Political views of defense counsels ought to be irrelevant to trials. Making much of attorneys' own political views, especially when the views in question are sharply at odds with the government's, is an element in state repression of political oppositions, as it was in the age of what is called McCarthyism:
<blockquote>Lawyers were particularly affected, especially those who defended people in anti-Communist proceedings. Whatever their own political beliefs, such lawyers were perceived as sharing those of their clients. Of course, some attorneys were or had been Communists. Like other middle-class professionals, many lawyers had been attracted to the party during the 1930s and 1940s. Many of them belonged to the cohort of talented liberal and left-wing attorneys who had staffed the New Deal agencies or worked with the CIO. By the late 1940s most them had left the government and the mainstream unions and were trying to establish themselves in private practice. The few members of the legal profession willing to handle the cases of Communists suffered economically. Their other clients, fearful of being stigmatized by attorneys who were publicly identified with the national enemy, went elsewhere. The political dissidents, deportees, and left-led unions that provided the core of their business were usually too forced major revisions in the port security program, for example. Insolvent to pay much, if anything.
Worse than the loss of clients and income was the possibility that defending the party might land them in jail or get them disbarred. The lawyers who represented the Dennis defendants were not the only attorneys to be charged with contempt of court as the result of their efforts during a Communist trial. Nor were they the only lawyers threatened with disbarment because of their politics. As the testimony of a Bay Area attorney reveals, the problems such lawyers faced made it particularly difficult for the protagonists in anti-Communist proceedings to find legal representation, especially if they did not want a known left-winger. Some of the defendants in the second round of Smith Act trials were rejected by more than two hundred attorneys.
Unlike the academic world and film industry, which were under outside pressure, the legal profession undertook to oust its tainted members on its own. The initiatives came from conservative attorneys associated with the anti-Communist network. The American Bar Association (ABA) set up a Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy, and Objectives to ensure that alleged subversives did not penetrate the legal profession. The association also adopted resolutions against allowing Communists and, later, Fifth Amendment witnesses to practice law. These resolutions, coming as they did from the organized voice of a highly respected profession, carried considerable weight. To implement them, national and local bar associations worked closely with HUAC, the FBI, and the rest of the anti-Communist network to screen applicants and begin disbarment proceedings against the more radical members. Few succeeded.
Important members of the legal establishment (and not just the targeted attorneys) opposed these ousters. After all, lawyers did have a traditional commitment to and understanding of civil liberties, as well as a professional responsibility to represent all types of clients. By the mid-1950s some eminent lawyers were concerned about protecting the public's right to counsel and refused to countenance political disbarments. Even more important, in a few instances local bar associations and attorneys from major law firms in cities like Philadelphia, Denver, and Cleveland had begun to take on Communist cases. Such gestures, coming from leading members of the bar, contributed to the lessening of the McCarthyist furor--even if they did not necessarily win their clients' acquittal. (Ellen Schrecker, The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents, Boston: St. Martin's Press, <http://www.english.uiuc.edu/maps/mccarthy/schrecker5.htm>, 1994)</blockquote>
Also, Lynne Stewart's view in question is a protected belief that is held by many and has been "shared at various times by the English, French, Israelis, and maybe the Americans," especially government officials, as Michael Tigar noted:
<blockquote>Finally, Lynne Stewart could very well share the view, held by many, 60 that the government of Egypt is repressive and should be replaced with one more attuned to the Egyptian people's will, even if the majority of Egyptians want a government based on Islamic principles. 61 Wanting to overthrow the government of Egypt is a desire that has been shared at various times by the English, French, Israelis, and maybe the Americans. As we pointed out at the June 13, 2003 hearing, the United States Department of State has concluded that governmental change in Egypt cannot occur by democratic means. 62 Lynne Stewart might also share the view, again held by many, that the process of change in Egypt will inevitably involve bloodshed, not because those seeking change want it but because the Egyptian security services have proven to be so irresponsibly violent. See Human Rights Watch, _Egypt: Hostage-Taking and Intimidation by Security Forces (Summary)_, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Jan. 1995) _available at_ http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Egypt.htm (Reply Decl. Exh. D). Ms. Stewart might even believe that if Sheikh Abdel Rahman were released from confinement he would become a spiritual leader of positive social change in Egypt. These protected and permissible beliefs are within the literal reach of the statute as applied in this indictment.
60 See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, _Egypt: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 1999_ (Feb. 23, 2000), _available at_ http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/408pf.htm (Reply Decl. Exh. A); Human Rights Watch, _Egypt: Trials of Civilians in Military Courts Violate International Law; Executions Continue, No Appeal of Death Sentences to Higher Court_, vol. 5, issue 3 (Jul. 1993), _available at_ http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/egypt (Reply Decl. Exh. C). 61 Secretary of State Colin Powell recently met with Egypt's intelligence chief Omar Suleiman to discuss concerns over human rights in Egypt. U.S. Department of State, State Department Noon Briefing, (Dec. 11, 2003), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/texts/03121102.htm. 62 Mtn. Tr. At 14-15.
("Motion to Dismiss and Memo of Support," filed on January 23, 2004, <http://www.lynnestewart.org/StewartMtnDismissMemoSupport.pdf>, pp. 44-45)</blockquote>
As a matter of fact, Rahman's view was regarded favorably by the US government (for which I presented evidence: Robert I. Friedman, "The CIA and the Sheik," _The Village Voice_, March 30, 1993; and Stanley Reed, "The Battle for Egypt," _Foreign Affairs_, September-October, 1993 [at <http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/pipermail/lbo-talk/Week-of-Mon-20050221/003838.html>]), not only during the US-Soviet struggle over Afghanistan but well beyond that period in history. Here is another intriguing piece of forgotten news:
<blockquote>During his visit last week to Egypt that took place in a highly charged diplomatic climate CIA director James Woolsey strongly "encouraged" president Hosni Mubarak to start talking with Egypt's Moslem Brotherhood. Woolsey believes the government cannot pursue a policy based exclusively on repression and that resuming contacts with the Brotherhood, considered as moderate Islamists, could pull the rug from under extremist groups. Mubarak, who fired his powerful advisor, marshal Muhammad Abu Ghazala (IN 214) and interior minister Abdul Halim Mussa in March and April, 1993 because they were rightly suspected of wanting to negotiate with the Brotherhood, failed singularly to appreciate Woolsey's advice. He reminded the U.S. official that Washington had still not extradited sheik Omar Abdul Rahman who is wanted by Egypt. He also asked that the Americans cut off external funding for Islamist groups and appealed for additional training for Egyptian police. ("EGYPT: CIA Backs the 'Brothers,'" Intelligence Newsletter, December 15, 1994, Section: Services, No. 254)</blockquote>
>>Jurors can be pressured into supporting the government against
>>their own conscience: "The anonymous juror, referred to as No. 7,
>>could be seen wiping tears from her eyes as the verdict was read.
>>And when the individual members of the jury were asked if the
>>verdicts as announced by the foreman were accurate, the juror
>>looked stricken, and twice only mouthed the word 'yes'" It's clear
>>that convicting Lynne Stewart and her co-defendants conflicted with
>>some jurors' consciences.
>
>That doesn't indicate pressure. It's actually expected given they
>were deliberating for weeks. It was obviously a hard decision and
>they no doubt felt that even if the law said one thing, they didn't
>like convicting Stewart under it. But none of this makes the jury
>process necessarily suspect; my point on the case is that's it's a
>tough call for a lot of good progressive folks, and accusing anyone
>who doesn't jump up in Stewart's defense as a rightwinger/Horowitz
>type is being dumb. It's not a good poster child case for that
>reason, since a lot of people will feel she did something wrong,
>even if the sentence may be too harsh.
Some jurors at the very least didn't think that what Stewart did constituted material support for terrorism and merited the punishments of disbarment and 20-plus years in prison.
Moreover, Special Administrative Measures and the way Department of Justice defines the scope of "legal representation" curtail the protection provided by the Sixth Amendment.
<blockquote>Under a set of regulations called Special Administrative Measures (SAM), some incarcerated persons are forbidden from communicating not only with the outside world, but also with their lawyers on any topic that DOJ deems to be outside the scope of "legal representation."
What is outside the scope of legal representation? No one knows, and the DOJ is not saying, as the SAM's are vaguely worded. But attorneys are not only allowed, but also duty-bound to provide broad services to their clients, as advisor, counselor, and intermediary between the client and the government.
According to Rule 1.2 of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers have a duty to render "candid" advice not only about the law, but also about "economic, social, and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation." (Elaine Cassel, "When Representing An Accused Terrorist Can Mean The Lawyer Risks Jail, Too," <http://writ.news.findlaw.com/cassel/20021008.html>, October 8, 2002)</blockquote>
Defendants and convicts can still have access to lawyers, but only if lawyers serve the government's interest first and their clients' interest second. -- Yoshie
* Critical Montages: <http://montages.blogspot.com/> * Greens for Nader: <http://greensfornader.net/> * Bring Them Home Now! <http://www.bringthemhomenow.org/> * OSU-GESO: <http://www.osu-geso.org/> * Calendars of Events in Columbus: <http://sif.org.ohio-state.edu/calendar.html>, <http://www.freepress.org/calendar.php>, & <http://www.cpanews.org/> * Student International Forum: <http://sif.org.ohio-state.edu/> * Committee for Justice in Palestine: <http://www.osudivest.org/> * Al-Awda-Ohio: <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Al-Awda-Ohio> * Solidarity: <http://www.solidarity-us.org/>