You disagree with the jury, that's your privilege. People disagree about OJ too. The jury heard the evidence, you didn't. Was the jury crazy to believe that the evidence was enough -- the standard, roughly, for constitutionally insuffient evidence? I don't think so.
For example, given the rest of the context, and not depending in Salem's testimony:
> * While building the World Trade Center bomb, the
> builders kept in
> close phone contact . . . Rahman.
Not sufficient by itself, but what do you think they were talking about in these calls with a man who made public statements calling for violence against the US? And whom, there was testimony, was giving instructions to kill foreign leaders and plan to attack US targets?
I don't discount Salem. Lots of informants are notorious liars and some of them are paid a lot of money. Some of them are real scumbags. The defense usually brings that out and sees if it convinces the jury that the informant isn't credible. Sometimes it works.
You wouldn't convict on the total evidence, but I think it is fair to say you wouldn't convict an avowed enemy of the US if he were caught with a smoking gun.
You say the case is "weak" -- I'm no expert on terrorism cases, but I do know what complex criminal conspiracies look like, and the evidence in this case is no worse than any number I've seen -- and even handled.
I'd represent the Sheik, or any criminal defendant, but you can't say he was denied due process or that the verdict is an obvious miscarriage of justice. Personally, I find it persuasive.
I don't think this is a particularly good test case for the limits of protected political speech. Stewart is a much better case.
jks
> >society.
>
> That is the US government's charge against Sheik
> Omar Abdel Rahman.
> The government successfully convinced the jury in
> the United States
> District Court for the Southern District of New York
> -- hence
> Rahman's conviction -- and the Second Circuit
> judges, but the
> government's case is weak.
>
> Here are the basic charges against Rahman: "The
> defendants were
> convicted of the following: seditious conspiracy
> (all defendants);
> soliciting the murder of Egyptian President Hosni
> Mubarak and
> soliciting an attack on American military
> installations (Rahman);
> conspiracy to murder Mubarak (Rahman)" (at
> <http://www.mipt.org/usvrahman2cir081997.asp>). It
> is clear that
> Rahman thought that it would be justified to wage
> war against
> oppressors, but did his speech in fact constitute
> solicitation and
> conspiracy to murder Mubarak and seditious
> conspiracy against the
> United States, Egypt, or Israel? Or was he merely
> stating his
> religious, political, and philosophical opinion
> regarding what a just
> war is and how to wage it?
>
> Let's take a look at what the government says Rahman
> said and did,
> based on the Second Circuit's summary of facts (at
> <http://www.mipt.org/usvrahman2cir081997.asp>),
> keeping in our mind
> that Emad Salem is a notorious liar who "received
> more than $1
> million for his services as an FBI informer"
> (Maurice Williams, "Bomb
> Trial Suspects Railroaded To Prison," <em>The
> Militant</em> 59.38, <a
>
href="http://themilitant.com/1995/5938/5938_10.html">October
> 16,
> 1995</a>):
>
> * As a result of these contacts, Salem traveled to
> Detroit with
> Rahman and others to attend a conference on the
> Islamic economy.
> During this trip, Salem, seeking to ingratiate
> himself to Rahman,
> informed Rahman of his prior service in the Egyptian
> military during
> the 1973 conflict with Israel. Rahman told Salem
> that this was not
> jihad because he had been paid to fight by an
> infidel government.
> Rahman also told Salem that he could make up for
> this, however, by
> assassinating Mubarak, a "loyal dog to the
> Americans." Tr. 4633-34.
>
> * By early 1992, Rahman had also welcomed Salem into
> the group.
> Rahman specifically praised Salem for attempting to
> restart
> paramilitary training with the group, noting that
> there would come a
> day when the training would be needed.
>
> * As Siddig Ali later explained to Salem, the
> training was meant to
> prepare the trainees for jihad wherever it was
> needed. During
> training, Siddig Ali reported to Rahman, and Rahman
> offered his
> insights into the training.
>
> * Rahman was making numerous calls to overseas
> numbers, including a
> Pakistan number which Yousef had inscribed in a bomb
> making pamphlet.
> Rahman, Salameh, and Yousef also made several calls
> to the same
> number in Pakistan in November.
>
> * In January 1993, Rahman appeared at a conference
> in Brooklyn, and
> voiced his beliefs in violent jihad. Rahman further
> stated that being
> called terrorists was fine, so long as they were
> terrorizing the
> enemies of Islam, the foremost of which was the
> United States and its
> allies.
>
> * While building the World Trade Center bomb, the
> builders kept in
> close phone contact with El-Gabrowny and Rahman.
> Salameh and Yousef
> repeatedly called El-Gabrowny at home and at the Abu
> Bakr Mosque and
> Rahman at home.
>
> * After contemplating bombing a U.S. armory, Siddig
> Ali proposed
> bombing the United Nations complex. When initially
> discussing this
> plan with Salem, he stated that Rahman had approved
> the attack on the
> United Nations, and had called it not merely
> permissible, but a
> "must" and a "duty."
>
> * Taking Siddig Ali up on his earlier invitation,
> Salem had a private
> conversation with Rahman on the night of May 23,
> 1993. At the bidding
> of Siddig Ali, Salem began the conversation by
> pledging allegiance to
> Rahman. Salem then told Rahman that he and Siddig
> Ali were planning
> to "do a job." Govt. Ex. 311T at 3. Salem explicitly
> asked Rahman
> about the United Nations. Rahman replied that
> bombing the United
> Nations was "not illicit, however will be bad for
> Muslims." Id. at
> 6-7. Rahman instead told Salem to "Find a plan, find
> a plan . . . to
> inflict damage on the American army itself." Id.
> Salem then asked
> about a strike on the FBI headquarters in New York.
> Rahman told him
> to "wait for a while," and to "plan carefully." Id.
> at 7.
>
> * Salem recounted this conversation to Siddig Ali,
> who stated that
> when he had discussed the United Nations issue with
> Rahman, Rahman
> had been in favor of the plan. Subsequently, in
> discussing the plan
> to bomb the United Nations with Hampton-El, Siddig
> Ali told him that
> he had received an "official fatwa" from Rahman
> regarding the plan.
> Govt. Ex. 315T at 7-9. Siddig Ali also told
> Khallafalla and Amir
> Abdelgani the same thing, stating the Rahman's
> approval was necessary
> whenever one did something "basically unlawful,"
> which would be wrong
> unless the "mission [was] under the flag of God and
> his messenger."
> Govt. Ex. 320T at 7-9.
>
> * As a result of the failure of the plan to execute
> Mubarak, there
> was some speculation by members of the group that
> Siddig Ali was an
> informer. Siddig Ali and Salem conversed one day
> with Rahman about
> the issue. Rahman voiced his suspicions that Siddig
> Ali was the
> informer. Ironically, Salem secretly tape recorded
> this conversation
> for the Government. During the conversation, Rahman
> revealed that
> Abouhalima, one of the World Trade Center bombers,
> was supposed to
>
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