding of pragmatic effectiveness: From my knowledge of the Israeli public and the strength of the Israeli political and military machine, their Achilles heel is not any form of violent attack, which merely feeds into their propaganda machine and which they have adequate resources to reply with. No, Israel’s Achilles heel would be mass non-violent action from the Palestinians, mass like haven’t been seen before (for instance, off the top of my head, every Palestinian woman more than 40 years of age from the Bethlehem region, begins marching towards the new Bethlehem checkpoint in the Wall, dividing it from Jerusalem…just keep on walking and only women…if it was mass enough, Israel would have no way to combat it….and if they block them once, they go again and again…and if the military did use violent means to stop them, it would only play against the Israelis. It would cause an international uproar, and even within Israel.) Obviously, Israel would try to plant people in the crowd to instigate violence, but they have been caught before, and it would just double the embarrassment and uproar against Israeli actions.
This, plus a real international movement of divestment, sanctions, and calls for implementation of the ICJ advisory opinion.
Bryan