Monday, Feb 14, 2005
Russia's foreign policy challenges
By Dmitry Kosyrev
Russia has not yet learnt to convert its economic successes into political influence abroad.
AT LEAST two critical sets of problems for Russia's foreign policy this year are also in India's sphere of interests or geographically close to it: Iran and Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan.
Both knots relate to the situation in which Russian diplomacy found itself last winter — that of a sudden challenge, if not the need to defend itself against a surprise attack. This was particularly sensed in relations with Europe, and, to a lesser degree, with the United States.
Russia has no problems with Iran. But this country remains the main apple of discord between Moscow and Washington, which has been noticeable in all recent contacts between the Russian and American leaderships. Of course, American accusations that Iran sponsors terrorism and is developing nuclear weapons are of a kind with the charges levelled against Iraq and since proved false. America faces the problem of, without losing face, catching up with the Europeans, Russians, Indians and others for whom Iran is a partner. Russia must find out how to help America solve the issue without Iran turning into the next Iraq. The challenge for Russia is avoiding conflict with the U.S. while protecting its own economic and political interests in Iran and the Middle East, and South Asia, interests that coincide with India's.
Central Asia poses a slightly different challenge. With anti-Russia forces coming to power in Georgia and Ukraine (which remain economically tethered to Russia), Moscow wants to ensure that the experience of the "street" seizing power is not repeated on another flank. This concern could be seen from its nervous response to events around the elections in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in late February.
An "orange revolution" in a Muslim state could lead to chaos and a threat to the stability of a whole region that is important for Russia. The problem is how Russia can join forces with its allies (China, India and others) not so much to maintain the current regimes in Central Asia as to set up viable political systems there that can guarantee peace and development. This should be done to pre-empt American or European "fans of freedom."
Putting forward an alternative to Western recipes for political arrangements in Asia is no laughing matter. In other words, Moscow's Asia policy is unexpectedly both a continuation and a reflection of its European-American policy. In both cases, not only Russia but also its neighbours will have to display diplomatic adroitness and toughness at one and the same time to protect their interests. Russia's foreign policy in the past few months has made this absolutely clear. It has demonstrated both its strength and weakness. A remarkable episode occurred during a recent news conference held by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. "We have reached a level of trust when we can ask each other all sorts of questions and get answers to them," was how the Minister responded to questions about frequent criticism rebounding between Moscow and Washington. Yes, hitting the right tone in dialogue with the most influential power in the world and maintaining it is an achievement. But how necessar
y is it? Herein lies one of the key problems of the foreign policy of a country with most of its territory in Asia, and most of its population in Europe, a country that has retained the status of the world's second-largest nuclear power and is quickly regaining its economic might, but has to work against great odds to claim a global role that corresponds to the vision of the Russian voters.
Many of Moscow foreign policy's complications are rooted in the fact that Russia and its electorate not only want to but potentially can play an independent role in the world, the role of a power forming the global order. On top of anything else, this struggle for a place of honour on the world stage is on in an unprecedented epoch — of change that is bound to realign all forces. New powers, first China and then India, will come to the fore in the world economy and then the polity in the next few years. Experts, including those from Goldman and Sachs or the authors of a recent CIA report, are debating who will follow. Some name Brazil and Russia, others Indonesia.
And while, for example, the European Union as a whole and European powers individually lack the flexibility and freedom to choose options — thereby meaning they statically watch novices ascend and then adapt themselves to these changes — Russia is in a different position. This position is both more enviable and more complex. Russia's geographical range, rapid economic growth, and much else are tempting it with a multitude of choices in foreign policy. But this is an extremely hard game to play, and creates complications both at home and abroad.
The key factor here is the country's limited potential. Russia has only just understood that its role in the world has changed. "A steadily growing economy no doubt boosts Russia's international standing," Mr. Lavrov said at the same news conference. "Today we have more scope for developing not only political dialogue with other countries, but also bolstering this dialogue with specific economic and investment cooperation projects."
The economic results of 2004 — economic growth posted more than 7 per cent — are impressive, although bureaucrats hoped for more and fear a slowdown this year.
On the one hand, the country's federal budget last year had a surplus of $25 billion, and the Stabilisation Fund — a reserve for future economic projects — was built up to about $20 billion. Last year, Russia, after cutting back its sovereign debt by one-third since 1999, increased its gold and hard currency reserves by nearly 70 per cent (they are approaching the $120 billion mark). Such record figures were not reported even in the Soviet era.
Lastly, the International Monetary Fund debt was paid off in late January. Now Russia is free to become a creditor itself within the IMF, attracting all the classic accusations of the organisation's debtors.
However, its gross domestic product, which amounted to about $613 billion, was too dependent on oil exports. The country has become wealthier, its per capita GDP has risen to $4,000, but it has failed to become a large world exporter in anything but oil and gas. Moscow's export and foreign trade potentialities are so far centred on energy — oil and gas supplies and construction of conventional and nuclear power plants — and also include potential for the export of military and civilian technologies. This is an improvement on the past, but not enough for a key role in the world.
This is why too many of Russia's foreign policy successes are ephemeral. Yes, the ability to talk to America and other powers as their equal is an achievement, but it does not compensate for Russia's very small percentages of foreign trade with the U.S. and most other countries. It may be recalled that reciprocal caution displayed by the two main powers of our world — the U.S. and China — is based above all on the fact that their economies are interlinked, that by harming China economically, the U.S. would harm itself. This is not true of Russia — yet. Moreover, over the expanses of the former Soviet Union, where many countries depend on economic relations with Russia for survival, Russia is also experiencing setbacks, above all in Georgia and Ukraine. In other words, Russia has not yet learnt to convert its economic successes into political influence abroad.
The most interesting and successful changes in Russian foreign policy are taking place in Asia. "These countries want us to return to the region as a strong independent player," says a source in a delegation from the Federation Council (upper house of parliament) that recently came back from Vietnam and had talks with several Pacific countries. Asia also needs Russia as a supplier of energy to fuel the swift development of new world giants. Japan, China, South Korea, and India are jostling for Russian oil, something that was very much in evidence last year.
In addition, the ruling establishments and public in Asia see almost eye to eye with Moscow on political philosophy and on the global order. Asia is free from the main issue that has poisoned and continues to poison Moscow's relations with Europe, especially with the EU. Namely, that the Europeans are disappointed that the Russian public is not eager to learn from European values, and Russians are angered that the European public does not accept the idea of communicating on an equal footing with a nation that considers itself to be different from the Europeans and will stay that way. For Asia, differences between peoples, civilisations and political systems are quite an acceptable situation.
The question is: how can this spirit be converted into foreign policy achievements? Perhaps the key to success lies in the greater confidence of the Russian political class in its freedom, its strength, and the legitimacy and attainability of its goals.
(The writer is vice-president of the Foreign Policy Association, RIA Novosti political analyst.)
Copyright © 2005, The Hindu.